Illinois State University

ISU ReD: Research and eData
Theses and Dissertations
7-1-2021

Interrogating Digital Rhetorical Privacy on Direct-to-Consumer
Genetics Websites
Charles Fletcher Woods
Illinois State University, charles.woods2187@gmail.com

Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.library.illinoisstate.edu/etd

Recommended Citation
Woods, Charles Fletcher, "Interrogating Digital Rhetorical Privacy on Direct-to-Consumer Genetics
Websites" (2021). Theses and Dissertations. 1479.
https://ir.library.illinoisstate.edu/etd/1479

This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by ISU ReD: Research and eData. It has been accepted
for inclusion in Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of ISU ReD: Research and eData. For more
information, please contact ISUReD@ilstu.edu.

INTERROGATING DIGITAL RHETORICAL PRIVACY ON DIRECT-TO-CONSUMER
GENETICS WEBSITES

CHARLES WOODS
187 Pages
This dissertation uses an intersectional feminist methodology and digital rhetorical
analysis to examine data related to direct-to-consumer (DTC) genetics websites. This work seeks
to better understand how rhetorical power is distributed asymmetrically through the use of DTCgenetics and through the privacy policies which prescribe user actions on the sites. I detail and
advocate for digital rhetorical privacy (DRP), a state of being when a user is confidant their
digital data is free from unauthorized observances by nefarious computer technologies and other
users. Through analysis I demonstrate that using DTC-genetics technology for police
surveillance is an unethical action and a violation of DRP that perpetuates the white-supremacist
law enforcement infrastructure in America. Moreover, this dissertation further examines the
rhetoric of privacy policies for DTC-genetics companies to explain how they obfuscate critical
information, including the various potential uses of DNA data after it is collected and the
relationship between DTC-genetics companies and police agencies. This work positions privacy
policies as the dynamic rhetorical genre writing instructors can use to teach about the importance
of digital privacy in a socially-just society and introduces the Digital Privacy Collective as a
resource for instructors interested in these issues.
Chapter 1 provides an overview of the project and outline the research questions and
exigencies guiding it. In Chapter 2, I present a feminist methodology for interrogating DRP

which distinguishes and problematizes the affordances and constraints DRP has upon
intersectional experiences. In Chapter 3, I argue that using DTC-genetics for police surveillance
is unethical and perpetuates the oppression of marginalized and multiply-marginalized bodies,
particularly Black bodies, because it reorganizes power and creates an undesirable precedent.
Chapter 4 argues the privacy policies prescribing user actions on DTC-genetics websites
perpetuate asymmetrical power dynamics. This chapter seeks to understand the relationship
between DTC-genetics and law enforcement surveillance by interrogating the methods police use
to collect and circulate genetic material as well as the motivations of police in surveilling
marginalized communities. In Chapter 5, I argue instructors should incorporate instruction
related to DRP in the writing classroom. I highlight how DTC-genetics privacy policies are an
intriguing genre to incorporate in the teaching of writing because the biopolitical technology
creates tension in the shift from protecting information online to sharing it with other users. In
Chapter 6, I offer The Digital Privacy Collective (digitalprivacycollective.weebly.com) as an
interactive, coalitional resource featuring activities, assignments, and lesson plans with an
intersectional approach to teaching about DRP in writing classrooms.
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CHAPTER I: AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERROGATING DIGITAL RHETORICAL
PRIVACY ON GENEALOGY WEBSITES

When police officers in Sacramento, California, escorted Joseph James D’Angelo out of
the home he shared with his daughter and grandchild in April 2018 they revealed to the world the
identity of one of the most notorious serial offenders in American history: the Golden State
Killer.1 Like many high-profile arrests and situations involving police intervention the capture of
the Golden State Killer garnered significant media attention both domestically and abroad. This
attention occurred not only because numerous decades-long cases were solved but because police
also revealed they had repurposed direct-to-consumer (DTC) genetics technology as a
surveillance tool to identify the culprit.2 DTC-genetics technology is a biopolitical technology
marketed to consumers who seek to learn more about their genetic make-up, medical
information, or family history without the direct involvement of a licensed healthcare
professional. Police agencies around the country have integrated DTC-genetics technology to
solve cold cases in the three years since the arrest of the Golden State Killer, firmly cementing
the newfound surveillance and policing strategy as a part of the American law enforcement
surveillance apparatus.

1

Michelle McNamara’s book, I’ll Be Gone in the Dark: One Woman’s Obsessive Search for the Golden State

Killer, provides a provocative look into the way DNA impacted the case as well as the work of the network of
amateur sleuths who helped authorities identify the Visalia Ransacker, the East Area Rapist, and the Original Night
Stalker as the same perpetrator: the Golden State Killer.
2

Authorities in California used the DTC-genetics website GEDmatch to perform the genetic testing in the Golden

State Killer case.

1

The purpose of this project is to eliminate the use of DTC-genetics for police surveillance
as a way of dismantling the white-supremacist American law enforcement infrastructure. When
police used DTC-genetics to identify the Golden State Killer, they performed an unethical
search, which was also an egregious invasion of privacy. Make no mistake: the Golden State
Killer is a criminal who deserves to be prosecuted for his crimes under California law. Yet, the
surveillance strategies employed to identify him have long-lasting, far-reaching social,
economic, and political implications which need to be analyzed because America has a long
history of discriminatory policing strategies abetting its white-supremacist justice system.
Importantly, it was the physical manifestation of D’Angelo’s genetic profile that allowed him to
avoid capture for so long. His positionality as a presumably cishet, white male benefitted his
quest to avoid capture; he did not undergo systematic surveillance by law enforcement as people
of color do day-to-day. Indeed, the emerging industry of DNA technologies allows the police to
use DTC-genetics to surveil Black, Indigenous, and People of Color (BIPOC) U.S. citizens,
which extends the long history of oppression of BIPOC citizens in America.
DNA technologies are the processes by which geneticists working for private companies
and hospitals, and as criminologists for federal and local police agencies, use physical DNA
samples to connect family members, diagnose the potential for hereditary diseases, and identify
criminals (particularly in sexual assault cases). Katie Worth (2015) accurately and thoughtfully
details the history of DNA: from a scientific phenomenon in the 1950s inclined to explain human
existence to the double-helix mapping breakthrough to the first courtroom conviction using DNA
in 1987. Worth also focuses on recent cases where technological imperfection has significant,
inequitable implications for the lives of BIPOC citizens. For example, some people have spent

2

months in jail after their DNA appeared at a crime scene because of technician or criminologist
errors even if their culpability was impossible 3.
Some people have been convicted, imprisoned, and faced the death penalty because the
imperfection in DNA technology coupled with the white-supremacist justice system makes it an
effective technology to repurpose. Lauren Kirshner’s (2017) work directs attention to the lack of
oversight of the methods used by New York state medical examiner’s offices by critiquing the
office’s relationship with various law enforcement agencies working within the jurisdiction.
While the negligent conduct Kirschner details in the state of New York is a concentrated
example, it is emblematic of the critical problem of unethical surveillance and policing tactics
used by law enforcement agencies across America. Furthermore, DTC-genetics is the perfect
conduit for perpetuating unethical policing, incuding framing innocent people based on blantant
immorality or unconscious bias. As a result this is a social justice issue and “as neutrality is still
a matter of question, our work must continue” (Beck & Campos, 2020, p. 9). Eliminating the use
of DTC-genetics for police surveillance contends with collisions of power in American society in
hopes of replacing asymmetrical-power infrastructures and establishing digital privacy as a
foundational principle of a socially-just, equitable future.
This project uses an intersectional approach that relies on Black Feminist Thought (BFT).
In Black Feminist Thought: Knowledge, Consciousness, and the Politics of Empowerment,
Patricia Hill Collins (1990) describes the matrix of oppression (or matrix of domination) as a

3

Lukis Anderson spent 5 months in jail in California after his DNA was found at a murder scene. However,

Anderson, a homeless man at the time, was incapacitated at a local hospital during the crime. Ultimately, it was
figured that the same technician worked to get Anderson from the streets to the hospital and then worked the murder
scene, transporting Anderson’s DNA in the process.

3

way of understanding how different characteristics such as race, gender, and socioeconomic
status exist simultaneously and why power is distributed asymmetrically throughout society. In
this project, I take an intersectional feminist approach to interrogate asymmetrical power on
genealogy websites and am guided by the following research questions:

1)

What are the affordances of an intersectional feminist approach to researching and
enacting digital privacy? What are the constraints? What might such an approach
reveal about how individual users and users from marginalized groups might
adapt and repurpose genealogy website technology?

2)

What are the effects of privacy on individual users and non-users of genealogy
databases? How do the interactions which occur on these sites impact different
bodies across space, time, and geographic locations? How is privacy conceived on
these websites and in their privacy policies?

3)

In what ways are privacy policies constructed to relay information to users? How
is power prescribed (asymmetrically) among the privacy policy’s various
stakeholders? What rhetorical strategies are employed to help DTC-genetics
companies leverage their power and gain user trust in privacy policies? How does
design impact user consent to engage on DTC-genetics websites?

4)

What are the affordances and constraints of intersectional feminist rhetorical
approaches to teaching about digital privacy in rhetoric, composition, and
technical communication courses?

5)

What are the implications of this project on digital rhetorics? What are the
implications of this project on intersectional feminist approaches to DRP? How

4

can scholars and instructors extend the knowledge made in this project to
dismantle other oppressive systems?

In this dissertation, I build a case against American law enforcement using DTC-genetics
technologies as digital surveillance tools because both the technology and the police contribute
to the matrix of oppression in American society. I position privacy policies as a dynamic
rhetorical genre instructors can use to teach students about asymmetrical power relations, digital
privacy, and writing. I implement an intersectional feminist methodology (Crenshaw, 2017,
Collins & Bilge, 2020) throughout this project to interrogate what I describe as digital rhetorical
privacy (DRP) on a collection of DTC-genetics websites including Ancestry, 23andMe, and
MyHeritage. Particularly, this project examines their privacy policies and other Terms of Service
(ToS) documents. I define4 DRP as a state of being when a user is confidant their digital data is
free from unauthorized observances by nefarious computer technologies and other users.
Nefarious computer technologies are things like cookies, but (like privacy) the concept exist on a
continuum. Defining nefarious means looking at the data that is collected and how it is used. Is
the data collected generally available like your name (directory data), or is it metadata that
reveals your location (non-directory data)? Does the privacy policy make visible how data
collected is used? Importantly, DRP is unattainable when law enforcement agencies repurpose a
powerful biopolitical technology like DTC-genetics and implement it as a digital surveillance
tool.

4

Defining privacy4 is very difficult even though the Fourth Amendment4 to the U.S. Constitution remains a

foundational law in the country because people understand what privacy is, but have different ideas about what
constitutes it (Henderson, 2012, Kostios, 2015).

5

Recognizing Exigence and Kairos
Multiple exigencies 5 prompt the urgent need to reject and replace the current relationship
between the DTC-genetics industry and police departments. Ending this relationship leads to the
elimination of an unethical, oppressive policing strategy that marginalizes BIPOC citizens and
contributes to the white-supremacist American justice system. Furthermore, ending the use of
DTC-genetics for police surveillance curtails the power of the police—which is already
asymmetrically distributed with the police holding more power than citizens in American
society—including their abilities to repurpose powerful biopolitical technologies and implement
them as surveillance tools. As Troy Duster (2012) points out, “The government can and does
search your DNA—as we shall see—without any cause save arbitrary social and political forces
happened to turn up your DNA in a database” (p. 311). It is these unethical searches, these
invasions of DRP, this project works to counteract before DTC-genetics becomes even more
ingrained as a tool for policing and surveillance. In addition, this project is propelled by
intersecting personal, social, and academic exigencies.
Personal exigencies drive this project. I have never taken part in DTC-genetics testing,
and because I am a white man, I have never faced the intense scrutiny by the police BIPOC and
multiply-marginalized people face every day. However, I have contended with the asymmetrical
power and unethical strategies of the police and their impact on me and people close to me
throughout my life. Indeed, the police in America use their power to oppress certain bodies based
on race, but also based on numerous intersecting identity categories, among them gender and
socioeconomic status. As a person of low socioeconomic status trying to improve his status

5

Lloyd Bitzer (1968) defines exigence as “an imperfection marked by urgency; it is a defect, an obstacle, something

waiting to be done, a thing which is other than it should be” (p. 6).

6

through education, I consider dismantling the white-supremacist American law enforcement and
justice systems critical to my own sense of self, as well as to my work as a scholar of rhetoric,
composition, and technical communication.
If law enforcement agencies continue to harness the power of DTC-genetics for digital
surveillance, then mass incarceration in America will continue to increase. The elimination of an
unethical policing strategy that perpetuates oppression is necessary—because it impacts a large
portion of U.S. society, if not all of it. Scholars can consider oppressive strategies like racial
profiling and DNA dragnets as well as more complex structures like Jim Crow Laws, the War on
Drugs, and the School to Prison Pipeline to better understand how racist policing and
surveillance strategies form the cornerstone of the American criminal justice system. In, The
New Jim Crow: Mass Incarceration in the Age of Colorblindness, Michelle Alexander (2010)
explains that mass incarceration 6 in America is the new Jim Crow, a new form of societal control
born out of the U.S. civil rights movement in the middle of the twentieth century. Furthermore,
this increase will occur not because guilty criminals are identified and arrested but because
police will inevitably purposefully use this technology in ways that oppress certain people
because oppression is inherent to the technology. Therefore, it is the responsibility of individuals
and members of budding coalitions to work to eliminate this oppression.

6

According to a March 2021 report from the Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS), Black people are incarcerated at a

rate more than 3 times the rate of white people.

7

Furthermore, Critical Race Theory (CRT) continues to be under attack by former
President Donald Trump and conservative and alt-right social and political figures, as well as
administrators in higher education. Importantly, the assault on CRT is much more than a handful
of critiques by influential white men. It is a calculated attempt to systematically root
misconception and doubt about the racial history of America within every corner of society and
across every discipline of the university. 7 That means to do this work responsibly means it must
account for the inequities of Black people and the law in America, and it must amplify their
experiences, perspectives, and voices. Therefore, this project seeks to specifically recognize,
reveal, reject, and replace (Walton, Moore, & Jones, 2019) the use of DTC-genetics for law
enforcement surveillance because this method of policing perpetuates America’s whitesupremacist culture.
Now is the opportune moment to perform this research because America is facing a
revolution concerning how policing is perceived in the country. Furthermore, the DTC-genetics
industry is projected to grow almost 20% in the next five years (BioSpace, 2021). Therefore, this
project is prescient as it thoroughly and thoughtfully examines a powerful biopolitical
technology at the crux of its emergence in American society against the backdrop of the
revolution against long-standing and current policing standards in the U.S. Thus, analysis in this
project takes an intersectional, anti-racist approach that counteracts the effects of racism in

7

In 2021, Nicole Hannah-Jones, founder of The 1619 Project, was denied a tenure-track offer at the University of

North Carolina at Chapel Hill based on the opinion of an influential white donor. Hannah-Jones’s situation drew
national attention and prompted questions about how donors influence educational curriculums, particularly those
which abet white supremacy. Ultimately, Hannah-Jones accepted a position at Howard University, a HBCU.

8

pursuit of a just and egalitarian society (Condon & Young, 2013).8 As chants to “Defund The
Police” ring out from Black Lives Matter rallies from Minneapolis 9 to Louisville10 and major
cities across the country we can harness our own power as individuals, and as part of a coalition,
to force an end to the use of DTC-genetics for police surveillance.
The rise in genetic technology for consumption by the general populous is a relatively
new phenomenon. Between 1990 and 2003, The Human Genome Project gained popularity as an
international, coalitional effort by scientists around the world to map the entire sequence of the
human genome. The collision of the emerging popularity of genetics and genealogy with the
expansion of Internet in the late 1990s led to sites like Ancestry, which debuted in 1996.
23andMe followed in 2006 and today sites like FamilySearch, MyHeritage, and Heritage Quest
Online, as well as companies like Helix, Laboratory Corporation of America, Nebula Genomics,
and Quest Diagnostics, provide their DTC-genetics and genealogy services to millions of users.11

8

Frankie Condon and Vershawn Ashanti Young (2017) expand their original arguments about anti-racist pedagogy

in the book Performing Antiracist Pedagogy in Rhetoric, Writing, and Communication.
9

George Floyd was murdered by former Minneapolis police officer Derek Chauvin via an illegal choke hold on

May 23, 2020. Chauvin placed his knee on Floyd’s neck for over 8 minutes after Floyd attempted to pass counterfeit
$20 at a convenience store. On April 20, 2021, Chauvin became the first white police officer convicted of murdering
a Black person in America.
10

Breonna Taylor was murdered by police officers in Louisville, Kentucky serving an unethical no-knock warrant

on March 13, 2020. In September 2020, a Grand Jury in Kentucky declined to charge any of the four officers
responsible for Taylor’s death with murder.
11

In February 2019, 26 million DNA kits had been sold across the industry (Bursztynsky, 2019). In 2020, Ancestry

revealed they alone had sold 30 million DNA kits.

9

As mentioned above, projected growth for the DTC-genetics industry over the next five years is
almost 20%.
Given that digital rhetoric scholars are currently invested in understanding how networks
form within and across websites and platforms, how identity is constructed—or co-constructed—
among users, and how data is collected and used, my project helps scholars and instructors
understand the importance of establishing DRP and implement it into their pedagogy as a way of
building a socially-just society. DTC-genetics represents an underexamined tension in data
sharing. Peter Chow-White (2012) explains that the emergence of DTC-genetics and other
biopolitical technologies in American culture represents a shift from the protection of personal
information online to the sharing of it. Furthermore, rhetoric and composition scholars are taking
up issues concerning surveillance and writing practices, as well as how algorithms shape student
writing, so my project can help scholars and instructors in these areas learn how to advocate for
their most vulnerable students through analysis of specific rhetorical genres, specifically privacy
policies. Importantly, this project seeks to build a coalition where digital rhetoric scholars and
teachers influence future scholars, teachers, and practitioners.
The last decade has not seen an increase in racism in American society; the last decade
has seen an increase in the use of digital technologies with video cameras (e.g. cell phones) and
internet service to record racism and racists and distribute videos and images instantly across the
web on social media platforms like YouTube and Facebook. 12 The digitally recorded murders of

12

This is what is called sousveillance, or the recording an activity via a wearable device (i.e. a cellphone, smart

watch).

10

Black people like Eric Garner 13, George Floyd, and Ma’Khia Bryant14 serve as catalysts in the
fight for racial justice in America. 15 As activists say their names, scholars in rhetoric, particularly
in digital rhetorics and cultural rhetorics, are examining the cultural discord of America’s current
moment through phenomena like #BlackLivesMatter, historiographical approaches to place and
protest, the influence of bodycams on policing in America, and the implications following the
insurrection at the U.S. Capitol in January 2021. Now is the time to examine those phenomenon
in addition to and in correlation with this project analyzing the use of DTC-genetics for police
surveillance.
Rhetoric is poised to reveal how DTC-genetics influences American society by
interrogating the social, political, and economic implications related to the biopolitical
technology. Malea Powell, Stacey Pigg, Kendall Leon, and Angela Haas (2010) define rhetoric
as “how individuals know, create, and invent within the everchanging and dynamic social,
political, and economic contexts in which they operate” (p. 4548). This project works to
understand how rhetoric enables the police to harness biopolitical power while simultaneously
constraining the power of others by offering complex analysis of how DTC-genetics impacts
American culture. Furthermore, rhetoric and rhetorical studies—particularly feminist rhetorical

13

Eric Garner was murdered by New York Police Department (NYPD) officers in 2014. Garner was suffocated

while calling out, “I can’t breathe.” The Black Lives Matter movement has since taken up Garner’s last words as a
part of their call-to-action to end police violence against Black bodies.
14

Police bodycam footage showed officers in Columbus, Ohio, fatally shoot 16-year-old Bryant in her driveway

after they were called to assist in a public dispute in April, 2021.
15

A unique case worthy of further interrogation at the intersection of sousveillance and police violence involve

Philando Castille’s girlfriend Lavish Reynolds using the Facebook Live function to live stream the aftermath of
Castille being shot by police following a traffic stop in Minnesota.

11

studies—has a history of contending with asymmetrical power and rejecting hegemonic and
white-supremacist systems (Schell, 2010). Thus, I take up an intersectional feminist
methodology for interrogating DRP which analyzes the collisions of power—the places where
power interlocks and intersects (Crenshaw, 2017)—between the DTC-genetics industry and law
enforcement agencies in America.

A Review of the Literature
Most digital technologies in America are designed for certain types of users: cisgender,
heterosexual, white, non-disabled, male users. Ironically, a range of DNA technologies and other
biopolitical technologies as well as several medical innovations over the last 70 years only exist
because of the body of a Black woman: Henrietta Lacks. In The Immortal Life of Henrietta
Lacks, Rebecca Skloot16 (2010) details Lacks’ life through the development of the He-La cells,
which originally belonged to Lacks—taken from her without her knowledge—and the startling
discovery years later by her children about the billion dollar industry built on their mother’s
DNA for which they have received no compensation. Lacks’ story is just one of many stories
about how America has unethically and immorally taken, controlled, and commodified Black
bodies without remorse or reparation. Lacks’ body gave so much to the development of the
medical industry and healthcare infrastructure in America, yet other scholars have centered the
impact genetic technology has on other multiply-marginalized bodies in the U.S.

16

Skloot’s book led the National Institute of Health (NIH) to implement an application process for working with

He-La cells in 2013, but her work is often critiqued. Skloot projects the tone of a white savior and the Lacks family
has not been financially compensated for the unethical use of Henrietta’s body.

12

It is critical to listen and learn from the experiences of those impacted by injustices,
particularly the experiences of multiply-marginalized people. Dorothy Roberts (2012)
interrogates how science, politics, and capitalism have impacted the genetics industry in her
book, Fatal Invention: How Science, politics, and Big Business Re-create Race in the Twentyfirst Century. Roberts, speaking from her positionality as a Black woman, explains how DTCgenetics, and genetic technology in general (including reproductive technologies), promote
injustice and inequity through racial classification and division. Roberts details how genetic
technologies deconstruct the work of the The Human Genome Project, which revealed that race
is not a natural division for humans. Simone Browne (2015) builds upon Roberts’ ideas to detail
how biometric technology has been a tool for the surveillance of Blackness since its inception up
to the present moment. Importantly, Browne’s work is a wide-ranging critique of the ways Black
bodies are surveilled in America from slavery to today and arrived just as the popularity of DTCgenetics was increasing in America. Roberts and Browne (as well as Michelle Alexander) are
scholars whose work has reached mainstream audiences, yet they are not the only ones taking on
this important research as scholars in rhetoric, composition, and technical communication also
locate their research at the nexus of privacy, power, technology, and identity.
Scholars in rhetoric and technical communication, particularly digital rhetorics, have
studied the subject of privacy online. Shortly before the .com bubble burst, Laura Gurak’s (1999)
book Persuasion and Privacy in Cyberspace analyzed ethos and delivery online and provided
insights into the future of computer technology through analysis of online forums like
Marketplace. Yet, as Aaron Hess (2018) notes, “The concept of digital rhetoric requires
sustained attention to the ways that rhetoric changes in a technological era and how technology is
shaped by human expression both about and through the technology itself” (p. 2). As digital
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technology became ubiquitous in the era of Big Data and Web 2.0, Gurak and Antonijevic
(2012) considered how privacy works when so much media is remixed and uploaded to social
media platforms and examine what happens when conversations and actions are digitized via
devices like cell phones. Furthermore, rhetoric and composition has taken up dilemmas
concerning all sorts of data sharing with implications both local and global—including issues of
doxing (Hutchinson, 2018), surveillance in writing program administration (Crow, 2013), and
grades as surveillance method in the classroom (Johnson, 2020)—and conversations in the
disciplines have concentrated on the dilemmas of genetics, genealogy, and digital privacy.
Importantly, since people’s expectations of DRP varies it is recommended to view public
and private on a continuum (Marx, 1998; Dennen, 2013). The information a user might share in
an anonymous discussion forum is quite different from the information a user might share on
their Facebook profile, and all of that information is quite different from the data users share on
DTC-genetics websites.17 DTC-genetics services—like social media platforms—are only
available online; subsequently, how has this impacted American culture amid concerns for DRP?
Richard E. Miller (2019) muses in On the End of Privacy: Dissolving Boundaries in a ScreenCentric World, that we live a culture where we do not fully understand the implications on our
bodies and cultures when DRP is invaded online because “the shift from a paper-based to a
screen-centric world has happened so quickly that all the assumptions underlying the institutions
that regulate how we communicate, how we make culture, and how we govern ourselves require
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practices of science from the protection of data to sharing it.
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fundamental revision” (xii).18 As a result, this project seeks to revise how DTC-genetics
influences police surveillance by ending the relationship between these two institutions.
The endgame for companies like Ancestry (and Google, Facebook, etc.) is to commodify
user data. Yet, tension exists between how online advertising targets individuals and algorithmic
processes like aggregation, which places your data in concert with data from other users to form
a data set for analysis. Corporate aggregators purchase consumer data from web companies,
financial institutions, retailers, and the government which they configure and sell to third parties
(Fernback, 2016). Understanding the commodification of data, which requires further research
currently beyond the purview of this project, against the backdrop of America’s whitesupremacist technological infrastructure is crucial work to continue for scholars across the
disciplines, but particularly those in rhetoric, technical communication, information technology,
and data science. In Algorithms of Oppression: How Search Engines Reinforce Racism, Safiya
U. Noble (2018) provides an example of an oppressive digital technology and a company that
continually faces criticism for their (mis)handling of user data. She explains through a thorough
analysis of Google’s search engines that algorithms present biases which privilege whiteness and
contribute to racial stereotypes, specifically those about Black women. Her work builds upon a
history of marginalized and multiply-marginalized scholars contending with the impact of digital
technologies on their lived experiences.
Another issue digital rhetorics has examined that is related to DRP are issues related to
access. Contemplating issues of access is one way to consider the intersection of technology,
18

Miller’s plan for revision includes revisiting a range of twenty-first century headline-making issues that involve

privacy and digital technology, beginning with the suicide of Rutgers University student Tyler Clementi and
culminating in a critique of the Tweeting President.
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DRP, and the history of racial oppression in America. Cynthia L. Selfe (1999) explains access is
fundamental for meaningful participation in the digital age. Yet, technological access is not
equitable. Adam J. Banks (2006) explains that meaningful access does not only refer to a
person’s material access to a technology. Echoing Selfe, Banks directs attention to the critical
literacies users need to understand the implications of their actions online. Furthermore, users
need to understand the potential unethical actions of other users and stakeholders, like digital
redlining: the practice of limiting access to information, technology, services, and the broadband
Internet from minority users. Considering issues of access and DRP together reveals who has
access and how it is regulated (Gilliard & Culik, 2016). One way to analyze these concepts in
tandem is to build on work by scholars like Stephanie Vie (2014) and examine the privacy
policies and other ToS documents prescribing power online.
Engaging with the privacy policies prescribing power on DTC-genetics websites and
their relationship with American law enforcement agencies responds to work included in the first
book-length text examining the impact of privacy and surveillance in writing studies, Privacy
Matters: Conversations about Surveillance within and Beyond the Classroom, edited by Estee
Beck and Les Hutchinson Campos (2020). Specifically, this project responds to questions Jason
Tham and Anne Hill Duin (2020) pose in their investigation of pervasive surveillance and
wearables: “How might we best make transparent to instructors and students the many contexts
within which data is collected and used? How might we problematize data ownership and work
to build informed data generators?” (p. 108). Investigating DTC-genetics contends with these
questions posed by Tham and Hill Duin about data ownership and seeks to move scholarship
beyond the impact of algorithmic surveillance and data collection on writing practices and
culture building (Beck, 2016; Noble, 2018) and towards the collision of biopolitical power and
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surveillance. Furthermore, in their project, Tham and Hill Duin analyze wearable technologies
which, like DTC-genetics, rely on data from the body.
Understanding embodiment is critical to feminist approaches to digital rhetoric and
surveillance. By interrogating DRP on DTC-genetics websites this project considers, as Dànielle
Nicole DeVoss (2020) does: “How do we address the fact that certain conditions of surveillance
affect different bodies and different digital presences differently? How do we navigate the
complex relationship we have within networks of surveillance, privacy, and our desire to connect
across social media spaces?” (p. 172-73). Analyzing DTC-genetics reveals how biopolitical
technogies impact bodies differently, as well as how different users interact with the technology
in different ways. DTC-genetics is designed to help users construct and navigate networks of
family members, but is that experience the same for all users? Furthermore, all users do not
maintain the same attitude about the important of digital privacy and even less scutinize how the
privacy policies for the different digital spaces they visit impact themselves and/or other users.
Analyzing DTC-genetics builds upon DeVoss’s questions by asking: are users willing to forgo
their desire to connect across DTC-genetics websites in order to secure their digital privacy? Do
users want DTC-genetics to be repurposed for surveillance by the police? Hopefully, the answer
to the latter question is no. However, user attitudes about digital privacy evolve with the
strategies for surveillance.
How we surveil and how we are surveilled evolves constantly in the era of New
Surveillance. Gary T. Marx (2015) defines surveillance as the regard for people through the
gathering of connectable data and explains that it is neither good nor bad without context.
Allowing the police to use DTC-genetics for surveillance is bad because it constitutes an
invasion of DRP—and, frankly, the means do not reasonably align with the ends since the
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technology is imperfect. Furthermore, Estee Beck (2016) explains that privacy policies are
written for the express purpose of protecting a company or website from legal damages, so they
represent asymmetrical power. In a 2014 Pew Research Center report only 44% of users
understood that privacy policies do not protect user confidentiality (Beck, 2016). Moreover,
another Pew Research Center survey found that only 48% of Americans understood that privacy
policies function as contracts about how their data is used (Vogels & Anderson, 2019).
Therefore, this project amplifies the importance of DRP by analyzing the privacy policies for
DTC-genetics websites as a response to lack of user understanding because building digital
literacy is a way of contending with inequitable power in society. I briefly outline each chapter
of this project in the next section.

An Outline of Remaining Chapters
In the next chapter I present a feminist methodology for interrogating DRP which
distinguishes and problematizes the affordances and constraints DRP has upon intersectional
experiences. This methodology values and engages with the embodied experiences feminist
scholarship centers and is influenced by theories from Black Feminist Thought, intersectionality,
and technofeminism. Specifically, it values and engages with surveillance studies scholarship
which details how New Surveillance technologies control multiply-marginalized bodies and
digital rhetorics scholarship interested in privacy and surveillance that works toward a more
digitally-secure and socially-just future. In this project, a feminist methodology for interrogating
DRP critically investigates inequitable experiences with DTC-genetics and law enforcement and
this chapter explains its application throughout the project.
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In Chapter 3, I argue that using DTC-genetics for police surveillance is unethical because
it leads to more police violence, which disproportionately impacts marginalized and multiplymarginalized bodies, particularly Black bodies, in America. Furthermore, I argue that continuing
to allow the police to use DTC-genetics as a surveillance tool abets mass incarceration and
violence against women because it is an innovative way to surveil and control bodies based on a
variety of intersecting identity categories, including socioeconomic status and gender. This
practice opens the door to other digital policing and surveillance strategies to usher in a
dystopian future defined by the surveillance state. Chapter 3 includes intersectional feminist
rhetorical analysis of DTC-genetics as a method of police surveillance to demonstrate law
enforcement’s unethical means and uses as they exploit powerful biopolitical technologies. In
this chapter I explain how DRP can be situated as a foundational principle in an era of New
Surveillance.
In Chapter 4, I argue the privacy policies prescribing user actions on DTC-genetics
websites perpetuate asymmetrical power dynamics. In this chapter, I explain how certain rhetoric
within the privacy policies that is related to temporality, transparency, and data collection impact
how users negotiate DRP. Specifically, I argue that DTC-genetics websites employ this rhetoric
in their ToS documents to obfuscate information from users, thus perpetuating relaxed attitudes
about DRP. This chapter recognizes and rhetorically analyzes underlying assumptions of DTCgenetics and privacy policies. It analyzes the values and beliefs of DTC-genetics companies,
American law enforcement, and the public to explain how rhetorical choices obfuscate
information about digital surveillance and tracking strategies in these policies. Importantly, this
chapter analyzes the rights we possess when our genetic material is accessed via DTC-genetics
websites and circulated among law enforcement agencies (a state actor). Finally, this chapter
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seeks to understand the relationship between DTC-genetics and law enforcement surveillance by
interrogating the methods police use to collect and circulate genetic material as well as the
political motivations of police in surveilling marginalized communities. With the relationships
between these private companies and law enforcement ill-defined and unregulated, this chapter
examines whether a DTC-genetics company that assists law enforcement in apprehending a
criminal is performing a public service. It concludes with a discussion of the critical implications
for this project and for the DTC-genetics industry, the American law enforcement infrastructure,
and for users and non-users who engage with this powerful biopolitical technology. Finally, I
forecast how instructors might combat these issues in writing classrooms.
In Chapter 5, I argue that because students must understand the magnitude of rhetorical
power digital technologies possess, writing instructors should take up the intersectional feminist
methodology for interrogating DRP described and utilized herein and incorporate instruction
related to DRP in writing classrooms. I highlight how DTC-genetics privacy policies are a
legitimate genre to critically study because they involve biopolitical technologies that construct
identities and texts that shape user information protection, privacy, and sharing. The chapter
features adaptable, scaffolded approaches for writing instructors who wish to incorporate privacy
policies into the writing classroom to teach and learn about DRP. Importantly, I direct attention
to potential assignments and the necessity of including work from marginalized and multiplymarginalized authors and critics in discussions of DRP, especially in the era of New
Surveillance. Finally, I argue that taking up an approach that amplifies the inequitable
implications of DRP works towards establishing it as a foundational principle of an equitable
society made up of a coalition of users.
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In Chapter 6: Coda, I explain the implications of this project for scholars invested in
intersectional feminism and in digital rhetorics. To replace how scholars and instructors currently
think about issues of DRP and surveillance in society I offer The Digital Privacy Collective
(digitalprivacycollective.weebly.com) as an interactive, coalitional resource featuring activities,
assignments, and lesson plans with an intersectional approach to teaching about DRP in writing
classrooms. Ultimately, The Digital Privacy Collective is a coalitional action which helps us
better understand how important DRP is not only to ending oppression in American society but
also to building an equitable world for everyone.
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CHAPTER II: A FEMINIST METHODOLOGY FOR INTERROGATING DIGITAL
RHETORICAL PRIVACY

Introduction: The Need for a Feminist Methodology for Interrogating Digital Rhetorical
Privacy
As mentioned in Chapter 1, Digital Rhetorical Privacy (DRP) is a state of being when a
user is confidant their digital data is free from unauthorized observances by nefarious computer
technologies and other users. Privacy and surveillance practices online are rhetorical phenomena
which maintain the power to actively exclude certain bodies and experiences from Western
socioeconomic privileges and advantages, ultimately leading to violent systemic oppression. 19
For example, local, state, and federal law enforcement participate in unethical surveillance and
policing that currently permeates American society at all levels. In response, I theorize a feminist
methodology for interrogating DRP accounting for the dynamics of privacy and inequitable
power in American society. This methodology engages with and builds on scholarship in
feminism, surveillance studies, and digital rhetorics, and the research I conduct with it offers
implications for these areas as well as for technical communication, cultural rhetorics, and
rhetorics of health and medicine (RHM). My approach contends with the culture of apathy
concerning DRP and challenges the powerful policies prescribing participation on genealogy
websites. Therefore, this methodology seeks to instill in scholars and students from the
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Ultimately, all biopolitical technologies impact our rhetorical agency based on asymmetrical power dynamics

within the technology and within our society. I refer to rhetorical power to describe how rhetorical phenomena
influence digital privacy in this project.
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aforementioned fields and the public the importance of securing privacy online in a way which is
socially just.
Feminism reveals how power is mediated and distributed among different stakeholders to
marginalize certain communities. It is “grounded in supporting the choices of women even if we
wouldn’t make certain choices for ourselves” (Gay, 2014, p.13). As Eileen Schell (2010) points
out, rhetoric and composition scholars have utilized feminist theory for over thirty years to
explain asymmetrical power based on gender and the disempowerment caused by social
institutions privileging of male experiences. 20 In the following pages, I present a feminist
methodology which distinguishes and problematizes the affordances and constraints DRP has
upon intersectional experiences; furthermore, I interpret and extend scholarship which resists
hegemonic norms which lead to unethical digital surveillance and policing strategies. This
methodology values and engages with the embodied experiences feminist scholarship centers
(Lorde, 1984; Haraway, 1988; hooks, 2000). Specifically, I am influenced by theories from
Black Feminist Thought (Collins, 1989, 2002; Jones Royster, 2000; Perry, 2009; Gay 2014) and
intersectionality (Cho, Crenshaw & McCall, 2013; Crenshaw, 1989, 2017; Glenn, 2002; McCall,
2005). Additionally, this methodology values and engages with surveillance studies scholarship
which details how New Surveillance can and does control non-hegemonic bodies and
experiences (Beck, 2016; Gilliard & Culik, 2016; Marx, 1998, 2015; Novotny & Hutchinson,
2019); and, digital rhetorics and technofeminist scholarship interested in privacy and surveillance
that works toward a more digitally-secure and socially-just future (Beck, et. al., 2016; Chow-
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“Composing as a Woman.” However, writing studies has been described as a feminized field; for early musings in
rhetoric and composition on this topic see Susan Miller (1991) or Sue Ellen Holbrook (1991).
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White, 2012; DeVoss, Haas, & Rhodes, 2019). The following sections of this chapter detail how
this approach critically investigates inequitable experiences with DTC-genetics and law
enforcement and explains its application to the chapters which follow.

Key Components of a Feminist Digital Rhetorical Methodology
This section summarizes the affordances of a methodology that draws from feminist
studies, surveillance studies, and digital rhetorics to interrogate DRP at the intersection of DTCgenetics and law enforcement to imagine a more digitally-secure and equitable future. 21 DTCgenetics refers to at-home genetic testing performed without the mediation of a healthcare
provider through companies like Ancestry.com, 23andMe.com, and GEDmatch.com. These
services often identify family heritages, match people with similar DNA, and reveal genetic
medical conditions. They have also been repurposed as a means of digital surveillance by the
police. This study centers actions by law enforcement agencies which have repurposed
GEDmatch as a digital surveillance tool, leading to blatant infringements of digital privacy for
certain marginalized users and non-users. A feminist methodology for interrogating DRP follows
the following framework:
•

21

Identifies and Values Intersectional Experiences with Digital Rhetorical Privacy

My interest in genealogy and law enforcement is fueled by autoethnographic research I performed which led me to

discover more about my father’s arrest (Alabama v. Woods, cc-92-820 (Alabama, 1992) as well as the methodical
criminality of my paternal grandmother. She was indicted and arrested in 1980 by federal agents for Securities and
Exchange Commission fraud and then again in 2009 as a member of an international drug cartel (USA vs. Woods,
2:09-cr-00153-CLS-SGC (11th Cir. 2009)). Indeed, the context of my on life as ignited an interest in genealogy and
law enforcement.
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o Requires self-awareness and considers positionality in relation to power
o Values the complexity of intersectionality and takes up and applies standpoint
theories
o Amplifies the experiences of marginalized users and non-users
•

Understands Privacy and Surveillance as Systems that Reinscribe Asymmetrical Power
Relations
o Recognizes privacy as dynamic, reliant on the context in which surveillance
occurs
o Acknowledges that surveillance is rhetorical and considers power relations in
terms of who decides what is ethical
o Understands that the privacy-surveillance continuum has violent implications for
marginalized bodies

•

Interrogates How Power is Mediated and Distributed in the Policies Prescribing Actions
Online
o Invests in examining how privacy policies form identities, construct communities,
and build cultures in digital spaces
o Resists systemic oppression by law enforcement by challenging the hegemonic
norms of digital privacy and surveillance
o Situates digital privacy as a foundational principle of a society free of whitepatriarchal regulation

25

Identify and Value Intersectional Experiences with Digital Rhetorical Privacy
This approach takes up the tenets of Black Feminist Thought to engage with the
rhetorical implications of a powerful biopolitical technology, DTC-genetics, and considers the
world Black women can build if “all the haters would raise up and let them get to work.”
(Cooper, 2018, p. 35). It examines the far-reaching impacts on our lived experiences beyond the
white, heteronormative experiences for which many digital technologies are designed. It
considers the interdependence of Black women’s standpoint, lived experience, and collective
consciousness, the interlocking nature of systems of oppression, and Black women’s struggle for
empowerment and universal social justice (Perry, 2009). It treasures the fact that lived
experience can and should be viewed through a lens which offers complex, nuanced explanations
for how systems of power intersect in culture to monitor and surveil us with the goal of bodily
control.
Intersectionality has permeated projects and scholarship in a range of disciplines
including sociology, feminism, law, and rhetoric in the last thirty years (Cho, Crenshaw, &
McCall, 2013). In the last five years, intersectionality has become an applicable tool to
understand lived experiences and curtail systemic injustice because the U.S. was governed from
2017-2021 by an administration that allows its leader to dehumanize women and other non-male
genders, incite racial tension online, and question the validity of Critical Race Theory. This
methodology responds to and counteracts user actions that perpetuate systematic marginalization
including the enabling of unethical and racist surveillance and policing strategies by
incorporating intersectionality as a tool for examining “where power comes and collides, where
it interlocks and intersects” (Crenshaw, 2017). The history of genetic technology, which includes
eugenics and DTC-genetics, is filled with the inequitable experiences among desirable and
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othered users and, when used by police, can cause violence to marginalized bodies in the form of
DNA-dragnets and racial profiling—strategies which amplify the need for an intersectional
approach to examining this rhetorical phenomenon. Importantly, my approach is not
representative of a comprehensive intersectional methodology, but does engage the
methodological complexities of intersectionality, including self-awareness and positionality.

Require Self-Awareness and Consider Positionality in Relation to Power
My childhood in Birmingham, Alabama22, exposed me to some oppressive systems
which govern our society. I was born in 1987 to a low-income family; less than 20 years earlier,
Birmingham was an epicenter of the American civil rights movement. Images of Black men
hosed down by Bull Connor and pictures of four little Black girls memorialized in The
Birmingham News were familiar to me. I witnessed and interacted with racism and poverty
perpetuated by the systems which differentially govern, police, and surveil bodies. Therefore, I
construct this methodology and undertake this project with the intent not to appropriate but
follow the advice of Patricia Hill Collins (2002) to center and amplify othered voices. Doing so
works to deconstruct the mythical norm Audre Lorde (1984) captured in, Age, Race, Class, and
Sex: Women Redefining Difference, at the Copeland Colloquium at Amherst College in April
1980, which was included in her book Sister Outsider four years later:
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My maternal grandmother’s house where I grew up was on the traditional homelands of generations of Muscogee-

Creek people until European settlers—mostly English and Scots-Irish—stole the land and forced Indigenous people
west in the early nineteenth century. The forced migration of tribes Indigenous to the Americas is a prime example
of how the U.S. Government has constructed and enacted oppressive practices to govern and police marginalized
bodies.
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Somewhere, on the edge of consciousness, there is what I call a mythical norm, which
each one of us within our hearts knows “that is not me.” In America, this norm is usually
defined as white, thin, male, young, heterosexual, Christian, and financially secure. It is
with this mythical norm that the trappings of power reside within this society. Those of us
who stand outside that power often identify one way in which we are different, and we
assume that to be the primary cause of all oppression, forgetting other distortions around
difference, some of which we ourselves may be practicing. By and large within the
women's movement today, white women focus upon their oppression as women and
ignore differences of race, sexual preference, class, and age. There is a pretense to a
homogeneity of experience covered by the word sisterhood that does not in fact exist. (p.
116)
Deconstructing the mythical norm Lorde expresses requires an understanding that othered voices
are not just different, but also considered less-than within the standards of America’s
heteronormative, white-patriarchal society 23.
Intersectional feminism allows us to confront our own marginalization, as well as the
complexities of our positionalities as desired in feminist and technofeminist research (Blair &
Tulley, 2007; Harding, 1986, 1993; Tetreault, 2019). Roxane Gay (2014) notes that having
privilege in one or multiple areas does not mean you are completely privileged. She also explains
that surrendering to the acceptance of privilege is a difficult task for many, but is expected,
because the acknowledgement of privilege is not a denial of the ways we are marginalized. For
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DRP, biopolitical technologies, settler colonialism, real and imagined borders, and Indigenous rhetorics.
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people similar to my own positionality and embodiment, it tasks us with being self-aware and
considering positionality in relationship to power. This means acknowledging I experienced
marginalization during my childhood in a low-income household in the rural American south,
but understanding also the oppression I experienced is not compounded and multiplied because
of other identity markers like race, gender, ability, etc. Moreover, because I am a white, ablebodied, cisgender, heterosexual male I was afforded educational opportunities not granted to
everyone which has allowed me the potential to improve my social class.

Value the Complexity of Intersectionality and Applies Standpoint Theories
The complex ways that power is mediated and repurposed when DTC-genetics is
implemented into the American law enforcement surveillance apparatus necessitates an
intercategorical approach influenced by standpoint theories. As Patricia Hill Collins (1989)
notes, Black women maintain a self-defined standpoint of their oppression as “political and
economic status provides them with a distinctive set of experiences that offers a different view of
material reality than that available to other groups [and] these experiences stimulate a distinctive
Black feminist consciousness concerning that material reality” (p. 747-48). The material
implications of DTC-genetics are not fully known now, but an intersectional approach helps to
more accurately and robustly examine the implications arising from the relationship between
DRP and biopolitical technologies like DTC-genetics.
To consider standpoint, one must take an intercategorical approach which “requires that
scholars provisionally adopt existing analytical categories to document relationships of
inequality among social groups and changing configurations of inequality along multiple and
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conflicting dimensions” (McCall, 2005, p. 1773) 24. More emphasis on relationality means we can
treat identity categories as dynamic anchor points (Glenn, 2002). Critiques of this approach point
to a lack of complexity, but, as Leslie McCall (2005) notes: “The categorical space can become
very complicated with the addition of any one analytical category to the analysis because it
requires an investigation of the multiple groups that constitute the category” (p. 1786). For
example, integrating analytical categories like gender and/or socioeconomic status for crossclassification to the anchor point of race in the rhetorical analysis in later chapters contributes a
nuanced complexity to both the study and the findings which reveals how marginalized bodies
are systemically oppressed based on an amalgamation of intersecting factors.
The differences in people’s lived experiences with powerful systems like DTC-genetics is
revealed through intercategorical intersectional analysis. However, in the last three decades
Crenshaw and a bevy of legal, cultural, and rhetorical critics have acknowledged intersectionality
is less concerned with “shallow questions of identity and representation” and “more interested in
the deep structural and systemic questions about discrimination and inequality” (Coaston, 2019).
Moreover, intersectionality does not reimagine a racial hierarchy principled by Black women.
Instead, it seeks to deconstruct racial hierarchies altogether because these powerful, biased
systems reject neutrality even when reduced to their most basic function. Similar to the theory of
intersectionality, biopolitical technologies like DTC-genetics are social, political, rhetorical and
demonstrate bias towards the companies who construct them and the consumers who purchase
them. While the arguments occurring in later chapters prod issues of identity and representation
online, this project aspires to extend rhetorical technofeminist work and serve as a catalyst for
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avoidable oppression whereas inequality refers to the uneven distribution of resources.
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reexamining power dynamics prescribed by the policies prescribing power on DTC-genetics
websites.
My standpoint—and thus this project—is shaped by my perspective of power and
knowledge (Harding, 1986, 1993). This methodology is a hybridization of Mieke Verloo’s
(2013) pragmatic and substantial approaches to standpoint theory’s addressing of intersectional
inequalities as it highlights possibilities for intersectional politics within the confines of existing
privacy policies and calls for a focus on structural change. Working towards socially-just
structural change dismantles the matrix of oppressive systems of privacy and surveillance which
make up our culture (Collins, 2002). As the Combahee River Collective Statement notes:
We also often find it difficult to separate race from class from sex oppression because in
our lives they are most often experienced simultaneously. We know that there is such a
thing as racial-sexual oppression which is neither solely racial nor solely sexual, e.g., the
history of rape of Black women by white men as a weapon of political repression.
(Library of Congress)
The Combahee River Collective rejected white feminism of the mid-to-late twentieth century as
lacking multifaceted perspectives on oppression; as such, the Combahee River Collective
Statement—detailing oppression from the perspective of Black lesbians—became a bedrock text
in Black Feminist Thought. It moved notions of identity—and how power impacts our
experiences—beyond Eurocentric ways of knowing. In this way, it builds upon and extends the
ways of knowing which generations of Indigenous women have experienced and shared in their
cultures. The Combahee River Collective Statement shaped an entire generation of women, as
well as following generations “whose psychic, and consequently physical, ‘shape,’ [and] psychic
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existence” was made possible (Allen, 1986). 25 This methodology works to amplify multiplymarginalized perspectives—those who have not only interacted with but been beleaguered by the
matrix of oppression—by rejecting socially-constructed binaries and instead analyzing how DRP
impacts intersectional experiences based on race, gender, sexual orientation, ethnicity, religion,
socioeconomic status, age, and other social factors.
In lieu of conforming to the white-patriarchal culture in which it exists, this approach
analyzes and highlights how DRP leads to unethical policing, but can and should lead to a more
digitally-secure and socially-just future. It acknowledges the epistemological advantage of
marginalized or oppressed groups and recognizes social location systemically influences our
experiences, shaping and limiting what we know, such that knowledge is achieved from a
particular standpoint (Intemann, 2010; Wylie, 2003). Defining standpoint is complex as one’s
collection of experiences are not universally representative. Instead, it is imperative to
understand standpoint feminism “take[s] communities, rather than individuals, to be the locus of
justification and objectivity [and] examine[s] power relations, institutions, policies, and
technologies that perpetuate oppression from the perspective of the oppressed, so that they may
be changed, undermined, or abolished” (Intemann, 2010, p. 786). In doing so we see the farreaching implications of the uneven distribution of power which lie beyond the individual.
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I value Juanita Sundberg’s (2014) struggle as a critic of geographical-posthumanism engagements. Like

Sundberg, my geographical location as a citizen and a researcher is one of a white supremacist settler society. It is
important for me to acknowledge this in order not to appropriate this knowledge.
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Amplify the Experiences of Marginalized Users and Non-Users
Kimberle Crenshaw’s coining of intersectionality in 1989 coincided with the rise of
Silicon Valley and the ensuing digital technologies and Internet culture which have made so
much meaning—and usurped other ways of making meaning and distributing power—within
American culture the last three decades. Innovative genetic technologies are useful and, to many,
desirable, but also oppressive. Sasha Costanza-Chock (2020) focuses on transformative media
organizing for social movements and design justice. They work towards reshaping innovative
technologies from their inception by asking, “What story is told? How is the problem framed?
Who decides the scope? What values are built into the designed objects and processes? Who
benefits? Who loses?” (p. 127-8). The questions Costanza-Chock posits relate to similar
concerns this project addresses regarding the experiences of marginalized users and non-users:
Who is telling the story? What are their motivations and what is the scope of their power?
Ultimately, they posit that those most affected (e.g. those who get access and how they access)
have nearly always already developed solutions most likely based on local materials, skills, and
infrastructure—and that often these problems are less about a particular tool or object, but are
social, cultural, and economic in nature (Costanza-Chock, 2020). Thus, taking an intersectional
approach to analysis amplifies the experiences of marginalized users and non-users to reveal how
power manifests in digital, biopolitical technologies like DTC-genetics.
Intersectional feminism and intersectional analysis as both a theory and a method
permeate across the disciplines of higher education because amplifying the experiences of
marginalized users and non-users provides a wide-ranging understanding of rhetorical
phenomena. The ubiquity of digital technologies and police surveillance in American culture has
led to digital rhetorics scholarship which analyzes the relationship between law enforcement
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(Hayes, 2017) and activism (Goodling, 2015). My approach builds on this work and highlights
the experiences of multiply-marginalized users and non-users to provide a broad understanding
of the implications of powerful hegemonic systems and biopolitical technologies. Moreover, this
work contributes to the coalitional approach to social justice as stakeholders are connected with
the potential for organization (Walton, Moore, and Jones, 2019). It allows for analysis of the
rhetorical features that assign power in the privacy policies for genealogy websites and it
prescribes analysis of the inequitable experiences of users and non-users—potential coalitions
(Carastathis, 2013)—regarding law enforcement surveillance via DTC-genetics.

Understands Privacy and Surveillance as Systems that Reinscribe Asymmetrical Power
Relations
This methodology recognizes privacy to be dynamic and reliant on the context in which
surveillance occurs, including the setting and motivations of the surveilling. Since expectations
of DRP vary it is recommended to view public and private, and privacy and surveillance, on a
continuum (Dennen, 2013; Marx, 1998, 2015). Yet, this perspective presents many complex
concerns with which this project contends: What is public and what is private? Is genetic
material a public good or a private possession? Defining concepts like public, private, and
possession must account for asymmetrical power. This project works to dismantle powerful,
hegemonic surveillance infrastructures in American society because the privacy-surveillance
continuum has violent implications for marginalized bodies. This methodology is informed by
surveillance studies scholars whose work focuses on New Surveillance technologies, including
website credibility and methods of data collection, and intersectional experiences with
surveillance and policing. The pervasiveness of digital technologies defines the New
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Surveillance culture in which we live; as digital technologies are developed and then repurposed,
the New Surveillance evolves. Gary T. Marx (1998) notes:
Examples of the new surveillance include[s] computer matching and profiling, big data
sets, video cameras, DNA analysis, GPS, electronic work monitoring, drug testing, and
the monitoring made possible by social media and cell phones. The new surveillance
tends to be more intensive, is extensive, extends the senses, is based on aggregates and
big data, has lower visibility, involves involuntary (often categorical) compliance of
which the subject may be unaware, tends to decrease cost, and reach remote locations.
(735).
Since the pervasiveness of digital technologies defines the surveillance culture in which we live,
incorporating New Surveillance theories illuminates the (un)ethicality of police using DTCgenetics as a surveillance apparatus for data collection and identification. This project is
concerned with discontinuing law enforcement’s strategy of repurposing digital technologies to
create a powerful New Surveillance instrument.

Recognize Privacy to be Dynamic, Reliant on the Context in Which Surveillance Occurs
We must consider the rhetorical context of surveillance to investigate power dynamics
when DTC-genetics is used as a surveillance tool. Gary. T. Marx (2015) posits surveillance is
neither good nor bad but “context and comportment make it so” (p. 733). He defines surveillance
“as regard or attendance to others (whether a person, a group, or an aggregate as with a national
census) or to factors presumed to be associated with these” and notes a central feature to be
gathering data connectable to individuals (2015, p. 734). Marx also conceives of a reasonable
expectation of privacy in a new era of digital surveillance and argues the ethics of surveillance be
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judged according to the means, the context and conditions of data collection, and the potential
uses (1998). Vanessa P. Dennen (2013) extends the reasonable expectation of privacy in research
practices to account for the spectrum of online spaces, from the most public to the most private,
and calls researchers to assess privacy from multiple angles by asking: “What is the intent of the
author? What are the restrictions on data access? How personal or revealing are the data? How
will the data be reported?” (p. 24). Dennen’s questions intend to protect the research participant;
yet, in the case of DTC-genetics similar questions are applicable to the user. Moreover, her
queries reveal the instability of the privacy-surveillance continuum.
Privacy and surveillance are rhetorical, and the power which is created and distributed
throughout American social systems as a result of their relationship is forceful but not
unchanging. In fact, the apparatus of surveillance in New Surveillance culture “which comprises
multiple technologies and vectors of power, is not inherently stable” (Lewis, 2006, p. 272).
Accordingly, this approach recognizes and challenges the stability of the digital surveillance
apparatus composed of “heterogeneous elements loosely coordinated to sustain a certain relation
of power…continually modified and adjusted to fulfill its strategic function” (Lewis, 2006, p.
272). The function, as Michel Foucault (1978) famously notes, is to control bodies and define
normalized identities—to exert power. Projects which utilize a feminist methodology fight back
against heterogenous normalization by digital surveillance by examining how genetic
technologies present inequitable experiences that lead to the ubiquitous surveillance of
marginalized bodies. The dynamism of privacy in an era of New Surveillance allows for
subjectivity on the individual level, yet it also affords society the opportunity to reconceptualize
digital privacy as a principle against oppression.
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Acknowledge that Surveillance is Rhetorical and Considers Power Relations in Terms of Who
Decides What is Ethical
Ethics and the privacy-surveillance continuum is a central concern of New Surveillance
heuristics. Gary T. Marx (1998) and Estee Beck (2016) designed frameworks to consider
methods of data collection and use and to assess website credibility. Marx’s Questions to Help
Determine the Ethics of Surveillance accounts for the dynamism of privacy regarding “new
technologies for collecting personal information that transcend the physical, liberty-enhancing
limitations” of antiquated, analog modes of surveillance (171). The investment in analyzing
privacy in the era of New Surveillance by scholars in both surveillance studies and digital
rhetorics includes Beck’s Rhetorical Framework for Evaluating Surveillance and Privacy
Practices. She draws upon David Lyon (2007) to establish a framework assessing ideological
viewpoints, methodological vision, and design of visibility and transparency which she hopes
fosters routine stronger critical thinking and influences “new design practices and principles for
delivering legal documents” (2016, 75). The theories Marx and Beck posit are important to any
examination of the rhetorical power of biopolitical technologies, but become even more critical
when examining the ethics of DTC-genetics as a police surveillance tool.
The complexities of power online—and, in turn ethics—has long been an area of interest
for digital rhetorics and surveillance studies scholars who see rhetoric and ethics as inherently
intertwined. Marx (1998) argues that the ethics of surveillance are assessed according to the
means, the data collection context, and the uses of the data collected. Questions Marx posits
include: “Does the technique cross a personal boundary without permission? Do individuals
consent to the data collection? Is the information used in such a way to cause unwarranted harm
or disadvantage to its subject?” (174). These queries are applicable to law enforcement’s
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utilization of DTC-genetics as they specifically foreground the complexity of consent—a key
consideration concerning useful evidence in the American judiciary system and, as such, within
the arguments made throughout this project. Moreover, Beck (2016) identifies privacy policies as
sites to assess “the views and beliefs assumed in terms and conditions, [evaluate] the underlying
purpose and collection method, and [assess] how the website operator designs statements for
efficient, easy use and comprehension along with transparent data practices” (75). By directing
attention towards assumptions of views and beliefs in privacy policies, Beck allows us to
understand how privacy policies perpetuate marginalization of othered users, a primary goal of
Chapter 4.

Understand the Privacy-Surveillance Continuum has Violent Implications for MultiplyMarginalized Bodies
Violence against and surveillance of oppressed bodies in America is nothing new. It has
been documented in slave narratives, oral traditions, and more recently, smartphone videos.
Moreover, violence against women—particularly Black women—persists in the asymmetrical
power relations of American culture. Brittney Cooper (2018) reminds us that more than one
thousand women are murdered each year, usually by men of the same race: “It has been said
before, but it is worth saying again: Toxic masculinity kills” (p. 73). Simone Browne (2015)
details the infamous history of surveilling Blackness in Western culture in her book, Dark
Matters: On the Surveillance of Blackness. While my approach situates itself among
conversations of digital surveillance, Browne importantly acknowledges that the surveillance and
policing of Black bodies is not a new phenomenon; beginning her book detailing the design of
slave ships during the seventeenth century, Browne makes it clear that the inequitable conditions
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of surveillance which systemically bred generations of injustice are amplified by the abundance
of digital technologies (e.g. video cameras on cell phones).
This methodology extends the work of Simone Browne (2015) at the intersection of
Blackness and biopolitics by acknowledging inherent biases and by amplifying marginalized
perspectives with DTC-genetics and law enforcement. Browne approaches biopolitics and
Blackness throughout her book and she asks important questions that foreshadow Estee Beck’s
(2016) call to assess the credibility of the technologists: “How do we understand the body once it
is made into data? What are the underlying assumptions with surveillance technologies, such as
passport verification machines, facial recognition software, or fingerprint template technology?”
(Browne, 2015, p. 114). Browne goes on to note there is a belief “these technologies are
infallible and objective and have mathematical precision, without error of bias on the part of the
computer programmers” (2015, p. 115). These are the methods of oppressive digital surveillance
with which we must contend first before we can challenge the surveillance apparatus as a whole.
One of the central questions with which this project grapples is who owns our genetic
material. When Estee Beck (2016) asks us how we understand the body once it becomes data,
she is asking us to consider the relationship between our physical embodiment, the material
infrastructures of technology, and rhetorical power. While bodies cannot be owned nor possessed
they are commodified for capital in American culture, particularly women’s bodies. How we see
the body once it is digitized and harnesses its biopolitical power online is a critical concern to
projects which deal with the rhetorical implications of DTC-genetics because power is unevenly
distributed among genders. Tressie McMillan Cottom (2019) describes how Western hegemony
that capitalizes 26 upon women’s bodies compounds existing gendered oppressions. Cottom is
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McMillan Cottom describes this as “bad capital.”
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specifically referring to beauty in her critique, but when we parse out the gendered differences
pertaining to a biopolitical technology like DTC-genetics impact on women’s agency, we can see
how invasive tracking technologies infringe upon their privacy more so than men.
DTC-genetics is not the only biopolitical technology in which gendered discrimination
occurs resulting in the uneven distribution of power. Such discrimination influences ways of
knowing and reduces its rhetorical agency, and in turn its power (Johnson, Levy, Manthey and
Novotny, 2015). Moreover, our bodies and its interactions with technology influence our ways of
knowing—and thus how power is distributed (Bates, Macarthy, Warren-Riley, 2019). Maria
Novotny and Les Hutchinson (2019) argue biopolitical technologies like the fertility and period
monitoring application Glow reduce agency and offer a feminist critique which challenges how
consent is obtained from users. This approach pushes back against asymmetrical power as a
result of digital surveillance of the digitized body and accounts for the lived experiences of not
only women but other marginalized groups, including those oppressed based on race. As the uses
of DTC-genetics continue to extend beyond learning about our families and our heritages, the
practices which lead to compounded marginalization will become more prevalent not just for
women, but for Blackness as well.
Systemic oppression permeates Western culture through practices such as redlining—
which abets surveillance. Redlining is “the practice of dividing up a city, making it harder for
poorer areas, and areas with larger minority populations, to access banking, insurance,
healthcare, or other services” and was outlawed via the Civil Rights Act in 1968 (CBC Radio,
2018). Focusing their analysis on higher education, Chris Gilliard 27 and Hugh Culik (2016)
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explain digital redlining is the use of digital technologies and the Internet to sustain inequities
among marginalized communities. They explain the necessity to understand how information
access “controls intellectual and financial opportunities for students” (Gilliard & Culik 2016).
This methodology seeks to extend analysis of oppressive digital redlining to DTC-genetics and
law enforcement to demonstrate how these technologies perpetuate the digital divide defined by
inequitable access to digital technologies, particularly Web 2.0 technologies (Opel, 2018; Vie,
2008).
New Surveillance theories allow researchers to conduct studies which exhibit the
dynamism of the privacy-surveillance continuum. A feminist methodology for interrogating DRP
is reliant on these theories as they afford the opportunity to investigate the values and beliefs of
technologists and assumptions within privacy policies. Importantly, both law enforcement
agencies and DTC-genetics employ technologists in the form of technicians who process the
genetic material. Heuristics from Gary T. Marx (1998) and Estee Beck (2016) allow us to
examine their values and beliefs, as well as methods of data collection and use, primary New
Surveillance ethical dilemmas. Moreover, the violent implications the privacy-surveillance
continuum has on Blackness influences the methods of data collection throughout this project as
demonstrated in the arguments constructed in Chapter 3 that are based on marginalized
experiences with law enforcement and the privacy policies included and language examined for
rhetorical analysis in Chapter 4.
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Interrogates How Power is Mediated and Distributed in the Policies Prescribing Actions
Online
Theories of privacy and surveillance in digital rhetorics inform this approach which
recognizes privacy policies as a powerful, dynamic genre for analysis of DRP. Aaron Hess notes,
“the concept of digital rhetoric requires sustained attention to the ways that rhetoric changes in a
technological era and how technology is shaped by human expression both about and through the
technology itself” (2018, p. 2). This approach builds upon work digital rhetorics has done to
analyze how digital privacy intersects with ethics, criminality, and genetics by examining how
privacy policies form identities, construct communities, and build cultures among users and nonusers operating within asymmetrical vectors of power. It works to situate DRP as a foundational
principle of a society free of white-patriarchal regulation by interrogating how DTC-genetics is
repurposed by law enforcement as an unethical surveillance strategy because we—as users of
these technologies and consumers of these products—must deconstruct the oppressive American
law enforcement system. To reach these goals, this methodology challenges the norms of digital
privacy and surveillance as a method of resistance against systemic oppression by law
enforcement.

Invest in Examining How Privacy Policies Form Identities, Construct Communities, and Build
Culture in Digital Spaces
This project is invested in examining privacy policies because they are one of the
principal genres that impact how users build culture and distribute power online. Estee Beck is at
the forefront of conversations concerning surveillance studies, writing practices, and social
justice. Her scholarship shapes the way scholars assess rhetorical principles like ethos in digital
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spaces, and her work identifying privacy policies as a genre to analyze to better understand
digital ethos and methods of data collection directly persuades this methodology which locates
privacy policies as a genre for analysis to better understand DRP. Beck (2016) explains privacy
policies are written for the express purpose of protecting a company or website from legal
damages; she notes that, in a 2014 Pew Research Center report based on 1,066 users, only 44%
understood that privacy policies do not correlate with user confidentiality. Questions concerning
user privacy and website surveillance abound in the age of Big Data; how do we grapple with the
rhetorical implications of this phenomena?
Beck’s framework assesses website credibility 28 and, like Gary T. Marx, accounts for
both privacy and methods of data collection. This methodology values Beck’s framework as she
implores us to analyze the credibility of the website by considering: “1. ideological viewpoints,
methodological vision, and design of visibility and transparency” (2016, p. 75). Beck emphasizes
that responsibility is shared and is a guiding heuristic to be applied to the analysis throughout this
project. Taking up Beck’s work affords the ability to robustly examine how power is distributed
online through analysis of the biases and intentions of the companies that publish privacy
policies and the users who interface with them. However, interfacing with privacy policies is
complex, time-consuming work which does not immediately reveal their rhetorical power. We
must also consider questions inspired by the work of Angela M. Haas (2018) that help us
understand how politics and access influence the use of DTC-genetics by law enforcement: what
are the political motivations of police in surveilling marginalized communities? Who (in the
28

Beck’s heuristic builds upon the work of David Lyon (2007) who identifies three themes of surveillance culture:

viewpoints, vision, and visibility. Lyon explains a surveillance state forms with the purpose of supervising human
behavior, an aspect of surveillance with which this project contends.
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public and in the agency) has access to the data collected through surveillance? How does DTCgenetics impact a range of diverse bodies? This project aims to answer these central questions as
it seeks to understand how power manifests on genealogy websites and within their privacy
policies.

Situate Digital Rhetorical Privacy as a Foundational Principle of a Society Free of WhitePatriarchal Regulation
To work toward this goal, we must consider the ways in which DRP intersects with
power and ethics. The relationship between rhetoric and ethics is of particular interest; in fact,
some rhetoric scholars cannot see rhetoric and ethics as inextricably different:
We see ethics as every day because we see ethics as fundamental to all human
interaction. Ethics pertains to character and credibility and to issues of trust,
responsibility, honesty, and integrity—what in rhetoric is called ethos, the character of
the speaker or writer. In taking this perspective on rhetoric and ethics, we are calling
upon a rhetorical tradition that sees the two arts—rhetoric and ethics—not as separate arts
belonging to separate disciplines, but rather as an inextricably intertwined set of concerns
fundamental to all communication interaction. (McKee & Porter, 2017, p. 27)
Many of the ethical issues concerning privacy digital rhetorics takes up intersect with the issues
concerning DTC-genetics and law enforcement. Among these issues are concerns about ethical
data harvesting and data sharing with implications both local and global.
For example, we might consider DTC-genetics company 23andMe selling its genetic data
to Spanish pharmaceutical company Almirall in January 2020 an act of digital aggression. Krista
Kennedy and Noah Wilson (2019) interrogate the ethicality of data harvesting—a method of

44

algorithmic data surveillance—from medical wearables (hearing aids) as a banal form of digital
aggression. They acknowledge the complexities of data ownership which stem from access, for
data is “anonymized as big data by the manufacturer for research and development purposes,
stored for an indefinite amount of time at an undisclosed data storage facility, and most likely
resold to other vendors in both identifiable and de-identified forms” (2019, p. 199). The ethical
concerns surrounding data harvesting Kennedy and Wilson detail are emblematic of central
issues with which this methodology grapples: what happens with our data (DNA) once it is
collected? And, who owns that data?
Important to this project is that in the 1990’s The Human Genome Project established
genetic material it collected should be treated like a public good, or open-access (Chow-White,
2012). As mentioned before, DTC-genetics exemplifies a shift in cultural practices of science
from the protection of data to sharing it (Chow-White 2012); such a shift also represents a
recalibration of power. As this methodology works to situate DRP as a foundational principle of
a society free of white-patriarchal regulation, it is important to note that oppression does not only
occur on genealogy websites and, in fact, is a part of mainstream Internet culture.

Challenge the Norms of Digital Privacy and Surveillance as a Method of Resistance Against
Systemic Oppression by Law Enforcement
Work in digital rhetorics has concentrated on the dilemmas of law enforcement data and
digital privacy. Perhaps the most well-known form of widely-shared law enforcement data is the
mugshot. Mark Grabowski and Sokthan Yeng (2013) argue websites that publish mugshots “are
not inherently unethical because they provide a valuable public service” (p. 100). This provokes
a question relevant to this project: if a genealogy website assists law enforcement in
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apprehending a criminal, is the genealogy website performing a public service? While
Grabowski and Yeng focus on one type of data, mugshots, Seth Long and Ken Fitch (2019)
analyze the rhetorical velocity (Ridolfo and DeVoss, 2009) of graffiti as it pertains to digital
surveillance by law enforcement. They don’t condone gang activity, or graffiti tagging, but they
do “suggest that the digital surveillance of graffiti by urban law enforcement raises interesting
rhetorical questions” about surveillance strategies (2019, p. 178). They problematize circulation
(albeit with a binary perspective) and ask, “how might texts or images be composed against
surveillance? As citizens 29, what rights do we possess when it comes to the appropriation of our
texts and images by—and the circulation of our texts and images among—state actors?” (Long &
Fitch, 2019, p. 178). This project responds to the problems Long and Fitch identify as it asks:
What are the methods police use to collect and circulate genetic material for surveillance? What
rights do we possess when our genetic material is accessed via genealogy websites and circulated
among law enforcement agencies (a state actor)?
Digital rhetorics work at the triangulation of digital technologies, law enforcement, and
social justice informs this methodology. Tracey J. Hayes (2017) examines law enforcement and
activism by tracing the movement of public protests from physical to digital places through
analysis of the #myNYPD. This digital movement is both ahead of its time and representative of
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algorithmic citizenship (2015). The constantly changing composite of one’s measurable types plus their user actions
online—the websites they visit, the social media posts they like, and the university honors program they are enrolled
in—constitute their algorithmic citizenship. Algorithmic citizenship is a new form of citizenship, one where your
citizenship, and therefore both your allegiances and your rights, are constantly being questioned, calculated, and
rewritten. Algorithmic citizenship, like citizenship to a country, is not immune to the matrix of oppression.
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how social-justice initiatives commence within digital communities. Catherine L. Langford and
Montené Speight (2015) examine another social justice initiative: #BlackLivesMatter, which was
formed in response to the acquittal of George Zimmerman for the murder of Trayvon Martin. 30
Five years following Langford and Speight’s article, the #BlackLivesMatter social justice
initiative is a critical voice—and a critical social media tool—in the fight against police brutality
and other systems of oppression on Black bodies in America. Langford and Speight explicate
how violence devalues Black bodies and construes them as disposable in our communities and
explain “mediated protests such as #BlackLivesMatter create a rhetorical space to challenge and
to re-envision the Black body within American society” (p. 79). Digital rhetorics investigations
of how privacy intersects with the surveillance and policing of Black bodies provides a nuanced
foundation upon which this project builds as it seeks to understand how privacy is conceived in
privacy policies and practiced on genealogy websites, and how both of these lead to
asymmetrical power.

Conclusion: A Feminist Methodology for Interrogating Digital Rhetorical Privacy In
Action
Ultimately, this work extends conversations into digital spaces where culture is made,
specifically genealogy websites, and examines the application of DTC-genetics by law
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took up surveilling and policing his neighborhood. The Martin case is similar to the murder of Ahmaud Arbery, a
Black man who, in 2020, was murdered by a group of white civilian-vigilantes as he was jogging through their
neighborhood. In both cases, the murderers operated as though they had state-sanctioned power by using laws which
uphold white supremacy.
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enforcement. Scholars who emphasize researching and teaching privacy and social justice define
my epistemology and inform the arguments I make throughout this project. An intersectional
approach affords thorough intercategorical analysis centered on the use of genetic technology by
law enforcement in a way which perpetuates marginalization due to asymmetrical power.
Integrating New Surveillance theories that account for the dynamism of the privacy-surveillance
continuum and the resulting violence enacted upon Black bodies allows this study to more fully
account for a range of experiences with DTC-genetics in its analysis. The decision to profile
certain oppressed groups and to analyze specific language is done to prompt change in the
American judicial system and in the way users value DRP. Ultimately, the analysis herein helps
us to better understand how culture is made and power is mediated on genealogy websites in
order to initiate change within law enforcement practices that situates DRP as a foundational
principle of a society free of white-patriarchal regulation.
Chapter 3 traces a history of digital surveilling and policing in America—specifically
focused on marginalized groups—and examines the rhetorical implications of DTC-genetics.
Initiated by the capture of Joseph James D’Angelo, aka the Golden State Killer, in 2018 after
Sacramento County Sheriffs uploaded DNA evidence to genealogy website GEDmatch, Chapter
3 questions the ethicality of DTC-genetics as it considers how law enforcement has harnessed
biopolitical power for digital surveillance. Considerations include analysis of the motivations of
the surveilling and examining how this technology inequitably impact multiply-marginalized
bodies. Furthermore, I argue to situate DRP as a foundational principle in an era of New
Surveillance.
Chapter 4 takes up rhetorical analysis to investigate the privacy policies guiding user
actions on genealogy websites. Chapter 4 focuses on how privacy policies define privacy for
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DTC-genetics websites like Ancestry and 23andMe by asking: How is privacy conceived of in
these documents? What are the values and beliefs of the company using the document? How
does this document mediate power within these unique digital ecosystems? Application of this
framework to this chapter includes analyzing genealogy website privacy policies with different
goals and for different audiences. Ultimately, the work in this chapter, and this study, hopes to
situate digital privacy as a foundational principle of a society free of hegemonic regulation by
directing attention to the lack of transparency in data collection and use by genealogy websites
which perpetuates inequitable experiences for marginalized users.
The fifth chapter of this project details a course plan for teaching a feminist methodology
in an courses that interrogate DRP. This framework challenges students to engage with their
assumptions concerning their own privacy, and the privacy of other users, in digital spaces, as
well as how their own positionality is connected to their rhetorical power. Application of this
framework to this chapter includes providing descriptions of projects which analyze the
intersectional rhetorical effects of DRP. Adaptable suggestions include ways to engage students
in meaningful classroom discussions about DRP and biopolitical technologies; moreover, a
scaffolded approach to examining DRP through interactive investigation of privacy policies is
detailed, including a discussion of the impact these documents have on marginalized students.
Finally, the sixth chapter uses this feminist methodology to build a coalition of users
committed to a more digitally-secure and socially-just future and forecasts future implications
concerning DRP praxis and scholarship.
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CHAPTER III: A CASE AGAINST IMPLEMENTING DTC-GENETICS INTO THE
AMERICAN LAW ENFORCEMENT SURVEILLANCE APPARATUS

Law enforcement and biopolitical technologies—including genetic technologies—have
been areas of interest for digital rhetorics and surveillance studies, yet the rhetorical power of
DTC-genetics and genealogy websites have not been fully interrogated by scholars in these
areas. Hybrid research at the intersection of law enforcement and DTC-genetics through the lens
of DRP presents underexamined sites for analysis which concern unethical, oppressive policing
prompted by unethical, oppressive surveillance and invasions of privacy. As described in earlier
chapters, DRP is a state of being when a user is confidant their digital data is free from
unauthorized observances by nefarious computer technologies and other users. This work is
crucial as concern for digital privacy has seeped into mainstream consciousness in the years
following the WikiLeaks scandal31 and Edward Snowden32 dumping data of highly-classified
government information. As a result, now is the time to perform analysis at these sites to reveal
how these technologies perpetuate asymmetrical power dynamics among different groups.
Scholars can learn much from studying instances when DTC-genetics is used as a tool for
forensic genealogy, but a more robust understanding of the far-reaching, embodied, rhetorical
implications of this technology comes from studying how unethical police surveillance
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leaked highly classified information from the National Security Agency (NSA) in 2013.
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disproportionately affects marginalized and multiply-marginalized people. America has long
surveilled and policed marginalized communities—particularly Black communities and
Blackness—and many projects contend with the ethicality of the American judicial system,
including law enforcement infrastructures. Simone Browne (2015) describes how the lantern
laws33 of the nineteenth century, surveillance of civil rights activists 34 in the twentieth century,
and cellphone videos and bodycam recordings 35 of racist police violence occurring in the twentyfirst century are examples of America’s long history of oppressive surveillance and policing.
Yet, based on the popularity of these services in recent years, many people did not consider (or
were not worried about) the power DTC-genetics brings to the police surveillance apparatus until
the technology was used to apprehend suspects starting in 2018.
In this chapter, I argue that using DTC-genetics for surveillance by law enforcement is
unethical and perpetuates the marginalization of othered bodies, particularly Black bodies,
because it reorganizes power and creates an undesirable precedent for society. This practice
opens the door to other digital policing and surveillance strategies that usher in the dystopian
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American civil rights movement of the 1960s with the goal of infiltrating and disrupting political organizations like
the Black Panther Party (American Civil Liberties Union, 2002). The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU)
started the #ProtectBlackDissent campaign to raise awareness of this history of surveillance as well as the updated
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future artists, critics, and historians warn about. Cases involving DTC-genetics for
acquittal/conviction demonstrate unethical means and uses as police harness their power and
exploit these technologies. To demonstrate some of the ways that law enforcement has unequally
delegated DTC-genetics technologies to run surveillance on Black people, this chapter provides a
feminist rhetorical analysis of the relationship between the DTC-genetics industry and police
agencies. I consider the following questions: what are the motivations of the surveilling? How
does this technology inequitably impact marginalized bodies? My rhetorical analysis is guided
by a feminist methodology that seeks to interrogate and reveal how surveillance infrastructures
are used to exploit the power of DTC-genetic technology and thus contribute to what Patricia
Hill Collins (2002) describes as the matrix of oppression based on intersecting identity
categories. How do DTC-genetics conceive of gender and race? How are low-income people
excluded from this technology? What might an intersectional feminist approach reveal about
how individual users and users from marginalized groups might adapt and repurpose genealogy
website technology?
This chapter addresses these questions by studying how law enforcement has
implemented DTC-genetics as a part of the American law enforcement surveillance apparatus.
First, I position my argument among current, relevant research within the purview of feminist
rhetorical studies and describe the context of interrogation of this rhetorical phenomena. Then, I
put into conversation existing New Surveillance theories with an intersectional approach—tenets
of the feminist methodology for interrogating DRP outlined in Chapter 2—to perform rhetorical
analysis of the use of DTC-genetics by the police and present a case against using DTC-genetics
for digital law enforcement surveillance. Finally, this chapter concludes with critical implications
for this project and American culture.
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The Context of Interrogation
This chapter argues law enforcement agencies abuse their power and infringe upon DRP
when they utilize DTC-genetics websites like Ancestry, 23andMe, and GEDmatch to run digital
surveillance. Importantly scholars must consider the contexts in which this practice occurs before
they can accurately and robustly trouble the rhetorical implications of this practice. One way to
learn more about the rhetorical context is to consider a range of critiques concerning the
implementation of DTC-genetics into the American law enforcement surveillance apparatus.
That is, learn something about “history, economics, politics, and social context, [and] take into
account the specific impact of race, class, gender, and culture” (Jones Royster, 2000, p. 257).
With these things in mind, consider that the technologists who actually build the technology
share concern for the effects of using DTC-genetics for surveillance and policing because the
practice does not align with the intention of the technology and lacks oversight and regulation. 36
Curtis Rogers is a retiree who started GEDmatch as a side project with fellow retiree John
Olson.37 In, “How a Tiny Website Became the Police’s Go-To Genealogy Database,” Rogers is
quoted: “My initial reaction was I was upset. I didn’t like this use of our website” to identify
people without their consent (Zhang, 2018) 38. However, now GEDmatch launched the DNA Doe
Project, an initiative “that uses genetic genealogy to identify John and Jane Does” (DNA Doe
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technology used, do not always align with the intentions of the technologies and engineers who design it. Analyzing
this tension is foundational to studies in technical communication and digital rhetorics.
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of nano-pharmaceuticals and advanced forensic tools by fully leveraging the power of DNA” (ParabonNanolabs.com).
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Project). The evolution of GEDmatch from a low-stakes side-project to “a go-to organization for
law enforcement agencies and medical examiners across the country” is one reason why scholars
need to question, argue, and, ultimately, change how these technologies mediate power in
American culture (DNA Doe Project).
The argument in this chapter is constructed through a feminist digital rhetorical
examination of dynamic genres to present a nuanced representation of the implications of DTCgenetics. Malea Powell, Stacey Pigg, Kendall Leon, and Angela Haas (2010) describe rhetoric as
“how individuals know, create, and invent within the everchanging and dynamic social, political,
and economic contexts in which they operate” (p. 4548). As such, this chapter works to capture
how rhetoric enables certain users to harness power while limiting the power of others by
offering a complex understanding of how DTC-genetics impacts our intersectional bodies. 39 The
intersecting identity categories of race, gender, and socio-economic status weave throughout this
chapter revealing the intersectional approach Kimberlé Crenshaw (1989, 2017) describes. Yet, it
is imperative to note that a catalyst for this work is perpetual police violence against Black
bodies in America. Intersectionality is more than a critical lens for analysis; it identifies and
subverts oppression in the systems which surveil us and allow others to control us with their
power. The affordances of viewing oppression based on combinations of identity categories
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international reports, and federal and state police records and court documents. Information from the Bureau of
Labor Statistics, Bureau of Justice Statistics, and other local and federal law enforcement agencies and organizations
demonstrate how DTC-genetics technology and law enforcement actions marginalize certain bodies based on a
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included as well to construct ample, broad context.
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offers complex accounts of the implications of DTC-genetics on police surveillance. The
decision to rhetorically analyze the impact of DTC-genetics industry and law enforcement on
intersectional race, gender, and socio-economic status identity categories illuminates the
inequalities perpetuated by the American law enforcement surveillance apparatus. Analysis of
these identity categories reveals much about the impact of DTC-genetics on American culture,
and positions further studies to consider other identity categories such as ethnicity, ability, and
sexuality; certainly, future projects should consider the intersections of all identity categories.

The Dynamism of the Privacy-Surveillance Continuum
Digital surveillance, including the collecting and sharing of personal information from
users, is not a new practice. As Estee Beck (2015) notes, the trend of tracking users became
concerning because technologies revealed personal information about users to companies. Doing
so created a new market which instantly changed how technologists used their power to alter
how users interacted online. Scholars across the disciplines—surveillance studies and digital
rhetorics included—were prompted to examine digital privacy in an era of New Surveillance
(Marx, 1998). The dynamism of the privacy-surveillance continuum has become of tenable
interest because, as Jessica Reyman (2018) argues, user data “is not merely a technology byproduct to be bought and sold; rather it forms a dynamic, discursive narrative about the paths we
have taken as users” (p. 516). The dynamic narrative of our data Reyman describes wields
rhetorical power when it is aggregated with infinite data points from millions of other users and
used to persuade or manipulate user behaviors. Moreover, manipulating user behavior infringes
upon a reasonable expectation of privacy and can lead to violence against marginalized users.
Yet, how is a reasonable expectation of privacy defined for users on DTC-genetics (Dennen,
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2013; Marx, 1998)? How do we understand the rhetorical implications that arise from police
using DTC-genetics as a method of surveillance?
Current uses of DTC-genetics technologies defy traditional Western cultural rhetorical
practices related to personalized scientific data. As explained in earlier chapters, the cultural
practice shifts from the protection of data to sharing it (Chow-White, 2012). This shift also
influences cultural perceptions and expectations of privacy. A reasonable expectation of privacy
is infringed upon when law enforcement agencies use DTC-genetics technology to conduct
digital surveillance. However, this does not only impact the privacy of criminals; rhetorical
implications extend to average users and everyday citizens who might quickly find themselves in
an authoritative society where police have unlimited power. Furthermore, this newfound method
of digital surveillance is unethical because it lacks transparency concerning the power of
possession. Peter-Chow White (2012) explains that scientists for the Human Genome Project
decided genetic material collected should be treated like a public good; yet the policies
supporting DTC-genetics websites said little about relationships with public law enforcement
agencies before 2018.40
What is a reasonable expectation of privacy? What governing laws—many of which were
created before digital technology became ubiquitous in our cultures—are applicable to privacy in
digital spaces? Posing the former question yields endless subjective responses, many of which
might start with the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States:
“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but
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upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.” (U.S. Const. amend. IV)
Advancements in digital technology have complicated the privacy-surveillance continuum, and
legislators have long relied on the Fourth Amendment to empower users and protect privacy. The
Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA) was passed in 1986, 15 years before the Patriot
Act ushered America into a surveillance state. Currently, no comprehensive legislation pertaining
to digital privacy or safeguarding user data exists to empower and protect American citizens, but
the issue has been considered at the state level; in January 2020, California implemented the
California Consumer Privacy Act of 2018 (CCPA) which “requires a business that collects
personal information about a consumer to disclose the consumer’s right to delete personal
information described above on its Internet Web site or in its online privacy policy or policies”
(SB-1121).41 Other countries, such as those comprising the European Union (EU), have long
worked to empower their citizens by securing their digital privacy. In 2018, the EU implemented
the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR)42, a multi-pronged law replacing the Data
Protection Directive43 initiated in 1995.
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While legislators across the world have wrangled with defining the reasonable
expectation of privacy, so have scholars in digital rhetorics and surveillance studies. Troy Duster
(2012) simplifies the issue as “the age-old balancing act between security and freedom—the
‘special needs’ of government to protect its citizens versus the individual’s right to privacy” (p.
311). The issue is not so simple because the proliferation of digital activity has led users to trade
privacy for sociality (Papacharissi & Gibson, 2011). Vanessa P. Dennen (2013) argues that the
reasonable expectation of privacy varies according to the digital space and must be assessed from
multiple angles, including those concerned with intent, access, and content. Another approach
comes from Gary T. Marx (1998), who identifies “the right to be let alone” as the central criteria
for a reasonable expectation of privacy. He hypothesizes four “Border and Trust Violations” that
cause “individuals to feel that personal borders have been violated and/or that their information
has been inappropriately gathered or treated” when the reasonable expectation of privacy has
been breached (p. 176). Moreover, Marx accounts for the means, the data collection context, and
the uses. Reconceptualizing his approach to account for intersecting identity categories
demonstrates how using DTC-genetics as a digital surveillance strategy perpetuates
asymmetrical power dynamics between the police and various groups within American society.

The Means
Means refers to method. DTC-genetics represents a new technology, or method, for
collecting personal information with greater acceptability. Assessing the means of surveillance
considers harm, boundary, trust, personal relationships, and invalidity (Marx, 1998). Questions
to consider concerning the use of DTC-genetics to solve crimes include: “Does the technique
cause unwarranted physical or psychological harm? Does the technique cross a personal
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boundary without permission? Is the tactic applied in a personal or impersonal setting?” (Marx,
1998, p. 174). When the power of DTC-genetics is used for surveillance then the answer to the
first two questions is yes. Implementing DTC-genetics as a part of the surveillance apparatus
causes unwarranted physical and/or psychological harm and crosses a personal boundary without
permission. Even as the use of DTC-genetics emphasizes personal relationships, answers to the
third question concerning personal relationships proves unique to each case.
Because vectors of power are manipulated, the means of using DTC-genetics by police to
identify perpetrators causes unwarranted physical and psychological harm and crosses a personal
boundary without permission. Moreover, the potential for physical and psychological harm
transcends perpetrators and their victims engulfing family, friends, and local communities when
police use DTC-genetics for surveillance. Physical harm could occur in the form of police
brutality (excessive use of force) often inflicted on people detained or arrested, perpetual
violence in the American prison system, and potentially death depending on the laws governing
their state. These acts of violence against individual bodies maintain the potential to expand
outward to include entire groups of people based on their intersecting identities. When we
consider Jim Crow laws during the twentieth century, Japanese internment camps during World
War II, and cages currently filled with migrant children at the Southern border of the U.S., then
we can see that Americans have long instituted policing strategies that allow them to wield their
power in a way which disproportionately impacts certain bodies and communities both
physically and psychologically.
Psychological harm affects people who endure the traumas of being associated with these
cases, including victims, families, and even the criminals themselves as they await trial,
sentencing, and serve their punishment. As Michel Foucault (1977) notes, the “trace of ‘torture’
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in the modern mechanism of criminal justice…[is] enveloped, increasingly, by the non-corporal
nature of the penal system” (p. 296-7). Most of the time when people think about the
psychological harm of the American criminal justice system—specifically prison—they think
about one body being impacted: the prisoner. However, if the means of using DTC-genetics
continues to be implemented into the American law enforcement surveillance apparatus then this
psychological harm is maximized to affect all citizens governed by the rules of society. Every
action and interaction people have could be linked to a crime randomly like in the case of Lukis
Anderson. Anderson was held for five months when his DNA was found at a murder scene after
the same emergency medical technician 44 assisted him and then a responded to the crime scene
later in the day, carrying Anderson’s DNA with him in the process (Worth, 2015). The result is a
society populated by citizens overseen by an authoritarian government that no longer recognizes
freedoms granted by the First and Fourth Amendments.
Police using DTC-genetics as a means of solving crimes crosses a personal boundary
without permission because people who are identified as criminals are usually not active
members of genealogical communities and did not consent for their data to be uploaded to the
site. Scholars from many disciplines, including bioethics, continue to grapple with the shades of
consent concerning how invasive biopolitical technologies wield power over bodies. Yet,
grappling with consent illuminates the tension between the values of the scientists working for
the Human Genome Project, which believed genetic material should be treated like a public
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good, and the capitalist owners of Ancestry, which was acquired for $5.4 billion by The
Blackstone Group in 2020. The Blackstone Group is a nefarious private equity firm which has
caused controversy with their blatant disregard for human life through gun violence and
leveraged their socioeconomic capital through proliferation of radical conservative propaganda.
Unfortunately, relationships among friends and family members, and particularly users online,
are tense as the authoritarian administration which governed the United States from 2017-2021—
and which The Blackstone Group supports—reveals the oppressive political ideologies of many.
While administrations change in America, the systemic issues BIPOC citizens face remain the
same. As a result, continuing to use DTC-genetics as a form of police surveillance could
completely dismantle the social relationships upon which society is constructed
The means of using DTC-genetics infringes on personal relationships because our genetic
material is inherently bound to other humans—all humans—yet the strategy of police
surveillance via forensic genealogy was applied in impersonal settings, including in laboratories
and other law enforcement infrastructures and settings. The apprehension of Marlon Michael
Alexander, who committed rape and murder, is a unique rhetorical situation in which to consider
the intersection of DTC-genetics and personal relationships45. After working with Parabon
NanoLabs, authorities found a “distant relative of Alexander’s in Georgia, who was able to
provide information about the family. A detective who had experience doing family searches
using genealogy websites then went to work, combing through census records and online
obituaries” to build a family tree and identify him (Moore & Murillo, 2018). Importantly, it is
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not known how distant Alexander’s relative in Georgia was to him, a pertinent consideration
since police surveillance via DTC-genetics infringes upon DRP through personal relationships.

The Data Collection Context
Other ethical issues concerning using DTC-genetics for digital surveillance include the
rhetorical context of data collection. The data collection context accounts for not only the
collection of information, but also the broader conditions surrounding that collection. Both the
public and regulatory agencies constantly grapple with “the rapidly growing ways in which these
data are purposed and repurposed in a constantly shifting context in which some people’s life
chances and opportunities are enhanced, and those of other people are limited” (Lupton &
Michael, 2017, p. 267). As outlined in Chapter 2, analysis of the data collection context
triangulates around issues of awareness, consent, and the symbolic meaning of precedent: “Are
individuals aware that personal information is being collected, who seeks it, and why? Do
individuals consent to the data collection? What does the use of a method communicate more
generally? Is it likely to create precedents that will lead to its application in undesirable ways?”
(Marx, 1998, p. 174). Criminals who have been identified and arrested via DTC-genetics must
have considered—although perhaps they were not aware—that their personal information would
be sought by police based on their crimes. Moreover, the symbolic meaning for the general
public perpetuates the precedent set with the capture of the Golden State Killer. For many, this
precedent is unwanted because it usurps agency—and in turn, DRP—and reorganizes power
around an oppressive, controlling institution: the state.
Awareness and consent are complex concepts to consider when analyzing DRP because
no user is aware of the full range of potential consequences of data collection and use—
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particularly the use of DTC-genetics for police surveillance—and often consent is not possible.
There are degrees of awareness leading to full awareness, or Total Information Awareness
(Lyon, 2003), which “represents a new integrating surveillance system through which law
enforcement, intelligence, and consumer data are tabulated by automated computer systems”
(Lewis, 2006, p. 270). Like awareness, shades of consent exist upon the privacy-surveillance
continuum. Consent “can be very problematic, given the role of culture in shaping perceptions
and the fact that choice always occurs within situations that are not fully free or within the
making of the person choosing.” (Marx, 1998, p. 177). Like Kristin Marie Bivens (2018), users
might consider one intersection of awareness and consent informed consent. Ultimately,
informed consent is a is a constantly negotiated practice defined by rhetorical agency—or
empowerment to make decisions about participation.
Informed consent in digital spaces varies in practice, but users might turn to website
cookie notices as a mainstream example of digital informed consent 46. According to the Federal
Trade Commission (FTC) website:
A cookie is information saved by your web browser. When you visit a website, the site
may place a cookie on your web browser so it can recognize your device in the future. If
you return to that site later on, it can read that cookie to remember you from your last
visit and keep track of you over time. (Federal Trade Commission)
Users who visit websites with cookie notices can opt-in or opt-out, which allows them to
exercise their rhetorical power about whether or not they wish to be surveilled. When Verogen,
Inc., acquired GEDmatch on December 9, 2019, they instituted a “Public + opt-out” option in
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which, “DNA data is available for comparison to any Raw Data in the GEDmatch database,
except DNA kits identified as being uploaded for Law Enforcement purposes” (GEDmatch).
Verogen’s decision to include an opt-out option gestures towards ethical transparency via user
empowerment concerning the data collection context for GEDmatch users. There is no evidence
which shows any of the perpetrators caught using DTC-genetics were aware DTC-genetics might
be used to identify them based on the analysis performed for this project. Moreover, none
consented to police uploading their original genetic material to GEDmatch because their consent
was unobtainable since they were unidentified suspects. This means the police agencies made
decisions to manipulate the genetic material of a suspect through a third-party (a DTC-genetics
website) without regulation or repercussions for their actions. Trust between police agencies and
the public is currently low in America, and in many places in the world 47; that gap will certainly
extend if police are allowed to continue to use DTC-genetics for digital surveillance because
their power lacks effective oversight and regulation.
Law enforcement agencies in Sacramento, California established the precedent and
shaped a symbolic meaning for DTC-genetics in American culture when they identified the
Golden State Killer using GEDmatch. The consequences of this infringement upon DRP was
ultimately felt on an individual level by the Golden State Killer, and now dozens of other
suspects who have been identified using the repurposed technology. However, these actions
maintain rhetorical implications for the broader society as well. Scholars interested in digital
privacy and activists working towards a socially-just society must contemplate how this
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precedent alters the ways Americans think about DRP now that they know police use DTCgenetics for surveillance. Americans need to consider the other digital technologies that are
going to be repurposed for surveillance with the potential to infringe upon DRP. Americans need
to work to make Terms of Service (ToS) documents more understandable and they need to enact
legislation which more explicitly protects user privacy and ends the use of DTC technologies that
rely on biometrics for police surveillance.
Technologists and law enforcement officials failed to navigate the long-range meanings
of their actions on American society, even as the surveillance state maintains a place in
mainstream consciousness. The consequences for the public are dire if police agencies continue
to harness this power for digital surveillance. Along with the ability to profile individuals within
larger communities, police presence will intensify in certain neighborhoods erroneously, and
they will be able to know (and perhaps predict) our politicized behaviors—like attending a
peaceful Black Lives Matter protest or a local fundraiser for LGBTQ kids in the community—
which ultimately leads to systemic control of bodies by limiting power. Upgraded editions of
technologies constantly usurp older versions. Increased utilization of biopolitical technologies
like DTC-genetics in American culture means citizens must be aware of which technologies are
repurposed by corporations and government institutions (like the police) and how nefarious
reutilization disproportionately distributes power among stakeholders.
The Patriot Act ushered in a new era of extensive and pervasive digital surveillance by
American intelligence agencies. On September 11, 2001, al-Qaeda terrorists hijacked airplanes
and crashed them into the World Trade Center in New York City, the Pentagon in Washington
D.C., and in rural Pennsylvania. Just 45 days later, on October 26, 2001, U.S. Congress enacted
the Patriot Act which eased restrictions on digital surveillance by government organizations and
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enhanced coordination among law enforcement agencies like the Federal Bureau of Investigation
(FBI) and the National Security Agency (NSA). Under Patriot Act authorization, the emails,
telephone conversations, and other digital communications by average users were now subject to
mundane scrutiny which intensified with cause. The Patriot Act forced citizens to relinquish their
privacy in order to use many digital technologies which, unironically, made average users more
willing to participate in algorithm-driven social media platforms in the years which followed
(Facebook launched in 2004 and Twitter in 2006), and, more recently, willing to submit their
DNA to DTC-genetics websites.
The Patriot Act also gave new meaning to DRP in American culture. Like all aspects of
Western culture, inequalities in DRP exist which marginalize certain bodies and those have been
amplified as privacy, and who gets privacy, has been reimagined in post-9/11 America. In
America, Black and Brown bodies face enhanced scrutiny at airport security checkpoints and
peaceful practitioners of religions like Islam and Judaism are murdered by white supremacists.
America’s involvement in futile wars in the Middle East continue to claim victims each year in
the name of democracy and freedom. As a result (and quite frankly), the use of DTC-genetics as
a surveillance tool by law enforcement is somewhat unsurprising considering the white, middleclass pursuit for more rigorous forms of digital surveillance following Columbine, 9/11, and the
long history of genetic-based oppression and policing in America. Yet, how are infringements
upon DRP resisted in this new surveillance era, one where digital technology is ubiquitous? We
must push for legislation which equitably accounts for all bodies within the purview of the law
(Regan, 1995). In doing so, the use of DTC-genetics—and infringements upon DRP—is a social
issue rather than an individual issue.
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The Uses
Uses refers to what happens to data after it is collected, including as it is aggregated and
shared among various parties. Scholars and activists must contemplate the different audiences
the data will be used to persuade, and the rhetorical implications for various bodies as a result of
the uses. According to Marx (1998), analysis of data uses for surveillance—dataveillance48—
considers the beneficence to the community, issues of proportionality, and the relationship
between the goals and the means of surveillance:
Does application of the tactic serve broad community goals, the goals of the object of
surveillance, or the personal goals of the data collector? Is there an appropriate balance
between the importance of the goal and the cost of the means? Are the goals of the data
collection legitimate? Is there a clear link between the information collected and the goal
sought? (p. 174)
When police agencies first started to use DTC-genetics for digital surveillance, they did so for
reasons other than those offered on the GEDmatch website at the time. Using information
gathered from DTC-genetics for purposes beyond those outlined in their policies represents an
unethical use of power, a distinct violation of DRP regardless of the beneficence to society, the
proportionality of costs, and the goals of the data usage.
Using DTC-genetics to identify criminals serves the broader community goal of solving
crimes and catching criminals, but is not beneficial to society because of consequences for DRP.
The potential assemblage of bodies impacted when DTC-genetics are used for police
surveillance can never be known. Perpetrators and their victims are not the only stakeholders in
their cases: friends, family members, police agencies, and members of local and far-reaching
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communities are impacted. Those impacted represent potential coalitions in our communities
(Carastathis, 2013). These coalitions are where the force for social change for a more digitally
secure future is generated. The Coalition for Genetic Data Protection—comprised of Ancestry,
23andMe, and Helix—represents one example of a successful coalition geared toward DRP; they
push to require law enforcement agencies to follow the legal process of a warrant in order to
search consumer databases (Van Ness, 2020). The Coalition for Genetic Data Protection is a
reminder that DTC-genetics are companies interacting with consumers, which manifests in every
decision the businesses make.
The proportionality, financial cost, of using DTC-genetics for surveillance outweighs the
goals of law enforcement agencies. According to the Budget of the U.S. Government for the
Fiscal Year 2019 published by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) the Department of
Justice (DOJ) requested $28 billion, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) $46 billion,
and the Department of Defense (DOD) requested $686 billion in funding for a total of $760
billion for the 2019 fiscal year.49 Outlawing the use of DTC-genetics for forensic genealogy
forces federal and local police agencies to reroute funds internally, ultimately revealing the
unethical discrepancies in public services funding in America. The possibilities for systemic,
long-term social changes are vast if just some of the funds the DOJ, DHS, and DOD received in
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2019 were rerouted for services with goals aimed at environmental preservation, inclusive,
communal education, and grassroots economic development. 50
The goals of data collection for DTC-genetics companies are delegitimized when genetic
material is unknowingly uploaded without consent. For the criminals police apprehended there
was not a clear link between the information collected and the goal of law enforcement’s actions
on the sites because using DTC-genetics as the means for forensic genealogy was new. What is
the connection between the means and the goals? Consider how well a test measures its data—or
reaches its goals—based on its method(s). The immediate goal of the police was reached, yet this
outcome was unpredictable because the technology was repurposed. Moreover, it is necessary to
consider that reaching this unpredictable technological goal maintains known and unknown
rhetorical implications, including the power to lead to predictive policing.51 Questions of “how
such forces shape our attention economies and cultural production increasingly require our
attention” now (Helles & Flyverbom, 2019). Even if the long-term consequences of repurposing
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biopolitical technologies like DTC-genetics are hard to predict, people must be ready to resist
any form of authoritative police control of their bodies.52

Valuing Diverse Bodies to Deconstruct Oppressive Surveillance Infrastructures
When law enforcement agencies use DTC-genetics for forensic genealogy, they utilize an
open-source database to surveil and identify violent offenders in order to solve crimes. This
repurposed means of surveillance deserves scrutiny, for those committed to social justice and
equal power must always press police, and all the systems which surveil us, for ethical
transparency. Scholars and the public must grapple with a more robust comprehension of the
implications of DTC-genetics as a forensic tool on American culture. Intersectional feminist
analysis offers a complex understanding of how New Surveillance technologies, including DTCgenetics, marginalize bodies based on identity categories which highlight the dimensions of racebased policing, police violence against women, and systemic socioeconomic status control.
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who seek social, racial, and economic justice in American society following avoidable murders of Black bodies by
police. Bodycam footage and cellphone recordings revealed that on May 25, 2020, former Minneapolis police
officer Derek Chauvin killed George Floyd by forcefully kneeling on and restricting his airway. Floyd’s death was
ruled a homicide due to “cardiopulmonary arrest complicating law enforcement subdual, restraint, and neck
compression (Hennepin County Medical Examiner Office). Floyd’s death served as a catalyst for those who seek to
build a more equitable future and lead to protests designed to propel our culture toward socially-just reforms,
beginning with defunding the American law enforcement infrastructure.
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Race-Based Policing
The establishment and evolution of law enforcement systems in America police and
regulate bodies based on racial identity categories. Centuries of race-based inequality in Western
culture have led to harsher sentences imposed on Black and Latinx defendants than on white
defendants because of unfounded, erroneous beliefs they “are more dangerous, more likely to
recidivate, and more adaptable to prison” (Steffensmeier, Painter-Davis, & Ulmer, 2016, p. 7).
Using systemic power to control certain bodies and actions contributes to the long history of
unethical race-based policing in America, which is amplified when DTC-genetics is utilized
more often by police to identify perpetrators in the future. DTC-genetics as a forensic genealogy
tool extends the rule of Jim Crow Laws and sundown towns53 and is categorized with racist
police methods such as stop-and-frisk laws and profiling.
The potential for violence against marginalized bodies—particularly Black bodies—has
increased as affiliative self-fashioning via DTC-genetics gained popularity over the last decade
(Nelson & Hwang, 2012). The last decade saw a significant increase in documented police
violence against Black bodies—violence which will increase as the use of DTC-genetics by law
enforcement increases. Even though there are no racial indicators available when DNA or other
bodily fluids are collected from a crime scene, the identification of certain genealogical and
medical diseases assists in building a racial profile once the DNA is processed in a lab 54,
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Sundown towns are all-white municipalities that practice racial discrimination through local laws and violence.
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For example, sickle cell anemia disproportionately affects Black people more than other races, so if police collect

genetic material which reveals a perpetrator suffers from the disease then they could reasonably assume their suspect
is Black. According to the National Institute for Allergies and Infectious Diseases (NIAID), “American Indian and
Alaska Natives were five times as likely to develop a case of HCV [Hepatitis C] than the white population,” which

71

inevitably leading to further police oppression when DTC genetics is used for forensic genealogy
more often. The Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS) is the primary source for criminal justice
statistics in the United States. BJS collects, analyzes, publishes, and disseminates “data on crime,
criminal offenders, victims of crime, and the operation of justice systems at all levels of
government. These data are critical to federal, state, and local policymakers in combating crime
and ensuring that justice is both efficient and evenhanded” (Bureau of Justice Statistics). The
BJS Arrest-Related Deaths (ARD) Program Redesign Study, 2015-16, found 1,348 potential
ARDs from June 2015-March 2016.
Technological advancements such as security cameras, bodycams, and cell phone video
cameras—forms of sousveillance55—allow for more documentable cases of police violence and
more collection of data from the human body. Yet, police violence is still rampant in America,
compounding preexisting violence against already oppressed bodies. Mapping Police Violence is
an organizational “collaborative collecting comprehensive data on police killings nationwide to
quantify the impact of police violence in communities” (Mapping Police Violence). According to
the 2017 Police Violence Report, 1,147 people were killed by police; 149 of those people were
unarmed, and the most unarmed people killed by police were BIPOC, which includes Latinx.
The 2017 Police Violence Report demonstrates race-based statistics in various ways; for
example, the report shows that police killed more white people (51) than Black people (49).
However, these statistics do not prove that police violence against bodies happens regardless of
race because white people (76.3%) make up a significantly larger amount of the American

means if forensic genealogy reveals this disease then police might reasonably begin their investigation with this
information in mind (NIAID).
55

Sousveillance refers to recording an activity via wearable or hand-held technology (Mann and Ferenbok 2013).
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population than Black people (13.4%) (United State Census Bureau). While there is not always
documented police violence (e.g. cellphone recordings) against criminals who are apprehended
via DTC-genetics, the potential for police violence exists in their arrest, detainment, and
incarceration.56

Police Violence Against BIWOC
The power to marginalize certain bodies sustains when DTC-genetics is used for police
surveillance, but marginalization exists based on the intersections of identity, not just racial
identity. Violence against women in American society occurs in many forms including police
violence. Transwomen, particularly transwomen-of-color, are disproportionately affected by this
violence; according to the 2015 U.S. Transgender Survey:
47% of respondents “were sexually assaulted at some point in their lifetime and one in
ten (10%) were sexually assaulted in the past year. In communities of color, these
numbers are higher: 53% of Black respondents were sexually assaulted in their lifetime
and 13% were sexually assaulted in the last year. (National Resource Center on Domestic
Violence)
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Rhetorics has taken up studying a variety of aspects of imprisonment culture, including literacy (Jacobi, 2011;

Berry, 2018), vulnerability (Owen, 2019) and agency via intellectual and creative freedom (Coogan, 2019; Coogan
2020).
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The deaths of Sandra Bland57 at the Waller County Jail in Hempstead, Texas in 2015, Layleen
Polanco58 on Rikers Island in the Bronx, New York in 2018, and the murder of Breonna Taylor 59
by police officers at her home in Louisville, Kentucky in 2020, represent only three of the
numerous instances of police violence against Black women. The major differences between
Bland, Polanco, and Taylor is that they were innocent and the women who were arrested after
police used DTC-genetics for forensic genealogy to uncover their crimes are more than likely
not. Black women murdered by police for low-stakes, unconfirmed, or non-existent violations
while women of other races—particularly white women—are escorted out of their homes by
police for much more heinous crimes reveals the unfortunate truth as to how power is distributed
in American society.60
Every so often the U.S. legislates policies and enacts initiatives which purport to protect
women in society, but few policies reach expectations. For example, the Violence Against
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28-year-old Sandra Bland was discovered hanged in Waller County, Texas jail cell after 3 days of detainment

following a pretextual traffic stop.
58

Afro-Latinx transwoman Layleen Xtravaganza Cubilette-Polanco was 27-years-old when she died in solitary

confinement on Rikers Island.
59

Breonna Taylor was murdered by Louisville Metro Police Department officers Jonathan Mattingly, Brett

Hankison, and Myles Cosgrove serving a constitutionally-complex no-knock search warrant. She was 26-years-old.
60

Deborah Riddle O’Conner is a white woman who was arrested in February 2020 after forensic genealogy revealed

she was the perpetrator in a murder that occurred in 1999. After no one answered pleas from the community for
someone to come forward, an infant John Doe, nicknamed “Baby Michael” after the patron saint of law enforcement
officers, was buried at Hair’s Chapel Free Will Holiness Church later that year (Marusak, 2020). She was
apprehended after a civil, non-violent interaction with law enforcement in the comfort of her own home. She was
charged with killing her newborn son by throwing him out of a moving vehicle on a North Carolina highway.
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Women Act (VAWA) of 1994 provided “landmark legislation that created legal protections for
victims of domestic and sexual violence and established funding streams for responding to these
crimes” (Starheim, 2019). VAWA funded domestic violence shelters and rape crisis centers, but
also financially supported systemically biased police agencies, prosecutors, and courts since it
was overseen by the DOJ. Currently, there is no legislation protecting women from violence
originating from powerful biopolitical technologies used to monitor and control them, nor their
interactions that originate in other digital spaces (e.g. on social media platforms).
According to Maeve Duggan (2017), women (11%) are more than twice as likely as men
(5%) to say they have been targeted online as a result of their gender. In 2014, Gamergate 61
made international headlines for backlash against the achievements of women online “which
went beyond the gaming world and infiltrated politics with the use of trolls to enact political
change that sustains the worst instances of traditional hegemonic power” (Bordalejo, 2019, p.
60). Methods of inflicting violence upon women in digital spaces comes in many forms—
stalking, doxing, and catfishing, among others—and will increase as DTC-genetics is used for
police surveillance. The potential for unethical or devious uses of this technology recall familiar
violence that results from men tracking their former partners via location data and other forms of
invasive digital surveillance, including apps like TrackMyFone and Spy Human that are
designed to monitor actions in specific digital spaces and on certain devices.
Police violence against marginalized bodies does not end with the arrest of a perpetrator
by means of DTC-genetics but continues throughout detainment and incarceration. The number
of deaths in state prisons rose 15% from 2006-2016 (Carson & Cowhig, 2020). Deaths covered
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Gamergate was an online harassment campaign directed at Zoë Quinn, Brianna Wu, Anita Sarkeesian, and other

women associated with gaming to discredit their achievements through sexism and misogyny.
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in the Mortality in State and Federal Prisons, 2001-2016 report published by the BJS include
deaths by natural causes, illness, suicides, and homicides, but not all prison violence leads to
death. Particularly, Black people are susceptible to death in prisons. Of course, this is because
the laws which prescribe power in American society are created to govern, surveil, and control
non-normative experiences. According to the National Association for the Advancement of
Colored People (NAACP), 56% of people incarcerated in the United States are African
American or Hispanic, yet this same demographic makes up only 32% of the country’s
population. Moreover, Black people are incarcerated at more than 5 times that of white people
and the imprisonment of Black women is double that of white women (NCAAP). Critics who
ignore obvious asymmetrical power dynamics in American society point to deficit models in lieu
of taking up Critical Race Theory to examine people’s lived experiences based on power, race,
and the law to help understand how police violence against Black bodies happens and why.
Physical, psychological, and sexual violence occur frequently in prisons. According to
the DOJ Report on Sexual Victimization in Prisons, Jails, and Juvenile Correctional Facilities,
6.9% of women inmates in prisons registered inmate-on-inmate sexual victimization and 2.3%
registered staff-on-inmate sexual victimization (Office of Justice Programs). Yet, the purview of
violence against women extends beyond police violence. According to the National Coalition
Against Domestic Violence (NCADV), 25% of women (1 in 4) have experienced violence from
an intimate partner and only 34% of women seek medical aid for such violence. If the future
involves widespread use of DTC-genetics to catch criminals, then the percentages of violence
against women in police custody and during incarceration increases. It is also fair to surmise
physical and emotional violence, particularly domestic violence, increases as well because many
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of the implications for DTC-genetics beyond criminality concern how people define family and
how they give power to their identity in society.

Systemic Socioeconomic Status Control
American law enforcement agencies rely on a number of tactics to systematically control
bodies based on socioeconomic status. Among the strategies they rely on to create disparities in
how different citizens are treated include gerrymandering and redlining. Citizens with an income
less than $20,000 face significantly increased risk of exposure to police use of force (Motley &
Joe, 2018). The economic implications for multiply-marginalized bodies when DTC-genetics is
used for digital surveillance are vast and the financial impact of genetic technology is inequitable
among stakeholders. Normalizing DTC-genetics as a means of forensic genealogy normalizes a
ubiquitous digital “gaze, a surveillance that makes it possible to qualify, classify, and punish”
(Foucault, 1977, p. 187). Moreover, it is important to note DRP excludes certain people based on
socioeconomic status (e.g. users who cannot afford security software or upgraded devices with
enhanced protection) and infringements upon DRP like when DTC-genetics is use for police
surveillance illuminate how classification and punishment is often a result of socioeconomic
status.
One familiar strategy governments and law enforcement use to manipulate classification
and perpetuate oppression is through gerrymandering, which involves reconstructing geographic
districts to benefit certain political stakeholders.62 The triangulation of gerrymandering, police,
and genetic technology directs attention to one of law enforcement’s most racist, unethical, and
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Gerrymandering has been employed in America to divide communities by race, but maintains economic

implications for government infrastructures like transportation, education, and law enforcement.
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unconstitutional policing practices: DNA dragnets. DNA dragnets are a police strategy involving
“the mass DNA sampling of individuals whom authorities have neither probable cause nor
reasonable suspicion to believe perpetrated the crime in question” in specific geographic areas
(Will, 2003, p. 130). The constitutionality of DNA dragnets has been challenged (Chapin, 2005).
Moreover, DNA dragnets are racist, unethical, and unconstitutional because—like DTCgenetics—they rely on a pre-existing database of genetic material for comparative analysis: a
process that highlights issues of lack of probable cause and consent. It is a violation of rights to
implore someone to submit physical evidence simply based on the hue of their skin. It is a
violation of American constitutional rights to do so without a warrant, which is how a DNA
dragnet functions. One frightening example includes the New York Police Department (NYPD)
coercing physical evidence from hundreds of Black men in boroughs beyond Queens to solve the
murder of Karina Vetrano, a woman living in the neighborhood. If the future of American
policing is to more often include the use of genetic technology for surveillance, then DNA
dragnets will proliferate as a racist, unethical strategy that is unconstitutional in America.
Another unconstitutional practice that occurs through the usage and manipulation of
digital technologies, but not just biopolitical technologies, is digital redlining. Digital redlining is
a discriminatory act aimed at keeping services—businesses, goods, information—from residents
of an area based on identity markers, including race and socio-economic status. Even though
redlining was outlawed in the Civil Rights Act of 1968, it led to digital redlining, a result of the
policies which regulate and monitor engagement with information technology which abets
surveillance (Gilliard & Culik, 2016). DTC-genetics, and all biopolitical technology, has the
power to perform digital redlining, ultimately propagating the digital divide in America through
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the systematic cataloguing of people based on various identity categories to exploit categorical
inequities in American society.
Like all biopolitical technologies, DTC-genetics exists within and perpetuates the digital
divide—and thus unequal power—among users. Key components intersecting DRP
categorization and the digital divide include access to technology and technical literacy (Bowie,
2012). As Peter Chow-White (2012) notes: “despite global proliferation of DNA databases and
genome scientists adopting discursive ethos of democracy, inclusion, and global diversity in
regard to genomic resources, there is a global digital divide in genomic data” (p. 293). On what
side of the genomic digital divide were the criminals? When considering this range of
implications we must think about both users without access to reliable technology and those
lacking technical literacies affected by the public’s rapid desire for DTC-genetics because their
bodies face disproportionate violence due to the economic implications of DRP.

Situating DRP as A Foundational Principle of Resistance
The identification and arrest of criminals by DTC-genetics prompts scholars to examine
how culture is made on genealogy websites. Privacy policies offer a primary artifact for analysis
concerning how power is mediated on these sites. Privacy policies represent a cultural object
with the ability to persuade how users conceive DRP by normalizing certain activities and
practices to shape meaning differently for diverse audiences and communities (Bawarshi &
Reiff, 2010). Further explication of this dynamic genre challenges the norms of digital privacy
and surveillance as a method of resistance against systemic oppression by law enforcement. How
do divergent ethics of various stakeholders contribute to violations of DRP? How can reimagined
privacy policies help the public reckon with and abolish police violence against marginalized
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bodies in American culture? Addressing these questions reveals much about the current cultural
moment and works to situate DRP as a foundational principle of an equitable society.
My analysis of the policies which prescribe user actions on DTC-genetics websites
reveals how they lead to ubiquitous police surveillance and violence. As mentioned throughout
this project, privacy policies regulate power within most digital communities, and are designed
to protect the companies (Beck, 2016). Thus, reviewing the rhetorical aspects of privacy policies
coincides with reviewing the ethics of the technologists which write them and the companies
which publish them. The GEDmatch privacy policy did not account for the divergent ethics of
law enforcement from casual consumers because DTC-genetics was an unfounded forensic tool.
This resulted in violations of DRP that led to violence in the form of arrests and incarceration,
but also unlocked a potential avenue for authoritative policing via systemic bodily control. Like
many of the strategies used by American law enforcement, the use of DTC-genetics for digital
surveillance is unethical; yet responsibility for this infringement upon DRP must be shared
among all stakeholders, including the police, the genealogy companies, the criminals, and the
public. If genetic material is going to be treated like a public good as scientists working on the
Human Genome Project desired, then DRP must become a foundational principle for all digital
interactions.
Ethical considerations between stakeholders when DTC-genetics is used as a forensic
genealogy tool vary because values and motivations differ among stakeholders. Estee Beck
(2016) directs attention to the ideological viewpoints, methodological vision, and design of
visibility and transparency as critical considerations to make concerning the credibility of
website privacy policies. Examining the “views and beliefs assumed in terms and conditions,
[evaluating] the underlying purpose and collection method, and [assessing] how the website
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operator designs statements for efficient, easy use and comprehension along with transparent
data practices” reveals how privacy policies perpetuate marginalization of some users (Beck,
2016, p. 75). Users must consider how the views and beliefs of the people in control of these
companies are reflected in the site’s privacy policy. For example, how does the aforementioned
purchase of Ancestry by The Blackstone Group, a firm which has faced scrutiny for human
rights violations by the United Nations, impact the ways data collection is outlined in the
Ancestry privacy policy? Moreover, users must contend with how and why those ethics lead to
unethical surveillance and police violence in American culture. There is no standard ethic for
users of genealogy websites or DTC-genetics companies, let alone a comprehensive ethic for
DRP. However, users might take up a virtue-based approach that looks to exemplars within the
community to develop a contingent normative system of values and beliefs for operating on
genealogy websites (Duffy, Holmes, & Gallagher, 2018). In doing so, user actions would be
prescribed by communal values and goals and not a policy that may exist based on the values
and goals of a handful of people.
The ethical question of autonomy—and by extension ownership—perplexes scholars
beyond rhetoric and surveillance studies. Bioethicists and medical ethicists have long debated if
our bodies should be our property, and changes to the ways human body parts are used in
medicine prompted major changes to laws (Goold, 2014). As mentioned before, the Human
Genome Project conceived of genetic material as a public good (Chow-White, 2012). Posthuman ethicists reject individual autonomy on the basis that we are also made up of non-human
material, as well as pointing to the interconnectedness of human bodies (Herring & Chau, 2014).
Law enforcement using DTC-genetics for digital surveillance complicates the ethics of
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ownership because the rules governing physical property differ from the rules governing digital
data.
When perpetrators are identified using DTC-genetics, it means their genetic material was
recovered from crime scenes and first entered into the CODIS system, which is considered an
ethical legal practice, but yielded no results. The CODIS database classifies information from a
range of criminals who have committed crimes of various magnitude and who have had their
genetic material collected as a result of their actions. However, it is unethical to classify the
offense of someone arrested for marijuana possession (a federal offense, but not a state-level
offense in many places) as having the same magnitude as someone who commits murder. Yet,
when CODIS or DTC-genetics is used for identification, the repercussion for both offenses
means losing ownership of your genetic materials forever; the digitization of that physical
material by DTC-genetics companies is unethical.
The identification of people without their consent could be considered a form of doxing.
Dox is neologism which refers to “dropping documents” and represents a user attempting to
wield power over another user leaking personal information online (Hutchinson, 2018). Doxing
is an unethical strategy, but the identification and notification of criminals in our communities is
ethical and necessary. While personal information online was not leaked, it was obtained and
used within digital contexts as law enforcement wielded a new power over society. As a result,
many friends and family members experienced the unwanted, traumatic revelation of their
personal data even though law enforcement’s goal was not to cause harm to stakeholders beyond
the criminals they sought. As users instill DRP as a foundational principle of a society free of
ubiquitous surveillance and regulation by white-patriarchal law enforcement systems, both the

82

use of DTC-genetics for forensic genealogy and doxing should not only be frowned upon as
unethical, but illegal.
Questioning norms of digital privacy and surveillance is a method of resistance against
white-patriarchal regulation exacerbated by American law enforcement systems. Technologies
are fallible because the people who create new technologies and repurpose old technologies
maintain biases. Genetic technology is imperfect and impacts various bodies disproportionately,
yet the justice system continues to utilize the technology as a tool which defines forensics
(Worth, 2015). One of the goals of this project is to end police violence against marginalized and
multiply-marginalized bodies by challenging the means, collection, and uses of data gained
through unethical digital surveillance. Users should challenge the values and beliefs of the
people who design technologies and write privacy policies regulating user actions and consider
how the ethos of the company is reflected in their internal protocols and public actions to
deconstruct the American law enforcement surveillance apparatus. Marginalized and multiplymarginalized bodies are disproportionately impacted when DTC-genetics is used for police
surveillance as demonstrated in this chapter. The long history of genetic technologies—from
eugenics to current trends in DTC-genetics—directs attention to how these technologies
maximize white privilege. Therefore, to utilize DTC-genetics for digital police surveillance only
perpetuates oppression in American culture. DRP is a method of resistance to this oppression.

Conclusion
Expanding New Surveillance theories to consider intersecting identity categories reveals
how the oppressions marginalized and multiply-marginalized bodies experience are compounded
when DTC-genetics are used to extend the power of the police. Indeed, this method of digital
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surveillance is unethical and the infrastructures which produce oppression in American culture
must be deconstructed. To deconstruct current oppressive cultural systems—and concurrently
values and beliefs—means infrastructures such as law enforcement and education must be
reimagined. One result of gerrymandering is the School-to-Prison Pipeline exacerbated by the
DOJ “Cops in Schools” initiative “which gave out $750 million to hire 6,500 new school-based
police” (Vitale, 2018, p. 55). What would it mean for the students in classrooms—and the
broader community—if the “Cops in Schools” initiative was reimagined as a program comprised
of additional teachers and counselors? Violence against bodies based on race, gender, and
socioeconomic status will continue in prisons and among low-income communities as the digital
divide expands, and when DTC-genetics is implemented as a part of the American law
enforcement surveillance apparatus. Dismantling the tyrannical American law enforcement
infrastructure is a method of contending with, and, ultimately, deconstructing oppression in
society.
Since DTC-genetics represents a shift in cultural practices from data protection to data
sharing, the policies regulating user actions on these sites do not account for the dynamism of the
privacy-surveillance continuum. DRP accounts for a reasonable expectation of privacy which
excludes the means of using DTC-genetics by police to identify perpetrators because it crosses
personal boundaries without permission and causes unwarranted physical and psychological
harm. The impersonal setting of DTC-genetics breeds a lack of awareness and consent of data
collection and use among users and non-users; disregard for awareness and consent is
emblematic of work performed by American intelligence and law enforcement agencies under
reauthorizations of the Patriot Act. DRP resists the unwanted and dangerous precedent—one
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which disproportionately affects different bodies—established when DTC-genetics was first used
as a means of forensic genealogy.
DRP must be situated as a foundational principle in American society to deconstruct
oppressive, hegemonic systems through comprehensive, adaptable legislation which builds upon
the Fourth Amendment and accounts for all users. 63 This is work all users and non-users must
commit to perform, including those who are propelled to change their attitudes about privacy
online based on my analysis in this project. Privacy policies provide a rhetorical genre in which
DRP can be imagined, performed, and regulated by governmental policy and oversight by
special interest groups and activists. Divergent ethics are going to exist since there is no standard
ethic for genealogy websites, but users operating on these sites should consider a virtue-based
approach to developing a set of values and beliefs for users. The rules governing physical
property must be extended to account for the digitization of genetic material; moreover, the use
of DTC-genetics for forensic genealogy should be illegal. Ending the police violence inflicted
upon marginalized and multiply-marginalized bodies through this means of digital surveillance is
a goal of this work. To begin, Ancestry and 23andMe must follow the lead of a site like
FamilyTreeDNA and put into their privacy policy that they will not work with law enforcement.
We must force our police agencies for transparency about how they spend their funds and force
them to end their relationship with DTC-genetics companies. Technologists and biotech
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In August 2020, Blackstone private equity firm purchased Ancestry for $5.7 billion. The “price tag represents a

significant jump to Ancestry.com’s valuation from four years ago, when Silver Lake and GIC invested in the Lehi,
Utah-based company at a $2.6 billion valuation” (Oguh, 2020). Blackstone has been criticized for their
environmental terrorism and corrupt political affiliations, including in 2019 when Blackstone provided Immigrations
and Customs Enforcement (ICE) guest lists for Motel 6 locations they own.
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engineers must concede to end involvement in these projects regardless of the personal financial
benefit. And scholars might examine the biases inherent to the policies regulating user actions as
a method of resistance to the oppressive American law enforcement surveillance apparatus.
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CHAPTER IV: ANALYZING HOW DTC-GENETICS PRIVACY POLICIES PRESCRIBE
POWER ASYMMETRICALLY AMONG USERS

The distribution of rhetorical power online is asymmetrical, which is reflective of the
systems that are influenced by white supremacy64 in American society, especially the law
enforcement and justice systems. Uneven power dynamics based on race, gender, socioeconomic status, and other identity markers persist in the creation of biopolitical digital
technologies, including Web 2.0 technologies which rely on the Internet. 65 Those people most
often excluded, both historically and contemporarily, are women and Black, Indigenous, and
People of Color (BIPOC). However, scholars can look to one rhetorical genre to better
understand how rhetorical power is prescribed online: privacy policies. A privacy policy is a
Terms of Service (ToS) document that prescribes power and regulates user actions within digital
communities. As mentioned in Chapter 3, according to Estee Beck (2016) privacy policies are
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White supremacy is the “idea that white people and the ideas, thoughts, beliefs, and actions of white people are

superior to People of Color and their ideas, thoughts, beliefs, and actions” and are perpetuated in all of our systems,
particularly the American justice system (Dismantling Racism Works Workbook).
65

Excluding people based on minority identity markers has been a pertinent issue within the fields of science,

technology, engineering, and math (STEM) historically. The work of National Aeronautics and Space
Administration (NASA) mathematicians Mary Jackson, Katherine Johnson, and Dorothy Vaughn and the infinite
commodification of Henrietta Lacks’ cells (HeLa cells) without financial compensation for her or her family are two
instances representative of how Black women’s contributions to STEM are historically glossed over. Jackson,
Johnson, and Vaughn worked to propel the first American, astronaut John Glenn, into orbit (Shetterly, 2016). Lacks’
cells aided in the development of the polio vaccine and genetics technology that led to, among other biopolitical
technologies, DTC-genetics (Skloot, 2010).
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designed as a legal statement to protect companies from lawsuits. There is a robust history in
rhetorical studies of contending with the implications of the policies which shape meaning in
society, including local and federal policies and laws, as well as internal communication genres
which regulate actions from various public and private entities and institutions. Indeed, digital
rhetorics transferred these foundational inquiries in rhetorics into the digital realm through
analysis of privacy policies, but investigating how rhetorical power is mediated through these
policies on DTC-genetics websites through the lens of digital rhetorical privacy (DRP) has not
been thoroughly examined. Following the surveillance and arrest of criminals using DTCgenetics, now is the time to perform work which reveals how privacy policies prescribe power
online.
As explained in other chapters, establishing and maintaining the bounds of personal
privacy is a foundational principle of American citizenship as detailed in the Fourth Amendment
to the United States Constitution: “the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause” (U.S. Const. amend. IV). However, as detailed in
Chapter 3, marginalized and multiply-marginalized bodies experience privacy differently in
American society; as such, these groups also experience digital privacy in ways which do not
align with the white, patriarchal experiences for which many digital technologies and the Internet
are designed. By studying privacy policies scholars gain a more comprehensive, albeit not
universal, understanding of how power is distributed unevenly online among different users.
However, a more complex understanding of the extensive implications of this dynamic rhetorical
genre occurs when we analyze how that power is asymmetrical and affects marginalized and
multiply-marginalized people disproportionately. Furthermore, examining the privacy policies
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prescribing actions on DTC-genetics websites underscores how the repurposing of this
technology—which relies on biometric data—for digital surveillance by law enforcement
ushered in an unwanted precedent with underexamined implications.
In this chapter, I argue that the privacy policies prescribing user actions on DTC-genetics
websites perpetuate asymmetrical rhetorical power dynamics that marginalize certain bodies
when DTC-genetics is used for digital surveillance by law enforcement agencies. In addition, I
explain that DTC-genetics privacy policies incorporate rhetorical strategies intended to obfuscate
surveillance and tracking techniques. My argument directs attention to the lack of transparency
in data collection and uses by genealogy websites that perpetuate inequitable experiences for
marginalized users. Guided by a feminist methodology for interrogating DRP, I apply the work
of technofeminists and surveillance studies scholars in rhetoric and composition—including
Beck’s (2016) rhetorical framework for evaluating surveillance and privacy practices, a multipronged approach to assessing website privacy policies. Her approach builds upon the work of
surveillance studies scholar David Lyon (2003, 2007) to posit a framework which accounts for
ideological viewpoints, methodological vision, and design of visibility and transparency.
Gary T. Marx (2015) notes that surveillance involving the state and organizations
commonly involves asymmetrical power, which manifests in their privacy policies. He explains
that this understanding advances with comparisons to instances “where control and domination
are not central as with other goals such as surveillance for protection, entertainment, or
contractual relations; where surveillance is reciprocal; and where it does not only, or necessarily,
flow downward or serves to disadvantage the subject” (Marx, 2015, p. 735). Thus, there is a need
to engage with privacy policies to more robustly understand how breaches of DRP via
biopolitical technologies exist on the privacy-surveillance continuum, especially technologies
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such as DTC-genetics which impact non-white bodies disproportionately while also maintaining
the power to reinforce white supremacist systems like the American justice system.
I review eight genealogy website privacy policies to better understand how transparency,
temporality, access, and data usage influence user actions. Specifically, I review how the
company’s values are defined in the policy, if the privacy policy includes a cookie policy and if
it is accessible to users, whether users can “opt-in” and/or “opt-out” of certain services regarding
data collection and use, the establishment of certain rights that users maintain while using the
service, transparency about any relationship with law enforcement, explanation of the process of
genetic matching, and the outlining of the uses of data collected including in aggregate form. To
gather a robust understanding of this phenomenon, I reviewed policies for mainstream DTCgenetics services like Ancestry and 23andMe, sites that serve marginalized communities like
African Ancestry and MyHeritage, and the policy from the site that established the unwanted
precedent of DTC-genetics for police surveillance, GEDmatch. 66 I also examine the privacy
policy for FamilyTreeDNA, RootsforReal, and FamilySearch.
Using this methodology and methods, this chapter identifies and analyzes underlying
assumptions about DTC-genetics technologies and privacy policies. It examines the values and
beliefs of DTC-genetics companies, law enforcement, and the public and explains how rhetorical
choices obfuscate information about digital surveillance and tracking strategies in these policies.
Moreover, this chapter contends with issues at the intersection of rhetorical power and DRP by
asking: how do DTC-genetics privacy policies inequitably impact a range of diverse bodies,
particularly marginalized and multiply-marginalized bodies? Who (in the public and in the
agency) has access to data collected through this technology? Importantly, it analyzes the rights

66

GEDmatch was purchased by Verogen, Inc. in December 2019.

90

users possess when genetic material is accessed via genealogy websites and circulated among
law enforcement agencies (a state actor). Finally, this chapter seeks to understand the
relationship between DTC-genetics and law enforcement surveillance.

Privacy Policies Contribute to Various Attitudes about DRP
When performing analysis of privacy policies, it is imperative to consider the history of
privacy in American culture alongside contemporary conversations because how humans
conceive of privacy, and what users want to keep private when they go online, evolves over time.
Privacy is not a newfound, unsophisticated concept in American culture; for example, the Fourth
Amendment was brought before Congress by James Madison in 1789 before being ratified on
December 15, 1791.67 However, policy changes, including the Patriot Act in 2001, alter the way
privacy is understood and data is collected. Mihaela Popescu and Lemi Baruh (2018) ask, “What
policy interventions would enable individuals to regain control of their data?” (p. 287). This
chapter argues that privacy policies offer a site for intervention to help users regain control
because they distribute rhetorical power asymmetrically online that can lead to infringements of
DRP. Moreover, user actions prompted by the privacy policies prescribing power on DTCgenetics websites contribute to what Patricia Hill Collins (2002) describes as the matrix of
oppression at work in American society because they do not account for the actions of and
implications for all users and non-users. Digital rhetorics scholars continue to be invested in
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understanding the rhetorical implications of privacy in digital spaces 68, and attention to the
significance of digital privacy is rising in the public sphere as interactions occur more often
online and as technologies which rely on biometric data, like DTC-genetics, are integrated more
frequently into society.
How users view privacy and surveillance, and how they engage with privacy policies, is
conditional; it is shaped by how people in our communities, including family, friends, and
neighbors are surveilled as well as how our ancestors were surveilled. Thus, privacy policies are
a “complex, multidimensional social phenomenon, a structurational nexis between action and
structure, between agent and institution, between past and future” (Miller, 2015, p. 69). They are
cultural objects with the ability to normalize certain activities and practices, and, as rhetorical
phenomena, hold the power to make and shape meaning in a variety of ways for different
audiences and communities (Bawarshi & Reiff, 2010). For example, the ways in which different
communities in America understand privacy differs: a Black woman and a white man are going
to have different understandings of privacy based on their own lived experiences and the laws
and policies of the country. Thus, the ways in which different users engage with privacy policies
varies. Importantly, privacy policies prescribe power, shapes identities, and forms communities,
but they also maintain disproportionate economic, social, and cultural implications for some
users because of how power is mediated online.
Privacy policies are a dynamic rhetorical genre to analyze to gain a better understanding
of how power has been unevenly distributed in American society and to gauge the implications
of biopolitical technologies for marginalized bodies. In America, non-white bodies and women
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face the most concentrated surveillance, historically and contemporarily, which intensified as the
means of surveilling transitioned from analog to digital technologies. In the digital realm, instead
of Jim Crow Laws there are Big Technology (Big Tech) companies and ToS policies which
oppress certain users based on their marginalized identity, which manifests in their lack of
rhetorical power; instead of state-sponsored surveillance of both Black and white American civil
rights activists there are session, persistent, and third-party cookies69 which track, monitor, and
record user actions online, often times with the goal of behavioral manipulation and bodily
control. DTC-genetics is a technology primed to aid in bodily control because it digitizes data
from the body. Dorothy Roberts 70 (2011) warns of the potential violent implications of emergent
biopolitical technologies in American society:
The new science and technology of racial genetics threatens to steer America on a course
of social inhumanity that already has begun to dominate politics this century.
Government policies that have drastically slashed social services have been accompanied
by particularly brutal forms of regulation of racial minorities; mass imprisonment at rates
far exceeding any other place on Earth or any time in the history of the free world;
roundup and deportation of undocumented immigrants, often tearing families apart; abuse
of children held in juvenile detention centers or locked up in adult prisons, some for the
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rest of their lives; official and unofficial infliction of torture in police stations and prison
cells; and rampant medical neglect that kills. (xi)
Roberts’ book, Fatal Invention: How Science, Politics, and Big Business Re-Create Race in the
Twenty-First Century, provides a Black woman’s perspective on the power of biopolitical
technologies to reinscribe racial categories that abet racist systems and uphold asymmetrical
vectors of power in American culture. We can see Roberts’s words as a tragic record of the
injustices marginalized citizens experience; moreover, we can also see her words as a
prognostication of the social issues white Americans would become more attuned to and contend
with in the latter half of the 2010s.
To better understand the implications of DRP on society, consider how attitudes about
privacy—specifically digital privacy—differ. Approaches to DRP and privacy policies are
mixed, with some users aware of the potential for harm when their privacy is infringed upon
while others maintain apathy to being surveilled online. According to a 2019 Pew Research
study, 81% of people feel as though they have very little/no control over the data companies
collect about them, which includes DTC-genetics companies; 84% feel as though they have very
little/no control over the data the government collects, which includes law enforcement agencies
(Auxier, Rainie, Anderson, Perrin, Kumar, & Turner, 2019). In comparison to other
industrialized countries who maintain a capitalist economic model, like many of the countries
that comprise the European Union (EU), Americans are decades and multiple iterations behind
on digital privacy and data protections. 71 In fact, it is not all that shocking that law enforcement
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harnessed the rhetorical power of DTC-genetics and implemented it into their digital surveillance
apparatus because of the surveillance apathy 72 many Americans demonstrate.
The reasons for surveillance apathy vary, but some Americans think they have nothing
valuable to protect and others believe they have no control over their security online anyway, so
why bother to secure it. Furthermore, numerous studies discovered a majority of users do not
read privacy policies because of the time investment required to dissect complex rhetoric (Hern,
2015; Turow, Hoofnagle, Mulligan, Good, & Grossklags, 2007). These user assumptions are
inaccurate and do not represent the rhetorical power of our actions online to affect other users
and non-users. danah boyd (2012) explains:
How machines see us depends on how our data connects to others. The tastes and
interests of people who don’t yet exist within systems can be easily predicted based on
the patterns of others. And, when machines have access to a person’s social network, the
predictions are even stronger. We aren’t as unique as those of us in the West might want
to believe; we are the product of the people we know and the socio-cultural environment
in which we are situated. (349)
The outcome of the 2016 U.S. Presidential election is the most prolific demonstration of the
rhetorical power that manifests as a result of the commodification of our digital data as a part of
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a global constellation of users. The Cambridge Analytica73 scandal which followed the election
was a revolutionary moment for people who seek DRP as a foundational value of an equitable
future because it revealed the nefarious methods of digital tracking technologies, data
aggregation, and data commodification for political marketing and behavior manipulation. The
result of the 2016 election led to horrific abuses of power and technology by Immigrations and
Customs Enforcement (ICE) to oppress certain communities, particularly bodies arriving and
seeking refuge along the U.S. Southern border. Continuing to use DTC-genetics as a digital
surveillance strategy by law enforcement agencies like ICE 74 reinscribes racial and racist identity
categories which lead to uneven economic and social opportunities. Yet, how various
marginalized and multiply-marginalized communities contend with these far-reaching
implications differ.

Determining Values and Beliefs About DRP from Privacy Policies
DTC-genetics companies utilize privacy policies which rely on a variety of rhetorical
choices to obfuscate critical information about data collection and data ownership. Indeed, this
practice is not unlike other web-based enterprises such as Big Tech conglomerates and social
media companies that rely on individual and collective surveillance apathy to gather user data.
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Irene Pollach (2005) explains that privacy policies intentionally obfuscate unethical data
handling and sharing procedures and use persuasive rhetoric to increase trust among consumers.
Unfortunately, privacy policies are long, jargon-filled documents users often scroll through and
ignore before robotically accepting. No one wants to read thousands of words pertaining to a
covenant they already know will be broken for financial gain—and these companies know it. For
example, 23andMe employs a privacy policy that is 9,240 words long–so long it includes a Table
of Contents; moreover, those 9,240 words only include the privacy policy and do not include the
ToS document or other supporting documents. Not all privacy policies share a similar length; the
RootsForReal privacy policy is only 833 words long. While lengths vary based on the magnitude
of actions occurring on the site and the outlining of necessary security measures for their users,
one constant among DTC-genetics privacy policies (and most privacy policies) is the rhetorical
decision to utilize specialized jargon which is confusing to the average user.
DTC-genetics privacy policies are often difficult for average users to understand, a
rhetorical choice that confuses them (leading to the aforementioned robotic acceptance of the
ToS) and is a blatant demonstration of asymmetrical power. Joseph Turow describes privacy
policies as “unreadable. They are filled with jargon that is meant to be understandable only to the
people writing them, or to people who work in the advertising industry today” (Smith, 2014).
The privacy policy for 23andMe, called a “Privacy Statement,” begins with a section called Key
Definitions which introduces critical terminology for understanding the privacy policy and using
the site. Understanding terms such as “Aggregate Information,” “De-identified Information” and
a multi-pronged explanation describing what 23andMe considers “Personal Information” do not
just require a specialist perspective, they surpass the expected comprehension level suggested for
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privacy policies and other online documents with legal implications for users, which is already at
the college level. 75
Scholars and users must examine values and beliefs outlined in privacy policies to better
understand how DRP is defined and how power is prescribed on DTC-genetics websites. In their
Summary of Changes to their privacy policy on September 23, 2020, Ancestry lists transparency,
simplicity, and control as guiding principles. MyHeritage, which “develops services for family
history research, DNA testing, and genetic health testing” lists commitments to trust, privacy,
and avoiding financial commodification as their “Key Privacy Principles” (My Heritage).
Performing analysis to understand how principles like transparency and trust are conceived of by
users, both individually and collectively, and enacted by companies based on internal and publicfacing corporate decisions offers a glimpse of how privacy policies, and DTC-genetics
companies, fall short in harnessing their power for progress and instead contribute to white
supremacist systems in American
Assessing the values and beliefs assumed in privacy policies reveals how the document
prescribes power asymmetrically. According to Beck (2016), companies create ToS documents
for protection from lawsuits which might lead to financial loss, so their primary value is
economic: to prevent financial loss. DTC-genetics companies are not unlike Big Tech companies
and companies who develop and sell biopolitical technologies in that they too want to make
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money.76 Indeed, this core value is compatible with the perception of other companies and
people at work within America’s capitalist economy, including competitive business owners and,
importantly, American consumers.77 Entities like the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) work to
protect consumers from being exploited as more of our interactions occur online. This includes
“implementation of comprehensive privacy and security programs, biennial assessments by
independent experts, monetary redress to consumers, disgorgement of ill-gotten gains, deletion
of illegally obtained consumer information, and providing robust transparency and choice
mechanisms to consumers” (Federal Trade Commission, 2019). To explicate the tension which
exists between capitalism and DRP, consider other values users maintain associated with digital
privacy in relationship to the values of DTC-genetics companies and police agencies. Even
though the FTC fights for the privacy rights of American consumers at a national level,
American legislators have done little to protect their own citizens from breaches of DRP,
effectively perpetuating asymmetrical power between corporate America and the average
consumer, many of whom are marginalized based on a range of identity categories including
socio-economic class.
Examining the values and beliefs of a DTC-genetics company is complex because not all
users share the same values and beliefs. Values such as transparency, simplicity, and user
agency, as well as trust, privacy, and avoiding financial commodification listed in the privacy
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policies for sites like Ancestry and MyHeritage are not monolithic. What it means for a company
to be transparent or to be trusted to not exploit user data for financial gain is dependent upon how
these concepts have influenced lived experiences. Figure 1 shows the Ancestry privacy policy
listing their guiding principles as transparency, simplicity, and control. The friction between the
values and beliefs of individual users, DTC-genetics companies, and law enforcement agencies is
visible in DTC-genetics privacy policies when analyzing how privacy policies obfuscate
information, particularly about tracking technologies. The ubiquitous digital landscape was
created for and continues to be curated by the white, patriarchal experience which prescribes all
power in Western society. Ending the proliferation of white-supremacist systems perpetuated by
DTC-genetics requires not only identifying and analyzing their capitalist corporate values, but
also understanding that those values are often drastically different than those guiding the lived
experiences of many of the users from diverse cultural backgrounds across America and the
world.

Figure 1: The Ancestry privacy policy listing their guiding principles as transparency, simplicity, and control.

Many public and private companies value transparency—or at least purport to do so—
which conflicts with the notoriously secretive practices of police. The 23andMe privacy policy
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states: “We will not provide information to law enforcement or regulatory authorities unless
required by law to comply with a valid court order, subpoena, or search warrant for genetic or
Personal Information” (23andMe). In their privacy policy, 23andMe is transparent that they view
their relationship with police as bound by law, which, ultimately and unfortunately, supersedes
any of the user rights outlined in the privacy policy. This is a clear example of asymmetrical
power represented in privacy policies. The Ancestry privacy policy empowers users with control:
“We give you control over the Personal Information you provide to us, including your DNA
Data, and how it is used, shared, and retained” (Ancestry). Granting users control directly
contradicts many of the policies and practices instituted by law enforcement for bodily control at
the municipal, state, and federal level. Furthermore, the perception of control is a façade because,
like the 23andMe privacy policy, Ancestry follows the “valid legal process [for] producing any
personal information about our users” (Ancestry). Ultimately, the façade of control is one of
many assumptions users make when they engage with a privacy policy and interact with other
users online.
DTC-genetics users assume that no one else can upload their data because that is what is
communicated to them in their privacy policies. For example, the GEDmatch privacy policy
states that: “GEDmatch will only collect your personal information if you provide it to us
voluntarily” (GEDmatch). When police upload DNA to a DTC-genetics website they do so
without consent, which does not constitute a voluntary upload of data. Quite literally, when
police harness the power of DTC-genetics they are not uploading their own DNA but the DNA
of another person, yet that these interactions with state-run entities occur is not visible in most
DTC-genetics privacy policies. In this way, DTC-genetics privacy policies fail all users and nonusers because the privacy policies only work if the user is uploading their own DNA. Currently,
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there is no feature for non-users to opt-out of their DNA being processed regardless of who
uploads it. Not only a breach of DRP, but a breach of contract occurs when DTC-genetics is used
for digital surveillance by the police, further solidifying my argument from Chapter 3 that this
practice as unequivocally unethical.
Ancestry, the largest online genealogy community in the world, does not address their
relationship with law enforcement until Section 7 of their privacy policy. Instead, sections
devoted to the information Ancestry collects (e.g., census records, newspapers) and the internal
use of user data within the company take precedence in the privacy policy. Information about
their relationship with law enforcement is buried in the policy because it is not written with real
people in mind; these policies are written by lawyers, not “embodied, situated users who make
choices in the moment based on context” (Waldman, 2018, p. 78). At thousands of words in
length, users do not have time to read in depth into the document. DTC-genetics companies
know this so they bury this information to discourage users from worrying about DRP. Users
must press these companies to foreground this information under federal regulation
(standardization78) until, hopefully, an end is put to unethical relationships between private
companies and government organizations altogether.
DTC-genetics users did not worry that their DNA upload might impact users beyond a
specific genealogical community until the use of DTC-genetics for police surveillance became
public knowledge in 2018 and their privacy policies were updated. GEDmatch updated their
privacy policy in 2018 after the arrest of the Golden State Killer and then again after they were

78

Beck (2016) muses on a standardized approach to privacy policies in what she refers to as a templated approach.

McDonald, Reeder, Kelley, and Cranor (2009) also offer a standardized approach to privacy policies in their work, A
Comparative Study of Online Privacy Policies and Formats.

102

purchased by Verogen, Inc. in 2019 to explain these newfound potential trajectories for user
data. (The policy was last updated on January 11, 2021.) Yet, DTC-genetics privacy policies still
struggle to effectively present this critical information regarding where one’s DNA might go and
whom it might affect. In less than two decades, MyHeritage, an Israel-based DTC-genetics
company, ballooned from a “humble garage startup” to a “global company [that] built the
leading platform for discovering family history” (My Heritage). Even though accessing the
MyHeritage privacy policy requires users to click a link which opens into a smaller pop-up
window and initially features text with a small font size, it does a better job than Ancestry of
making visible the company’s relationship in the section titled “Our Key Privacy Principles.” In
the third paragraph of the policy, the company writes: “My Heritage prohibits law enforcement
use of its DNA services” (My Heritage).
FamilyTreeDNA, another leader in the DTC-genetics industry, does not disclose to users
information about their relationship with law enforcement until Section 4B, which means this
information is less visible. Section 4B is less visible to users who read the policy because it is
buried in the policy and, therefore, represents a lack of transparency concerning
FamilyTreeDNA’s relationship with the police. In perceived pro-police rhetoric, their policy
states: “FamilyTreeDNA uses your Genetic Information for the following primary purposes: [to]
comply with requests from law enforcement or their authorized representatives that meet our
Law Enforcement Standards” (Family Tree DNA). Since users assume their DNA does not
maintain a trajectory beyond a certain genealogy website—and the companies know this—
burying this information deep in their privacy policy allows FamilyTreeDNA to obfuscate not
only their relationship with the police but also their willingness to work with police, thus
enabling traditional white supremacist systems. DTC-genetics companies rely on users making
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these assumptions to obfuscate critical information regarding tracking technologies including
session and third-party cookies, invasive surveillance strategies with nefarious purposes.
Examining how the rights that users maintain while using DTC-genetics services are
outlined in the privacy policy aids in understanding how using the technology for police
surveillance violates DRP. Even though DTC-genetics privacy policies do not effectively protect
users from violations of DRP, the companies still must follow certain legal procedures before
sharing information with law enforcement, which is often outlined in their privacy policies. Yet,
legal warrants issued by presiding judges have not curtailed police agencies from uploading
physical evidence from crime scenes. Why? According to a Consumer Report 79 from July 2020
the reason is because lawmakers have failed the public:
Lawmakers must step up and close the regulatory gap by making sure that genetic
information remains confidential, with detailed requirements to allow for authorization to
disclose the information to specific recipients but in a way crafted to protect the privacy
of non-consenting related consumers. (Consumer Reports, 2020).
A critical aspect of regulation concerns when and how law enforcement agencies can use DTCgenetics websites for forensic genealogy. Even though sites like MyHeritage, with their refusal
to work with law enforcement in writing, are at the forefront of establishing and protecting user
rights and information, other sites like AfricanAncestry fall short of protecting users. Even
Ancestry, the largest online genealogy community in the world, struggles with outlining user
rights concerning the company’s relationship with law enforcement. Their privacy policy
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explicitly states: “Ancestry does not voluntarily cooperate with law enforcement”; yet the policy
continues in the next paragraph: “If we are compelled to disclose your Personal Information to
law enforcement, we will do our best to provide you with advance notice, unless we are
prohibited under the law from doing so” (Ancestry). The aforementioned Consumer Report is
correct in that lawmakers—the people users trust to write effective policies and institute realistic
regulations—must act in a way which establishes responsibility as shared among all stakeholders
including companies, lawmakers, and users alike.
To analyze the rights users have as outlined in DTC-genetics privacy policies, consider:
what rights do users maintain when their genetic material is accessed via DTC-genetics websites
and circulated among law enforcement agencies? The agency users have when they join a
genealogy community is outlined in ToS documents and privacy policies, yet these policies have
not protected users from egregious violations of DRP by law enforcement. GEDmatch’s opt-in
option is one example of a DTC-genetics company outlining and allowing users to choose their
rights, but other DTC-genetics companies are less transparent in explaining user rights. For
example, 23andMe outlines user rights as four “Choices” related to access, marketing, sharing,
and deletion. In this privacy policy, users maintain the right to access the site, to choose the
advertisements they see, to share information on the site with other parties, and to delete their
account. Yet, this section of the 23andMe privacy policy, which outlines user rights, also states:
23andMe will also retain limited information related to your account and data deletion
request, including but not limited to, your email address, account deletion request
identifier, communications related to inquiries or complaints and legal agreements for a
limited period of time as required by law, contractual obligations, and/or as necessary for
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the establishment, exercise or defense of legal claims and for audit and compliance
purposes. (23 and Me)
Contradictions abound in the 23andMe privacy policy; in the same section, the company
prescribes users the power to delete their account and then, almost immediately, states that
accounts are not actually deleted and that 23andMe will keep a record of identifiable
information. This means that depending on when certain users deleted their accounts, their
genetic information was sold to Almirall without their knowledge or consent—a truly stunning
violation of DRP.
DTC-genetics privacy policies inhibit full participation from all users, but particularly
those who lack access. Furthermore, those users who do not have the access required to develop
the literacies needed to fully understand the rhetorical power of DTC-genetics technology or any
biopolitical technology are also excluded. Lawmakers and legislators in America perpetually fail
at writing and enacting policies which empower bodies equally because they work within
inherently white supremacist systems. The divisions in literacy and access among races, genders,
and socio-economic classes in America are evident in the digital divide.80 According to Stephen
Reder (2015) and Antonio Byrd (2019) adults marginalized based on their race are less likely to
develop meaningful literacy skills which translate to real-world scenarios because they do not
have the same access to digital technologies. Without access and literacy, many racially
marginalized adults are unable to engage in what Mark Warschauer and Tamara Tate (2018)
describe as “full participation” (p.69). Indeed, the use of complex rhetoric within a privacy
policy is an intentional rhetorical move which reinscribes white supremacist culture in America.
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Visibility of the Data Collection Context of Privacy Policies
The data collection context is inherently complex, particularly when digital technologies
are repurposed for means beyond the original intent laid out in their privacy policies like DTCgenetics. Gary T. Marx (1998) notices a distinction in the data collection context “between (1)
the actual collection of the information and (2) the broader conditions surrounding collection”
(175). The data collection context is further muddled when analyzing the relationship between
individual users and state-actors, like law enforcement agencies, in the era of New Surveillance
because rhetorical power is asymmetrical, with the police maintaining greater power, as laid out
in the Patriot Act. While the Patriot Act authorized omnipresent digital surveillance for the U.S.
government with the purpose of rooting out domestic and foreign terrorism, the troubling trend
of tracking users also has an impact on American consumerism because the technologies used
(cookies) reveal personal information about the user to companies (Beck, 2015). Indeed, the
omnipresent digital surveillance authorized by the Patriot Act and the use of cookies to track
user actions represents a convergence of the tensions between public and private in the twentyfirst century.
Examining if a DTC-genetics privacy policy has a cookie policy accessible to users
reveals how these companies obfuscate information to deter users from thoroughly engaging
with the information in the policy. DTC-genetics websites use cookies that track, monitor, and
record user actions online as their primary means of digital surveillance. The effectiveness with
which DTC-genetics websites relay this information to users varies. For example, Figure 2
shows how Ancestry includes an accompanying “Cookie Policy” with their privacy policy that
details how session and third-party cookies, as well as other tracking technologies, are used on
the site. The description of cookies and their uses on Ancestry are clearly explained and the
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company even details the other types of tracking technologies users can expect, including
pixels81, local storage, and software development kits (SDKs)82. These tracking technologies
assist in the surveillance of users; for example, pixels “allow us and third parties to place
Cookies on your browser” (Ancestry). Yet, users must seek out this information in another
document, which means they must be savvy enough to know where to find the document via
hyperlink before they can begin to comprehend the information contained within it.

Figure 2: Ancestry’s Cookie Policy details how both session cookies and third-party cookies, as well as other tracking
technologies, are used on the site.

Since Ancestry is the largest online genealogy community in the world, making the
information about their digital surveillance technologies clear for the user makes sense as more
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users means the potential for more legal issues. Yet, not all DTC-genetics privacy policies are as
transparent as Ancestry’s (which is quite far from perfect). GEDmatch fails to commit to even
using session cookies, simply stating that “cookies may be used by this site” (GED match).
Furthermore, the GEDmatch privacy policy states that third-party cookies might be used, but
that:
We have no control over how third-party sites may utilize cookies. If you feel that a
third-party site is engaging in unethical or illegal use of this capability, please notify us so
that we may take appropriate action to remove that link. (GED match)
GEDmatch’s decision to question their own power by stating they have no control over how
third-party cookies are used is confusing because most public-facing rhetoric from web-based
companies purport a digitally secure front. Perhaps this is an attempt to curb the responsibility
and culpability of the company, or to empower the users as it asks them to contact the
company—which gives them agency and puts them in control of their experience; however this
is reckless as responsibility must be shared among all users and stakeholders and, ultimately, any
sense of agency is a façade because users are already being surveilled at the point when they
might contact GEDmatch.
Examining whether users can “opt-in” and/or “opt-out” of certain services regarding their
data collection and use on DTC-genetics websites uncovers how transparent a company is with
consumers about their relationship with other companies and organizations. GEDmatch, through
their relationship with Parabon NanoLabs, is the DTC-genetics company that aided authorities in
Sacramento, California to identify and apprehend the Golden State Killer in 2018. More than a
year later, in May 2019, GEDmatch recategorized the four classes of DNA found on the site and
introduced “public + opt-in” and “public + opt-out” options following pressure from users after
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The New York Times reported the company assisted authorities in Utah to solve an assault 83; until
this time, DTC-genetics technology had only been used on rape and murder cases. The
GEDmatch “public + opt-out” option specifically addresses the use of the site by police. It states:
“DNA data is available for comparison to any Raw Data in the GEDmatch database, except
DNA kits identified as being uploaded for Law Enforcement purposes” (GED match). The optout option is a transition toward both limiting the power of police surveillance and empowering
the user.84 However, it falls short in severing the relationship between the technology and law
enforcement users, like the MyHeritage privacy policy which reads, “MyHeritage prohibits law
enforcement use of its DNA Services” (My Heritage). Indeed, DTC-genetics companies must
follow the lead of sites like MyHeritage and disallow law enforcement from using their tools and
technology in order to secure user DRP.
The opt-out option limits how our genetic material is used as well as who has access to it
in both the public and in the company. However, while many DTC-genetics websites purport
simple, easy processes for consumers who want to engage with their products, the uncertainty
concerning who has, or could have, access to DNA remains. For example, AfricanAncestry
“helps expand the way people view themselves and the way they view Africa!” (African
Ancestry). Under the section of the privacy policy labeled “Sharing,” the company provides a
legal disclaimer which explains:
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Though we make every effort to preserve user privacy, we may need to disclose personal
information when required by law wherein we have a good-faith belief that such action is
necessary to comply with a current judicial proceeding, a court order or legal process
served on our Web site. (African Ancestry)
Unlike MyHeritage, AfricanAncestry empowers the police on a case-by-case basis. The lack of
detail and rhetoric like may and in good-faith in this legal disclaimer allow for resounding
subjectivity for discerning the actions of the company and decries efforts for procedural
transparency and consistency. Moreover, the AfricanAncestry privacy policy, like many of the
privacy policies prescribing power on DTC-genetics websites, veils the power of the company
from the user, only revealing their authority when they choose, and in turn restricting the rights
of users.
Many DTC-genetics websites and privacy policy websites include an explanation of the
process of genetic matching as a way of being transparent, but often times these explanations are
jargon-filled and confusing to the average reader. Over the last twenty years, FamilyTreeDNA
“pioneered the field of genetic genealogy” with over 2 million users (Family Tree DNA). Their
website homepage begins with pricing for searching paternal and maternal lines, as well as
pricing for ancestry services. Scrolling, users find a section titled “How It Works” which
explains the “four simple steps to jumpstart your DNA journey,” which is shown in Figure 3
(Family Tree DNA). Including this simplified explanation—by the company—of how their
specific DTC-genetics technology works, and thus the rhetorical power it holds, is a common but
not comprehensive practice across genealogy websites. For example, AfricanAncestry includes a
“How It Works” tab to detail their process, but FamilySearch provides little information about
their process; and, instead of foregrounding how their technology works, 23andMe features
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information about how their technology contributes to individual health and disease prevention.
These simplified explanations prove contradictory to the deceptive and misleading rhetoric used
to relay information to users in the privacy policies which prescribe power on their websites.
Furthermore, simple “How It Works” explanations are a form of deception which disavow the
true complexities when DTC-genetics is repurposed for law enforcement surveillance.

Figure 3: The FamilyTreeDNA “How It Works” section explains the simple steps to starting “your DNA journey.”

When police officers curtail policy and use DTC-genetics for digital surveillance they
demonstrate the inadequacies of existing privacy regulations in America. These inadequacies are
replicated in the privacy policies regulating actions on DTC-genetics websites. As described by
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the FamilyTreeDNA privacy policy, police are not allowed to use FamilyTreeDNA services to
perform forensics without written consent. This is inadequate because power in this relationship
remains asymmetrical and oversight is unregulated. As Popescu and Baruh (2018) describe,
“regulating privacy means regulating data collection practices as they pertain to” individual
users, but “the individual is but a node in the larger assemblage” (p. 287). Without state and
federal regulation in America the utilization of DTC-genetics for law enforcement surveillance is
going to continue to grow more rampant because privacy policies allow it. Thus, it is critical for
users to not only understand the information in privacy policies, but also how the DTC-genetics
technology they engage with works and how law enforcement repurposed 85 the technology with
disregard for existing privacy measures. Ultimately, the unauthorized use of DNA data by the
police to solve crimes reveals the multitude of adverse uses our data might maintain when
submitted to a DTC-genetics website. It also demonstrates the unethical lengths to which police
officers will go to maintain power and gain power without regard for building a trustful
relationship with the communities they serve.
Examining how the uses of data collected by DTC-genetics companies (including in
aggregate form) reveals how seriously they consider values like transparency and trust. For
example, the RootsforReal privacy policy (called a Privacy Statement) explains, “Currently we
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unidentified physical evidence (like DNA) found at a crime scene and stored in a forensics lab to a DTC-genetics
website. If lucky, they get a familial match and construct a family tree until they identify the family member who
fits the description of the unidentified perpetrator. In other instances, like when police attempt to identify human
remains (particularly those of children) or solve an isolated crime, they usually perform a maternal and/or paternal
search to identify the parents instead of a full ancestral search.
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may share your information with Roots for Real entities and/or authorised distributors for Roots
for Real products that are located in other countries (see Worldwide Representation) in order to
satisfy your business needs” (Roots For Real). However, other RootsforReal entities and
authorized distributors are not named in the policy, nor is law enforcement. While the
RootsforReal privacy policy does not mention the police, other services like FamilySearch bury
similar information so that it is not visible to users. Mention of FamilySearch’s relationship with
police does not occur until Section 4C, over halfway through the policy. As mentioned earlier,
the MyHeritage privacy policy is exemplary in outlining their relationship with law enforcement
as it occurs at the beginning of the policy as a part of their Guiding Principles. What motivates
RootsforReal to keep some information from users about how DNA data is used and what
motivates MyHeritage to be more transparent than other DTC-genetics services? How do these
values network with those of police agencies who use DTC-genetics technology to solve crimes?
Law enforcement agencies maintain various political motivations for performing this type
of digital surveillance, many of which contribute to the systemic marginalization of certain
communities, including low-income communities and communities of color. Troy Duster (2012)
explains that they do so without probable cause, in fact, “without any cause save arbitrary social
and political forces happened to turn up your DNA in a database” (p. 311). These actions, while
unethical, are permitted by the privacy policies which define the vectors of power among
community members on genealogy websites. For example, “A Note About Aggregated Data” in
the Ancestry privacy policy states:
Ancestry may disclose user information in an aggregated form as part of the Services or
our marketing, or in scientific publications published by us or our research partners. For
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example, we might note the percentage of immigrants in a State that are from a particular
geographic region or country. (Ancestry)
This means a DTC-genetics company is recording identifiable information that, in aggregate
form, can detail “the percentage of immigrants in a State that are from a particular geographic
region or country” (Ancestry). What is stopping law enforcement agencies from using that data
to control immigrant bodies at the U.S. Southern border and across the country? Moreover, how
do we know they are not already? Indeed, the façade of American police officers as pillars of the
community deputized to protect and serve ethically evaporates as more law enforcement
agencies and police forces are infiltrated by white supremacists.
One complex aspect of how data is used after it is collected is determining who owns the
data, which is complicated when considering genetic material. On the homepage of
FamilyTreeDNA, the company describes their commitment to their users: “We believe your
DNA belongs to YOU and only you…period. For that reason, we will never sell your DNA to
third parties. Can the other guys say that?” (Family Tree DNA). These sentiments are echoed in
their privacy policy and their approach—to highlight their security measures to protect users as
the best—is synchronous with the American capitalist system. However, it contradicts the ideals
of the scientists who developed the Human Genome Project, which, as mentioned earlier, viewed
genetic material as a public good (Chow-White, 2012). The tension between sharing information
and safeguarding it, between private and public, presents the question: is a DTC-genetics
company performing a public service if it assists law enforcement in apprehending a criminal?
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Discussion: Understanding the Impacts of DTC-Genetics Privacy Policies
The answer to the question above is complex because the relationship between state-run
entities (like the police) and private corporations (like DTC-genetics companies) is
multifaceted—if not tenuous—in the U.S., particularly in the era of New Surveillance. Today,
many of these relationships, and relationships between government organizations and users as
well as companies and users—are defined in privacy policies. Importantly, U.S. courts view
companies as individuals and empower them with many of the same rights as citizens, a fact
reinforced by the Supreme Court in the Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, in
2010.86 Additionally, it is not uncommon for law enforcement agencies to contract out work to
private companies who maintain similar training, and, in many cases, superior capabilities for
technology and armory.87 The services offered by DTC-genetics companies, as outlined in many
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of their privacy policies, range from single-line maternal or paternal searches, full ancestral
searches, and health and disease screenings—which are often superior to local genetic
technology used for forensics. When DTC-genetics technology services are repurposed as a
digital surveillance tool, the company transitions from supplying consumers with privatized
goods and services to supplying a public service. This is unethical due to lack of compensation
laid out in a contractual agreement and, much more importantly, regulation and oversight by the
government and special interest groups. In turn, these politicized actions often reveal the whitesupremacist motivations of police agencies as they continue to erroneously police, surveil, and
oppress multiply-marginalized communities.
American law enforcement agencies maintain various values revolving around safety and
the law 88, but these values are not compatible with the corporate values declared in the privacy
policies for DTC-genetics companies. A coalition of researchers and activists must form to end
the use of DTC-genetics technology by the police through their research and actions (praxis)
because the relationship perpetuates systemic racism and white supremacy. A report for the
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“protect the lives and property of our fellow citizens,” “fight crime,” “maintain a higher standard of integrity,” and
value human life” (New York City Police Department). Indeed, many of the police departments across America
purport similar, or some variation of, these values. For example, the police department in Normal, Illinois, the
location of ISU, summarizes the core values of their Community Policing philosophy: “ We are committed to
working in partnership with the community to promote safety and enhance the quality of life for our citizens”
(Normal Police Department). The discord values among police departments and DTC-genetics companies
demonstrates one aspect of the questionable ethicality of this relationship.
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Brennan Center for Justice89 states “efforts to address systemic and implicit biases in law
enforcement are unlikely to be effective in reducing the racial disparities in the criminal justice
system as long as explicit racism in law enforcement continues to endure” (German, 2020). The
explicit racism detailed in this report is the public advocation for and joining of white-supremacy
groups and tactical militias by police officers, law enforcement officials, and elected and
appointed politicians on social media and in other public rhetoric90, an issue occupying the FBI
since at least 2006—and possibly dating back further—according to internal intelligence
assessments (Speri, 2020). Harnessing the power of DTC-genetics for digital surveillance
perpetuates and expands the matrix of oppression as these unethical actions continue to oppress
bodies beyond white, patriarchal norms.
Police perpetuating and protecting their power over BIPOC citizens aligns with many of
the values of white supremacy culture outlined by Showing Up For Racial Justice, a network of
grassroots organizations working to undermine and combat white supremacy. The same report
from the Brennan Center for Justice explains that white supremacists have infiltrated police
agencies across the country (German, 2020). Therefore, utilizing DTC-genetics as a form of
digital surveillance supports the core values of white supremacy, including paternalism, a belief
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well as current and former GOP legislators.
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in objectivity, binary thinking, and the reliance on the power of the written word (Showing Up
For Racial Justice). When it comes to the use of DTC-genetics for digital surveillance, police
agencies rely on the power of the written word that comes from the privacy policies which
prescribe power and regulate user actions on genealogy websites. A coalition of scholars and
activists devoted to a digitally-secure and socially-just future must work to update, oversee, and
regulate the creation of privacy policies for companies which maintain relationships with the
U.S. government.
There was nothing in the GEDmatch privacy policy that restricted police in Sacramento
from repurposing DTC-genetics to identify and apprehend the Golden State Killer.
Consequently, these actions created a dangerous and violent precedent that impacts bodies
inequitably in American culture. Moreover, not all of the privacy policies prescribing power on
genealogy websites analyzed for this study include rhetoric outlining their approach to a
relationship with the police. Their use by the police continues to aid and abet—and normalize—
strategic digital surveillance via DTC-genetics, which is a violation of DRP. Furthermore, this
form of racist and unethical strategic digital surveillance enables DNA dragnets and digital
redlining, ultimately exacerbating the digital divide in American culture and oppressive
byproducts of white supremacist policies like the School-to-Prison pipeline.91 Those devoted to
ending this unethical practice and curtailing the power of the police must continue to produce
research and cultivate calls-to-action which are developed from the things they find in the
privacy policies for these organizations and companies.
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Conclusion
The privacy policies prescribing power on DTC-genetics websites are ineffective. The
technologists who write them and the companies who publish them incorporate rhetorical
strategies which intentionally obfuscate information about surveillance and tracking techniques.
These rhetorical moves include utilizing complex jargon and legalese, making information hard
to discover among various documents and hyperlinks, and publishing policies that are so long
that users maintain apathy instead of inquiry concerning their content. Each of these rhetorical
moves contributes to the lack of transparency about data collection and use of DTC-genetics
companies. Moreover, these moves allow DTC-genetics companies to hoard power and
distribute it asymmetrically at their will. The result is unethical privacy policies which enable
white supremacy and perpetuate inequitable experiences online for marginalized and multiplymarginalized users. Ultimately, these inequitable experiences online spill over into reality in the
form of police violence and the surveillance state, which disproportionately impact BIPOC
individuals in American culture.
The privacy policy for 23andMe was last updated on October 30, 2020, and reflects
changes for users in California who are empowered under the California Consumer Privacy Act
(CCPA) of 2018. CCPA gives consumers the right to know who is collecting data about them, to
delete personal information, to opt-out of the sale of their information, and protects them from
being discriminated against for invoking these rights. CCPA is a way DRP is being secured for
citizens at the state level, but this issue requires action at the federal level, too, if user privacy is
ever to be secure. Americans need to know they do possess some power when it comes to
controlling their DRP. 80% of Americans report they are asked to agree to a privacy policy at
least once a month and 25% of Americans report they are asked to agree to a privacy policy daily
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(Auxier, Rainie, Anderson, Perrin, Kumar, & Turner, 2019). Privacy policies, then, are the site
where users and researchers can reimagine how power is prescribed, how relationships between
private companies and government organizations are formed, and how privacy is not only
protected but valued as a right among all users and non-users as they establish DRP in a sociallyjust society.
Scholars and activists must continue to press police agencies—from the local to the
federal level—for transparency concerning their means of digital surveillance and their
motivations for using such strategies. Furthermore, the public must press DTC-genetics
companies to end any and all relationships with law enforcement agencies and to explicitly state
this in their privacy policies. The privacy policy for MyHeritage serves as an example of how
DTC-genetics companies can decry a relationship with law enforcement. If users do not demand
transparency from these stakeholders, as well as the end of relationships between police agencies
and DTC-genetics companies, the magnitude of ubiquitous unethical surveillance will intensify
and more police violence, particularly against Black bodies, will occur. One way to raise
awareness of this critical issue impacting American culture is to teach about DRP with privacy
policies in writing classrooms, which I will explain in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER V: IMPLEMENTING PRIVACY POLICIES TO INTERROGATE DRP IN THE
WRITING CLASSROOM

In the last three decades, research at the triangulation of digital technologies, New
Surveillance strategies, and rhetorical power in the teaching of writing has gained prominence in
rhetoric and composition. Focus in digital rhetorics and technical communication include how
different bodies interface with different digital technologies, including those that rely on
biometrics, and how algorithms shape user experiences and impact user privacy. Scholars in
these areas who are interested in digital technologies, New Surveillance strategies, and rhetorical
power are keen to investigate new and repurposed digital technologies. For example, ever since
computers were integrated into classrooms, rhetoric, composition, and technical communication
scholars have interrogated a variety of issues related to literacy, access, and power. Analysis of
these issues, and the inequitable impact on different bodies and communities, continues with the
widespread integration and use of the Internet and cloud-based technologies (Web 2.0) in
American society in the twenty-first century.
The affordances of using digital technologies in the classroom often supersede
apprehension about digital surveillance, even for instructors who value digital rhetorical privacy
(DRP). Educational companies and Big Tech conglomerates like Google and Zoom offer
services ripe for adaption for writing studies curricula and implementation into university
learning management systems (LMSs) to reach various goals. Certainly, implementation can
streamline instruction for teachers and students, but it also creates access for students with
limited resources and allows for new kinds of interactions that are beneficial for students.
Sometimes, implementation of these technologies is simply mandated by the university (e.g.
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Zoom). When many universities transitioned to online and hybrid formats for instruction during
the Spring 2020 semester as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic, a format my institution
continues one year later, universities strengthened their relationships with Big Tech companies.
Unfortunately, these companies, as well as U.S. lawmakers, rarely prioritize user DRP. Thus the
potential to compromise students’ privacy exists when universities form relationships with these
companies and ask instructors to incorporate their technologies into the classroom. Due to the
lack of institutional support and resources (e.g.. time) instructors can use a feminist methodology
for interrogating DRP to help themselves, and their students, understand the complex landscape
of digital privacy and surveillance and what’s at stake when DTC-genetics is used for police
surveillance.
In this chapter, I argue instructors should take up a feminist methodology for
interrogating DRP and incorporate instruction related to digital privacy in the writing classroom
because students must understand the magnitude of rhetorical power digital technologies possess.
Learning about the implications of DRP is beneficial for students (and instructors) as more of our
interactions occur online, particularly those related to our social and economic needs.
Furthermore, an increase in hacking for political and economic gain on an international scale
means students are going to be contending with these issues in many of their careers. One of the
most visible digital privacy and surveillance genres users encounter is the privacy policy. I
identify Terms of Service (ToS) documents and privacy policies as rhetorical genres that can
amplify how the asymmetrical distribution of power online impacts different bodies and
communities inequitably. I highlight how DTC-genetics privacy policies, particularly, are an
intriguing genre to incorporate in the teaching of writing because DTC-genetics are a biopolitical
technology that creates tension in society as it represents a shift in the protection of personal
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information online to the sharing of it (Chow-White, 2012). Moreover, DTC-genetics maintains
the power to disenfranchise certain users, and, additionally, represents a unique position in
American culture as a digital technology that has been repurposed as a New Surveillance tool.
Finally, I argue that taking up an approach that directs attention to the inequitable implications of
digital privacy on a range of bodies and communities works toward establishing DRP as a
foundational principle of an equitable society.
This chapter unfolds in this way: first, I position my argument among feminist writing
studies and technofeminist scholarship in rhetoric, composition, and technical communication
which highlights tenets for interrogating DRP. Next, I detail the importance of understanding
privacy policies as a social construct, a dynamic genre with the capacity to distribute power
asymmetrically and thus build culture online in a way which leads to marginalization and
violence against othered bodies in American society. Then, the chapter features adaptable
approaches for writing instructors who wish to incorporate privacy policies into the writing
classroom to teach and learn about DRP. The assignments detailed in this chapter are not tailored
for a specific DTC-genetics website like Ancestry, 23andMe, or MyHeritage. Instead, instructors
are encouraged to choose privacy policies which work for their students and meet the learning
objectives of their courses. For example, some privacy policies are much longer than others;
working with the privacy policy for Ancestry could span across units or an entire course whereas
working with a shorter privacy policy, like the ones for GEDmatch or FamilySearch, could be
done during a single assignment or unit.
While this chapter is designed for instructors who teach writing in the college or
university setting, readers will find that some assignments are more efficiently adapted for firstyear-writing (FYC) courses while others might be implemented in upper-level writing, rhetoric,
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and technical communication courses. Importantly, attention is directed not only to potential
assignments, but also to the necessity of including work from marginalized and multiplymarginalized authors and critics in discussions of digital privacy in the era of New Surveillance.
The penultimate section of this chapter explains how instructors should consider aspects like
genre analysis and performance, rhetorical context, and demonstration of transferable knowledge
in the assessment of assignments which use privacy policies to teach about DRP. Finally, the
conclusion describes implications for this project as well as the writing classroom and explains
how this approach builds a coalition of users who value DRP.

A Feminist Methodology for Interrogating DRP in the Writing Classroom
A pedagogy that identifies and values intersectional experiences with DRP understands
privacy and surveillance as systems that reinscribe asymmetrical power relations and interrogate
how power is mediated and distributed in the policies prescribing actions online. A
technofeminist methodology for interrogating DRP is poised to influence how instructors
approach the teaching of writing now and in the future because it requires self-awareness and
considers positionality in relation to power. Implementation must occur with the intent to center
and amplify othered voices (Collins, 2002), and with the understanding that these voices are not
just different but also considered inferior within the standards of America’s white-supremacist
society. Therefore, an approach which considers collisions of power and reveals the far-reaching,
violent, inequitable implications of DRP is necessary; moreover, such analysis illuminates how
power is prescribed asymmetrically in American society. Adopting such pedagogical values for
writing instruction contributes to a coalitional approach to social justice—one where
stakeholders are connected with the potential for organization (Walton, Moore, and Jones, 2019).
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Furthermore, it prescribes analysis of the inequitable experiences of users and non-users,
themselves potential coalitions, and engages students with identifying their own proximity to
power and considering their experiences with DRP and New Surveillance technologies,
ultimately positioning them as a coalition or as users primed to enter into one.
Interrogating DRP in the writing classroom means recognizing privacy is dynamic and
reliant on the context in which surveillance occurs. Gary T. Marx (1998) explains that what is
considered public and what is considered private—and thus privacy and surveillance—should be
viewed on a continuum. In the writing classroom, this approach to teaching writing considers the
rhetorical power that is distributed throughout American society as a result of the (in)stability of
the relationship between DRP and surveillance online (Lewis, 2006). To investigate this
instability, consider implementing rhetorical frameworks from scholars like Estee Beck (2016) 92
and heuristics from Marx. 93 Particularly, Beck (2016) identifies privacy policies as sites to assess
“the views and beliefs assumed in terms and conditions, the underlying purpose and collection
method, and how the website operator designs statements for efficient, easy use and
comprehension along with transparent data practices” (p. 75). By directing attention towards
views and beliefs, students understand how privacy policies prescribe power asymmetrically
online.
The privacy-surveillance continuum—which includes privacy policies—has violent
implications for Othered bodies, including those marginalized because of their race, gender,
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socioeconomic status, or other identity marker. Julie Bates, Francis Macarthy, and Sarah WarrenRiley (2019) explain that our bodies and their interactions with technology influence our ways of
knowing—and thus how power is distributed; ultimately, this influence reduces rhetorical
agency, or power (Johnson, Levy, Manthey, and Novotny, 2015). Thus, interrogating DRP in the
writing classroom must invest in examining with students how privacy policies build culture in
digital spaces. Instructors have a range of local and global privacy policies to choose from,
including the privacy policy for their own college or university. Instructors who venture beyond
familiar institutional privacy policies might consider the ToS documents prescribing power on
DTC-genetics websites because analysis challenges the norms of DRP as a method of resistance
against white-supremacist systems including many biopolitical technologies and the American
law enforcement and justice systems.
Interrogating DRP in the writing classroom includes taking up an approach that values
ethical digital privacy, but also recognizes the complexities in the relationship between ethics
and surveillance. Instructors who incorporate privacy policies for DTC-genetics websites must
emphasize the relationship between individual genetic material (of/from our bodies) and how
scientists at the Human Genome Project described DNA as a public good. Interrogating the
collisions of power between how humans consider bodily privacy and the capitalist values of
DTC-genetics companies helps students understand how the shift from protecting to sharing
personal information online also represents a recalibration of power. Furthermore, it creates
space for students to establish their own values concerning DRP. Recalibration does not
predicate equity or equality, diversity or inclusion, which is why this approach to teaching
writing is critical. Ultimately, taking a feminist approach to interrogating DRP in the teaching of
writing situates DRP as a foundational principle in a society where New Surveillance
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technologies are ubiquitous because it values analyzing how rhetorical power is prescribed in
privacy policies as a way of empowering users, building coalitions, and working towards a more
equitable society.

Privacy Policies as Social Construct in the Writing Classroom
Interrogating DRP in the writing classroom necessitates the incorporation of inclusive,
diverse resources (e.g. course readings, digital tools, interactive spaces) throughout the course
because amplification of these voices reveals how rhetorical power is prescribed asymmetrically
online and how marginalized and multiply-marginalized bodies are impacted unequally when
digital privacy is infringed upon.94 When preparing to teach a course centering DRP, it’s
important to acknowledge the tension between resources produced for and by marginalized and
BIPOC scholars because Big Tech (and American culture) is constructed to cater to a white
supremacist culture. Specifically, instructors might incorporate scholars such as Simone Browne
(2015) and Safiya U. Noble (2018), as well as the Digital Black Lit and Composition (DBLAC)
to explicate this tension. Instructors could introduce Browne’s (2015) Dark Matters: On the
Surveillance of Blackness to chart the long history of racial surveillance in America and as a way
of explaining how many of the methods of surveillance used today mimic those used during
slavery. To understand oppression in the digital sphere, instructors might introduce Noble’s
(2018) Algorithms of Oppression: How Search Engines Reinforce Racism and perform many of
the same searches as classroom activities that Noble performs as part of her study of Google.
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Instructors teaching graduate courses on privacy, surveillance, and Blackness might encourage
their graduate students to take what they have learned beyond the classroom and join a DBLAC
Virtual Writing Group. Ultimately, amplifying the social, economic, and political implications
for users and non-users beyond the hegemonic norm demonstrates not only how rhetorical power
is prescribed asymmetrically, but also how the students themselves are a part of these systems, a
goal of interrogating DRP. Analyzing the genre of the privacy policy—the site where rhetorical
power is prescribed in digital environments—in the writing classroom, specifically the privacy
policies for DTC-genetics websites, reaches this goal.
Interrogating DRP requires a Rhetorical Genre Studies (RGS) approach to the teaching of
writing because it prompts robust analysis that reveals the complexities of rhetorical power
distribution online and the impact on our social systems/lived experiences. As writing studies
scholars Anis S. Bawarshi and Mary Jo Reiff (2010) explain,
In the RGS approach to teaching genre analysis, students learn how to recognize genres
as rhetorical responses to and reflections of the situations in which they are used;
furthermore, students learn how to use genre analysis to participate in and intervene in
situations they encounter. (p. 192)
Courses which center digital privacy for analysis must identify privacy policies as the site for
intervention and examine genre samples, establish genre conventions, perform genre
remediation, and consider, with students, the ways to creatively break genre conventions as they
contend with things like audience, purpose, and context. Performing genre analysis in this way
reveals how the policies which prescribe power online reflect the systemic asymmetrical
distribution of power throughout society. Incorporating privacy policies for DTC-genetics
websites (or any biopolitical technology) exhibits how rhetorical power is harnessed and used to
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support ubiquitous surveillance in America’s white supremacist culture. Moreover, this approach
prompts students to ask questions about their own technology use, to examine the relationship
between state actors and private/public corporations95, and to, hopefully, prompt them to
overcome their apathy about DRP.
As described in earlier chapters, Americans display surveillance apathy about DRP for a
variety of reasons. Some believe they have no information of value to take and use, and about
half of Americans feel like they do not have control over who accesses their information online
(Auxier, Rainie, Anderson, Perrin, Kumar, & Turner, 2019). Indeed, for many students—and
their instructors—their relationship with DRP is a paradox. Susanne Barth and Menno D.T. de
Jong (2017) describe the privacy paradox as when “users claim to be very concerned about their
privacy but do very little to protect their personal data” (p. 1039). How do instructors contend
with and overcome the privacy paradox in the writing classroom? Often times engaging
assignments and energetic attitudes are simply not enough, even when analyzing issues related to
biopolitical technologies, including DTC-genetics. Instead, design courses in a way that prompts
analysis of how power is distributed and situates DRP as a foundational principle of a society
free of white-supremacist regulation.
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Approaches which challenge students to contemplate power, privacy, and surveillance, particularly when

analyzing the relationships between the individual and the state, as well as biopolitical technologies, often draw
upon the work of French philosopher Michel Foucault. Instructors who seek further readings from Foucault on these
topics might begin with Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison (1977) wherein he challenges ideas about
power, surveillance, and punishment and adapts English philosopher Jeremy Bentham’s panopticon (an architectural
design for prisons) to describe contemporary society as a carceral society.
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Even as the privacy paradox exists among users, not all attitudes concerning DRP are
similar, particularly among users of different ages. According to the aforementioned Pew
Research study on digital privacy in the U.S.,
Americans ages 65 and older are more likely than younger adults to say it is acceptable
for law enforcement to use customers’ genetic data to help solve crimes, approve data
collection to assess terrorist threats, and have smart speaker makers share users’ audio
recordings in investigations online. (Auxier, Rainie, Anderson, Perrin, Kumar, & Turner,
2019)
Therefore, younger users, many of whom populate writing classrooms from FYC to advanced
rhetoric and technical communication courses, are primed to focus on the relationship between
rhetorical power and DRP. Yet, as noted in Chapter 4, the rhetoric used in privacy policies
predisposes many users from engaging with them; instead, most users robotically scroll and
consent before clicking submit. How do instructors overcome these complex rhetorical strategies
to reverse engineer the privacy paradox and ignite interest—and, importantly, keep it—when
analyzing such a complex genre?
When engaging students in dialogue about DRP through privacy policies, instructors
should begin by working with students to identify genre conventions, including analyzing how
things like exigence, intention, form, and substance shape the genre and reflect the social actions
captured—and thus the power prescribed (Miller, 2015). Why is this information critical now?
What other genres could this information be presented in effectively? Develop and scaffold lowstakes assignments and activities that allow students to work in the genre and that challenge them
to consider the information they find in a privacy policy in relation to their own position and the
power they hold. How do the ways they interact with the policy mirror their position in society?
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This approach constructs a socio-cultural foundation that reveals the tensions between exigence
and intention, substance and form that genre studies relies upon for analysis; moreover, it
amplifies other dimensions of the genre Carolyn Miller (2015) identifies, like the material and
symbolic, the individual and collectivity. Indeed, interrogating these tensions within the genre of
the privacy policy reveals the places and spaces where vectors of rhetorical power collide
(Crenshaw, 2017). Using privacy policies for DTC-genetics websites for analyzing in the writing
classroom demonstrates how the tension between genre conventions—like individual and
collectivity, and material and symbolic—mimics the tension created by the shift from protecting
personal information online to sharing it. Such analysis allows students to develop skills which
transfer to other courses across the disciplines as they prepare to go out into the world and do
things.
Instructors who take a RGS approach to interrogating DRP in the teaching of writing
must design courses which help students develop skills that transfer beyond the writing
classroom, across the disciplines, and into new writing settings and social situations. Anne
Beaufort (2007) explains that genre knowledge serves as a mental gripper for negotiating new
writing situations and that “teaching genres as learning strategies can provide students with tools
that transfer to multiple contexts” (Bawarshi & Reiff, 2010, p. 191). Beaufort’s description of
genre as a mental gripper affirms many studies which have argued RGS enables a meta-cognitive
awareness.96 Indeed, approaching issues related to DRP and DTC-genetics in the writing
classroom requires such nuance. As the privacy policy is the site for students to intervene in the
asymmetrical distribution of power online, viewing privacy policies as a dynamic rhetorical
genre casts instructors and their students “into the problem space and the typified structures and
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Rhetoric and composition scholar Charles Bazerman (2009) describes this process as cognitive apprenticeship.
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practices of the genre and provide the means of solution” (Bazerman, 2009, p. 291). Ultimately,
an RGS approach to analyzing privacy policies in the writing classroom fosters greater cognitive
growth and helps students develop transferable skills that help overcome the privacy paradox and
establish DRP as a foundational principle for users.

Adaptable Strategies for Implementing Privacy Policies in the Writing Classroom
In their book, Genre: An Introduction to History, Theory, Research, and Pedagogy, Anis
Bawarshi and Mary Jo Reiff (2010) outline four “Guidelines for Analyzing Genres,” that
includes collecting samples of the genres, identifying the scene and describing the situation in
which the genre is used, identifying and describing patterns in the genre’s features, and analyzing
what these patterns reveal about the situation and the scene. This approach stresses “the
interaction between genre and context, guiding students from analysis of the situation to the
genre and then from the genre back to the situation” (Bawarshi & Reiff, 2010, p. 194). One way
to perform analysis and expand understanding of a rhetorical genre is through remediation, or
adapting the content of a text into a new form for a potentially different audience (Alexander &
Rhodes, 2014, p. 60). It is very likely that students and instructors alike are not familiar with
many privacy policies, including those prescribing power on DTC-genetics websites. Therefore,
analyzing and learning about privacy policies requires a multi-pronged approach to remediation
for students.
Every DTC-genetics website has its own privacy policy “written for the express purpose
of protecting a company or website operator from legal damages” which outlines the datacollection practices permissible on the site and governs its use (Beck 2016, p. 70). Students in
composition (including FYC), rhetoric, and technical communication, in addition to those
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studying communications, information technology (IT), and education, are well suited to
investigate these digital policy documents through this assignment sequence because this
technology (and sector) are emerging and, inevitably, will impact them. When performing an
analysis of a privacy policy, begin with heuristics to work through genre conventions: how
audience, exigence, structure, form, and intention work to shape a genre and the social actions it
encapsulates (Miller, 2015, p. 69). Consider which users and non-users does this document
potentially impact. How do specific rhetorical choices impact how critical information is taken
up? What is the intent of the people who write and design these documents, and the companies
that publish them? The goal is to inform remediations that emphasize rhetorical changes students
would implement to make the policy more accessible.
Instructors should carefully craft introductory and low-stakes activities throughout the
assignment sequence in relation to the high-stakes genre remediations. Particularly pertinent
should be the terminological foundation: develop interactive and practical ways to talk through
concepts like digital surveillance, digital privacy, biopolitical, and data collection. Perhaps
instructors could ease student apprehension about studying with a complex genre by working
with a familiar privacy policy first as an introduction to the genre. I would suggest the privacy
policy for their university for instructors who take this approach because it allows students to see
how they are protected (or not protected) at a local level. Many more students engage with social
media platforms than DTC-genetics, so interrogating policies for popular platforms like
Facebook and Instagram or emerging platforms like Tik Tok and talking about their issues with
digital privacy (e.g. Cambridge Analytica) could demonstrate to students how their actions
online already contribute to issues with DRP. When approaching the DTC-genetics privacy
policy for remediation students should highlight the changes they will implement to make the
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policy more transparent and readable. Students can decide on the genre of the remediation after
considering the changes which need to occur; they might produce infographics, flyers, social
media posts, zines, podcasts, public service announcements, documentaries, short videos, and
other genres during this part of the assignment sequence. 97 The following section details an
assignment sequence focusing on multiple genre remediations that center concepts like
temporality, transparency, language, digital surveillance, data usage, and meaningful access.

Privacy Policy Genre Remediation Assignment Sequence
Working with a privacy policy over multiple genre remediations provides students the
opportunity to thoroughly interrogate something they interact with every day to help them better
understand the information in the document and how to assess privacy practices in different
digital spaces. Instructors should decide if they want to adapt this assignment sequence as a unit
(or two) or for an entire course, as both are feasible. An initial remediation of a privacy policy
should center user comprehension and is meant to change the privacy policy’s content into a
more accessible form by considering things like content and audience. Appendix A describes this
assignment which considers the complex jargon in the policy as well as the assumptions the
audience might make based on prior knowledge. A second remediation, which is described in
Appendix B, examines both direct impacts and long-term effects of privacy policies, like digital
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Additionally, students could perform usability tests, hold focus groups, and peer review as they examine the

social, political, and economic implications of digital privacy throughout the assignment sequence.
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redlining.98 While the goal of the remediations is to provide meaningful access99—not just
understanding the text of the policy but also its social, economic, and political impacts—the first
remediation focuses on making the policy more accessible to wider audiences, including those
audiences who are most vulnerable and most affected. Analyzing privacy rhetorics within the
privacy policy before the first remediation demonstrates how these documents address complex
concepts such as data collection and use to prescribe power asymmetrically—issues which are
critical to the second remediation. The goal is to work through this rhetoric to inform a
remediation that is more effective for various audiences and to help students see themselves as a
part of a constellation of users who maintain algorithmic citizenship.
James Bridle (2015) describes algorithmic citizenship as a new form of citizenship where
a user’s allegiance and rights are contemplated and manipulated by algorithmic processes using
data captured from their internet usage. The privacy policies for DTC-genetics websites
represent a microcosm of a user’s global algorithmic citizenship because they collect data and
use similar processing techniques which can marginalize certain bodies. Yet, being an
algorithmic citizen is not unlike being a citizen of the U.S. or any other country. There are
certain rules and regulations users must follow or they will face scrutinization, particularly when
DRP is infringed. When instructors prompt students to think about algorithmic citizenship
theoretically they create a way for students to learn about and acknowledge that algorithmic
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broadband Internet to certain users. Digital redlining is examined more robustly later in this chapter.
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Rhetoric and composition scholar Cynthia L. Selfe (1999) explains that meaningful access requires meaningful

participation by users and that these technological tools we required for participation should be free to citizens in our
society.
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surveillance, which is often outlined in privacy policies, maintains disproportionate implications
for marginalized and multiply-marginalized bodies.100 Furthermore, since DTC-genetics
companies want to make profit, pointing out how these companies do not really support social
justice initiatives and instead hope to make money off of genetic material helps students see that
the social, political, and economic implications of their algorithmic citizenship are critical to all
discussions of DRP and New Surveillance.
When approaching the privacy policy for an initial remediation, prompt students to
highlight the rhetorical changes they would incorporate to make the document more effective for
various audiences, or other algorithmic citizens. Since the privacy policies for DTC-genetics
websites do not directly impact students (unless they have submitted their DNA to a DTCgenetics company), ask them what they would do to make the document’s information more
accessible and how they would explain the long-term implications of using this technology.
Instructors might have students provide this information in reports or through rhetorical analysis.
Furthermore, prompt students to consider rhetoric related to the temporality, transparency, and
language of the privacy policy.

Temporality. Temporality refers to analyzing when the privacy policy was published
and/or updated. Understanding the temporal aspects of a privacy policy is important
because analysis will reveal not only the date of publication, but also allows for
consideration of the ever-changing technological landscape. Questions to consider when
analyzing the temporal aspects of a privacy policy include: When was the privacy policy

100

Workshops are one way to continue to raise awareness among teachers about the importance of issues related to
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published? When was the last time the policy was updated? (Studying the differences
between iterations of privacy policies can yield valuable insight.) Who is most affected
by temporality? What technological advancements have occurred in society that now
supersede the privacy policy? What policy changes have occurred in society that now
supersede the privacy policy?101

Transparency. Transparency refers to analyzing the ways information is relayed to users
in a privacy policy. Understanding transparency is important because companies often
utilize various rhetorical strategies to obfuscate information from users; these strategies
include burying information through a series of hyperlinks, supplying multiple
conditional and supporting documents tangential to the actual privacy policy, and/or by
making the document so long no user engages with it. Questions to consider when
analyzing the transparency of a privacy policy include: what methods of data collection
are inaccessible to users? What relationships does the company that publishes the privacy
policy maintain with other companies and state actors or government entities? What are
the potential trajectories of your data once it is collected?

Language. Language refers to analyzing the specific words, figures of speech, and jargon
used to relay information to users in the privacy policy. Understanding language use is
important because often times technologists and technical communicators use language
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designed and taught at Illinois State University (ISU) revealed the privacy policy prescribing power on ReggieNet,
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that veils how power is distributed asymmetrically. Questions to consider when analyzing
the language used in a privacy policy include: What rhetorical arguments are formed by
the policy? How are rhetorical appeals (ethos, pathos, logos) incorporated in the
document? What complex jargon is used and why? What rhetorical implications do these
words and concepts mean for users and non-users? Which users are most affected by
adverse implications?

Answering questions related to temporality, transparency, and language helps students develop a
sense of comfort with analyzing the different dimensions of privacy policies as they contend with
what it means to be an engaged algorithmic citizen navigating the complexities of different
digital ecosystems. With a critical foundation constructed through the work done in the first
remediation, students are prepared to move on to a second remediation which focuses analysis on
how data is collected and used, as well as the long-term implications of asymmetrical rhetorical
power online.
The exchange of personal information for accessing biopolitical technologies and
services, like DTC-genetics, is among the most complex issues to address when considering how
and why data generated online is used. With this in mind, have students move to address fartherreaching problems which grow out of issues related to temporality, transparency, and language in
a second remediation. For example, challenge students to consider how rhetoric in privacy
policies impacts digital surveillance, data usage, and meaningful access.

Digital Surveillance. Contemplating digital surveillance means understanding how users
are regarded and attended to online. Often times, the goal of digital surveillance is
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control: to manipulate the user (who is also a consumer) into doing things like purchasing
a certain product or endorsing a certain political candidate. Digital tracking technologies
like Cookies are the most prolific form of digital surveillance. A cookie is a seemingly
insignificant piece of data that records a user’s browsing history to optimize their
experience online. As detailed in Chapter 4, the privacy policies for DTC-genetics
websites are critically important sites to learn about how digital-tracking technologies are
implemented on a specific website and across various websites. For example, the privacy
policy for Ancestry is accompanied by a Cookie Policy which explains how Pixels and
software development kits (SKDs) impact users on the site. Further investigation reveals
how the ways certain users are tracked and surveilled mimics the ways certain bodies are
controlled in American society.

Data Usage. Prompting analysis of how DTC-genetics companies use data once it is
collected means mapping potential trajectories based on the uses outlined in the privacy
policy. This means not only understanding who within the DTC-genetics company can
use your data, but also understanding that corporate partnerships, government
compliance, and other sources of profit are catalysts for digital surveillance and unethical
uses of data. The relationship between DTC-genetics companies and law enforcement
agencies is scrutinized throughout this project because genetic material collected by
companies like 23andMe and GEDmatch were not intended to be used for digital
surveillance until the precedent was set in 2018. Other pertinent questions concerning
data usage relate to value, proportionality, and revenue. Does this surveillance strategy
serve the goals of the community, the object of surveillance, and/or the data collector?
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Does balance exist between the significance of the data usage and the personal and
communal cost of the means of surveillance? And “is the personal data collected used for
profit without permission from, or benefit to, the person who provided it?” (Marx, 1998,
p. 174).

Meaningful Access. Contemplating issues of access is one of the primary ways to make
connections between digital technologies, DRP, and the history of racial oppression in
America. Cynthia L. Selfe (1999) explains access is fundamental for meaningful
participation in the digital age, which includes ubiquitous New Surveillance technologies.
Adam J. Banks (2006) explains that meaningful access is unattainable for African
Americans because many lack the critical literacies to meaningfully participate in society
let alone information exchanges online. For example, consider the consequences of
redlining on user actions online. Redlining concerns limiting resources for specific
groups of people, traditionally racial minorities; digital redlining is when this practice
occurs online and concerns limiting access to information, technology, services, and the
broadband Internet. Thinking about and discussing access and redlining in the writing
classroom reveals not only “who has access but also about what kind of access they have,
how it’s regulated, and how good it is” (Gilliard & Culik, 2016). This means discerning
how privacy policies could be remediated to help users better understand how and to
which users they distribute rhetorical power. Since digital redlining creates easily
observable inequitable experiences, this approach to teaching with and about privacy
policies and DRP pushes students to consider how this frequent practice extends beyond
actions online and into users’ everyday lives.
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Investigating rhetoric about digital surveillance, data usage, and access in privacy policies helps
students transfer the knowledge they are making together in the classroom about how DRP
works and about how unethical surveillance occurs in a way which reveals the social, political,
and economic implications on different bodies in society. Furthermore, the techniques used to
investigate a DTC-genetics privacy policy are transferable to most privacy policies and other
ToS documents. For example, analyzing the privacy policy for the LMS for your college or
university is an appealing proposition considering the local impact on students. Additionally, the
policies for mainstream internet search engines like Google and social media platforms like
Facebook, which are often criticized for mismanaging DRP, are sites ripe for analysis and
remediation.
The privacy policy remediation assignments sequence described herein is specific, but
instructors are encouraged to adapt and transform them into assignments which work best for
their classrooms and for their student populations. For example, instead of centering temporality
instructors might choose instead to focus on things like visual rhetoric or usability; instead of
issues of data usage, instructors could focus on how methods of data collection and Internet
tracking technologies detailed in certain privacy policies impact Internet advertising. Moreover,
instructors might choose to adapt these strategies into a collaborative writing assignment or to
work with a community partner who maintains a privacy policy for their website. Instructors
who transform these assignments into collaborative writing assignments should consider William
Duffy’s (2020) strategies of surplus composition, turnaround writing, and nonattribution
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composing102, as critical ways of helping students “discover the importance of objective
dimensions of an emerging text and learn how to ask questions about and engage the resistances
it poses” (p. 128). Furthermore, instructors who pursue working with a community partner on
their privacy policy should choose a minority-owned business seeking expansion or a
philanthropic organization whose mission includes social justice. If you do find a community
partner in this mold with which to work, carefully take up Maori decolonial studies scholar Linda
Tuhiwai Smith’s (2012) approach to community research which foregrounds learning from
community members’ experiences and wisdom.103 Indeed, instructors who engage with a
community partner must be careful not to colonize or appropriate their partner’s knowledge and
work.

Assessment and DRP in the Writing Classroom
Learning outcomes vary across classrooms, programs, and institutions, but instructors
who choose to teach about DRP with DTC-genetics privacy policies should focus on critical
rhetorical objectives related to genre analysis and performance, cultural and ethical context, and
demonstrating transferable knowledge. Focusing on each of these objectives when assessing
remediations of privacy policies in the writing classroom helps students learn and master these

102

William Duffy (2020) describes surplus composition, nonattribution composing, and turnaround writing in his

book Beyond Conversation: Collaboration and the Production of Writing. Surplus composition is “all the writing
one does that is related to but not the primary writing of a particular project” (p.128). Turnaround writing hones in
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concepts. Importantly, the magnitude of the grade matters; genre remediations of privacy policies
should be among the highest, if not the highest, weighted assignment during a writing course
because of the knowledge of the complex concepts and rigor of writing required to perform the
work. Instructors should create and scaffold various lower-stakes assignments and activities for
students to complete throughout a sequence, unit, or course which augment the aforementioned
learning outcomes.104
While scholars in rhetoric and composition have long theorized the nature of genre,105
instructors should emphasize that privacy policies are a social construct (Miller, 2015).
Assessment should focus on how well students analyze and perform in the genre of the privacy
policy during their remediations. Bawarshi and Reiff (2010) describe working in a genre as a
performance within defined conventions and account for both the shared nature of a genre and
for variations, or uniqueness, of genre performances. As Amy DeVitt (2015) notes,
Each performance of a genre demonstrates its degree of prototypicality, disciplinary
membership, historical moment, authorial identity, and many other qualities shared with
other members of its category. Yet all of those sources of variation gathered together
cannot account for the unique text that an author performs in a unique moment in a
unique rhetorical situation, its unique action carrying out a unique communicative
purpose through a unique process. In the end, each text is a unique performance. (p. 45)
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Indeed, privacy policies are a complex genre and the ones prescribing power on DTC-genetics
websites offer students the opportunity to perform in a genre with implications for their society.
Assessing how well students perform in a genre like a privacy policy challenges them to
understand the rhetorical context and inequity of digital surveillance; moreover, it helps them
develop transferable knowledge they can use when performing in other genres in other
disciplines and as they go out and make an impact on the world.
As detailed throughout this project, the ways users contend with DRP and experience
digital surveillance vary based on their positionality and this is no different for students in
writing classrooms. For example, at ISU only 27% of students come from underrepresented
groups (University Metrics of Excellence). Many of the students share similar white,
heteronormative experiences with both DRP and digital surveillance. 106 However, instructors at
more diverse campuses, especially those teaching BIPOC students and at Historically Black
Colleges and Universities (HBCUs), Tribal Colleges and Universities (TCUs), and HispanicServing Institutions (HSIs) will encounter very different student experiences—antenarratives—
with DRP and digital surveillance than the students at ISU because of the history of unethical
surveillance of othered bodies in America. An antenarrative “forges new paths forward and
emboldens [technical communication’s] objectives to unabashedly embrace social justice and
inclusivity as part of its core (rather than marginal or optional) narrative” (Jones, Moore, and
Walton, 2016, p. 212). Therefore, instructors who choose to teach about DRP and/or with
privacy policies must demonstrate cultural awareness of how antenarratives about privacy—
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digital or otherwise—surveillance, and ethics differ across cultures and communities and how
well students demonstrate the knowledge of this in their remediations.
Incorporating privacy policies for biopolitical technologies like DTC-genetics in the
writing classroom offers students the opportunity to interrogate how privacy is interpreted and
enacted across cultures and assessment should center on how well students consider this in their
remediations. Moreover, amplifying injustices brought upon by using DTC-genetics for digital
surveillance positions discussions of social justice with law enforcement and science to help
students learn how their actions online can lead to the asymmetrical distribution of rhetorical
power in American society. When taking up a social justice approach in the classroom, Angela
M. Haas and Michelle F. Eble (2018) challenge scholars to critically analyze “systems of and
rhetorics from hegemonic power—and how and why they have historically shaped how we
regard specific cultures and communities in relation to their technical and scientific expertise, or
lack thereof” (p. 12). Teaching about DRP with privacy policies for DTC-genetics websites
offers students the opportunity to learn about hegemonic power, therefore assessment should
focus on how well students understand the rhetorical context and how well they contend with
and equivalize the distribution of power in their remediations because it changes their practices
when they engage online and helps them learn to be more culturally-aware, socially-just users
and citizens.
Writing courses included in Writing Across the Curriculum (WAC) programs, and even
Writing in the Disciplines (WID) programs which magnify disciplinary specialization, often
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maintain learning objectives concerning knowledge transfer.107 Transfer theory hypothesizes
knowledge provided in one context can be repurposed in other contexts (Bransford, Brown, &
Cocking, 2000; Andrus, Mitchler, & Tinberg, 2019). The skills students develop must be
transferable to other genres and knowledge transfer should be assessed by how well students
contend with threshold concepts in their remediations. Threshold concepts “provide a productive
frame for faculty to productively engage with questions about the purposes of [an assignment]
and to consider how to support students as they work to achieve these purposes” (Adler-Kassner,
Majewski, & Koshnick, 2012). Linda Adler-Kassner and Elizabeth Wardle (2015) deliver thirtyseven threshold concepts like writing is a social rhetorical act 108 and others related to things like
audience, purpose, and genre “not as canonical statement, but rather as an articulation of shared
beliefs providing multiple ways of helping us name what we know and how we can use what we
know in the service of writing” (p. xix). Instructors who teach about DRP with privacy policies
should highlight knowledge transfer as a learning objective because it helps students to take up
the skills they develop in the writing classroom and deploy them when performing in other
genres in other classes, in their jobs, and in their careers.
As mentioned earlier, many students have minimal experience with privacy policies
because most do not read them and because hardly any have performed in the genre. Admittedly,
unless students are planning careers as technical communicators, technologists, or entrepreneurs,
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they will probably not perform in this genre again. Even the entrepreneurs will more than likely
take a neoliberal, capitalist approach to producing a privacy policy for their start-up and
outsource the work as they seek to establish corporate relationships and community partnerships.
Yet, as Irene L. Clark and Andrea Hernandez (2011) explain, “when students acquire genre
awareness, they are not only learning how to write in a particular genre. They gain insight into
how a genre fulfills a rhetorical purpose” (p. 66-67). Thus, while the purposes of the genres in
which students will work in the future will change, their ability to identify purpose—and other
threshold concepts—allows them to perform effectively. Therefore, the assessment of knowledge
transfer is critical in the writing classroom because it helps students see how the knowledge they
make working in this niche genre is applicable to many of the genres and writing situations they
will encounter in the future.

Conclusion
Interrogating how power is distributed asymmetrically in the privacy policies prescribing
user actions online reveals how these policies form identities, construct communities, and build
cultures in digital spaces. Taking up and implementing a feminist methodology for interrogating
DRP in the writing classroom requires self-awareness, recognizes privacy is reliant on the
context in which surveillance occurs, understands privacy policies maintain violent implications
for othered bodies, and values digital privacy while recognizing the complex relationship
between ethics and New Surveillance technologies. Understanding privacy policies as a social
construct, a dynamic genre with the potential to impact an infinite constellation of users and nonusers, is necessary in order to register the social, political, and economic implications on
marginalized and multiply-marginalized bodies brought upon by actions that occur online.
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Analyzing rhetoric in the policies associated with temporality, transparency, and language
constructs a foundation for students to build upon as they contend with how rhetorical power is
distributed asymmetrically online and in the larger society, as well as their own sense of online
activity as users, or their algorithmic citizenship.
Introducing DTC-genetics privacy policies and analyzing how they marginalize certain
users—thus questioning their ethicality—in the writing classroom is a form of resistance to the
systemic oppression of marginalized bodies by vectors of hegemonic power like the American
law enforcement and justice systems. As students intensely study, analyze, and remediate the
privacy policies for DTC-genetics websites they can learn more about issues related to digital
surveillance, data usage, and meaningful access. Moreover, centering DTC-genetics with
unethical surveillance and inequitable access contributes to a social-justice approach to teaching
writing because it amplifies marginalized experiences with an oppressive biopolitical technology
to demonstrate how certain bodies are oppressed in American society. Therefore, when assessing
student work instructors must find proof of this acknowledgement along with demonstration by
the student of the ability to effectively perform in the genre and to explain how this knowledge is
transferable.
Ultimately, this approach to teaching writing situates DRP as a foundational principle of
a society free of hegemonic regulation. Before dismissing this idealization, consider that the
most efficient way to achieve it is to teach users about the significant impact DRP has on lived
experiences and to prompt them to enact change in their own actions and in their own
communities. Therefore, the classroom—specifically the writing classroom—is the ideal site to
perform this work because it constructs a coalition of users and non-users with the potential to
impact change. Rebecca Walton, Kristen R. Moore, and Natasha N. Jones (2019) explain that
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through “intersectional, coalitional approaches [to technical and professional communication
(TPC)], we can address issues of inequality and oppression” (p. 133). When students learn about
DRP in the writing classroom, a coalition is created of people who value digital privacy in their
own lives and actions online, who are culturally aware of the dynamism of the privacysurveillance continuum and its violent impact on marginalized and multiply-marginalized bodies,
and who want to build a society where surveillance is ethical, not ubiquitous, and where power is
redistributed symmetrically as a form of resistance against traditional hegemonic systems and
infrastructures. In Chapter 6, I describe the implications of this project on rhetoric, composition,
and technical communication, as well as future projects related to biopolitical technologies and
privacy policies, and further detail how scholars and activists can recognize, reveal, reject, and
replace current values about digital privacy and instill DRP as a foundational principle of a new
society free of hegemonic rule.
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CHAPTER VI: CODA

I detail some of the ways that multiply-marginalized and Black, Indigenous, and People
of Color (BIPOC) citizens face oppression at the hands of law enforcement in America in this
project. As I have argued, the oppression multiply-marginalized and BIPOC people face from the
police is amplified when biopolitical technologies like direct-to-consumer (DTC) genetics are
repurposed and implemented as a part of the American law enforcement surveillance apparatus.
Furthermore, the implications of using DTC-genetics for police surveillance does not end with
certain bodies in American society, but extends to impact everyone as DNA is what connects
every human being. Ultimately, using DTC-genetics as a police surveillance tool brings to life a
dystopian future ruled by an authoritarian surveillance state. In this Coda, I explain what I hope
readers take away from this project. I detail some of the implications this project has for digital
rhetorics and for intersectional feminist approaches to digital privacy and present questions to
consider for further research studies. I explain how I believe that teaching can be a tool to
combat injustice.
After reading this project, I hope that readers understand the importance of amplifying
DRP in American society. As explained throughout, the way to do so is through education and
activism, and by taking an intersectional feminist approach to analysis and resources.
Furthermore, I hope that readers understand that police violence against multiply-marginalized
bodies is a systemic issue in America and that using DTC-genetics for surveillance perpetuates
the white-supremacist systems and infrastructures of the country. I hope readers understand that
racist systems like Jim Crow Laws and segregation are not oppressive structures lost because of
social progress, but systems that have been reimagined and integrated into the world’s digital
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infrastructure through things like digital redlining and DNA dragnets. Additionally, I hope
readers understand that the way to overcome oppression—and to end the use of DTC-genetics
for police surveillance—is to through coalition building. As such, emerging coalitions need a
sustainable way to continually develop dynamic, multi-dimensional resources for teaching in
order to amplify DRP as a value of a socially-just society
Teachers might set out to build a coalition in their classrooms, but scholars and
instructors interested in digital privacy and social equity must work as a coalition, too, and they
need resources. I developed the Digital Rhetorical Privacy Collective 109 as an interactive,
coalitional resource that features activities, assignments, and reading lists that contribute to an
intersectional approach to teaching about DRP in writing classrooms. As this coalitional resource
develops in the coming months I will seek out and secure funding through grants and other forms
of non-profit revenue to expand this project. Specifically, I plan to apply as an individual scholar
for funding opportunities through the National Council of Teachers of English (NCTE) and the
Conference on College Composition and Communication (CCCC). Furthermore, I plan to seek
out funding from federal sources like the National Endowment for the Humanities (NEH) and
state-level entities like Illinois Humanities which require tax exemption through the non-profit
organization I incorporated in 2020. The Digital Rhetorical Privacy Collective is a project I
undertake to continue to better understand—and assist others in understanding—how important
DRP is not only to ending oppression in American society but also to building an equitable world
for all.
This project extends current conversations about privacy and surveillance in digital
rhetorics that focus on data collection and use. Understanding how companies use data that could
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potentially identify users and non-users is a pertinent concern of this project, and should continue
to be examined by scholars in digital rhetorics. In their investigation of wearables, Jason Tham
and Anne Hill Duin (2020) question: “How might we best make transparent to instructors and
students the many contexts within which data is collected and used? How might we problematize
data ownership and work to build informed data generators?” (p. 108). I chose to focus on DTCgenetics in this project because I am interested in how companies use biometric data. Moreover,
I wanted to use my proximity to power and privilege to perform work that dismantless white
supremacy in America, so I decided to argue against the use of DTC-genetics by law
enforcement—a white-supremacist system. Digital rhetorics scholars can utilize the
intersectional feminist methodology for interrogating DRP outlined in Chapter 2 and used
throughout this project to undertake projects which critiques how data is collected and used.
Scholars should focus on facial recognition technology and iris recognition technology
developed by companies like IrisGuard as these are strategies for surveillance that rely on
biometric data collection and use. Scholars interested in the relationship between private
companies (like DTC-genetics) and state-actors (like the police) should focus attention on other
digital technologies that play a role in identifying and prosecuting suspects, specifically bodycam
technologies developed by companies like Axon.
This project extends current conversations about privacy and surveillance in digital
rhetorics that focus on access and power. As explained in Chapter 1 and Chapter 5, technological
access is not equitable and meaningful access does not only refer to a person’s material access to
a technology (Banks, 2006). Digital rhetorics scholars can use the intersectional approach to
interrogating DRP herein to analyze other biometric technologies to understand how they restrict
access and regulate power based on intersecting identity categories. Which users have access and
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why? Who is prescribed power and why? Is power distribution asymmetrical? This project
focuses on DTC-genetics because the technology represents a shift from protecting data online to
sharing it (Chow-White, 2012). However, there are other biometric technologies digital rhetorics
scholars can analyze, like the facial and iris recognition technologies mentioned above, as well as
fingerprint and voice biometrics developed by companies like AuthenTrend 110, Veridas111, and
Aware112.
One way to analyze how data is collected and used, as well as to interrogate concepts like
access and power, is to examine the privacy policies and other ToS documents prescribing power
online. This project engages with the privacy policies prescribing power on DTC-genetics
websites to reveal how rhetoric related to temporality, transparency, data usage, digital
surveillance, and access influence user attitudes about DRP. Scholars in digital rhetorics should
revise and add to these criteria just as they revise and add to an intersectional feminist
methodology for interrogating DRP for analysis at the sites they study. In Chapter 5, I posit that
to interrogate temporality, instructors and students might ask: What technological advancements
have occurred in society that now supersede the privacy policy? What policy changes have
occurred in society that now supersede the privacy policy? Technological advancements and
policy changes are not the only things evolving, as attitudes about DRP will evolve over time,
too. Scholars interested in understanding changing attitudes about DRP might consider: What
individual, community, or mass invasions of DRP have influenced user attitudes? How do new
or repurposed technologies and/or digital spaces influence how users think about DRP?
110

AuthenTrend is a company that uses fingerprint authentification to improve cybersecurity measures.

111

Veridas is a company that offers adaptable identity verification solutions for clients.

112

Aware is a company that offers SDKs as well as fingerprint, face, iris, and voice matching services since 1992.

154

This project reveals how the use of DTC-genetics for police surveillance impacts bodies
differently. In the epilogue of Privacy Matters: Conversations about Surveillance within and
Beyond the Classroom113, Dànielle Nicole DeVoss (2020) asks: “How do we address the fact that
certain conditions of surveillance affect different bodies and different digital presences
differently? How do we navigate the complex relationship we have within networks of
surveillance, privacy, and our desire to connect across social media spaces?” (p. 172-73). As
mentioned in Chapter 1, this project builds upon DeVoss’s questions by asking: do users want
DTC-genetics to be repurposed for surveillance by the police? The use of DTC-genetics by the
police is not the beginning of law enforcement using digital and/or biopolitical technologies to
control certain bodies, but it is a landmark moment because it represents both how power can be
recalibrated when a technology is repurposed as well as an egregious violation of DRP abetted
by the relationship between a company and a state actor. Digital rhetorics scholars should
continue to interrogate DTC-genetics companies—and all Big Tech companies—but particularly
those who maintain relationships (e.g. contracts) with the American government because other
technologies will be repurposed and used for bodily control by the police. Approaching this
research with an intersectional feminist approach for interrogating DRP in the future positions
scholars to interrogate how collisions of power among different stakeholders impacts users
differently in America.
I intend for future scholars interested in intersectionality and feminism to revise and build
upon the intersectional feminist methodology for interrogating DRP presented in Chapter 2 and
used throughout this project. Since this approach identifies and values intersectional experiences
with DRP to amplify the experiences of multiply-marginalized users and non-users, scholars
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should analyze intersecting identity categories beyond the race, gender, and socioeconomic
status categories examined in this project. Future research project could consider how
neurodivergent users understand and experience DRP? And, what about non-users, like the
criminals identified using DTC-genetics? Future projects might examine how technologies
(especially those that are repurposed) that rely on biometric data collection like facial and iris
recognition technology impact bodies differently. Furthermore, this approach interrogates how
power is prescribed asymmetrically online in privacy policies. Future research endeavors should
always consider which stakeholders have more power and why. This will reveal where collisions
of power occur (Crenshaw, 2017). Moreover, dismantling asymmetrical power online through
coalitional action amplifies DRP. It is my hope that scholars take on this work to situate DRP as
a foundational principle of a society free of white-patriarchal regulation.
One way to amplify the importance of DRP is through classroom instruction that
magnifies its importance and situates it as a principle of a socially-just society. This instruction
must come from scholars and instructors working in rhetoric and composition, as well as in areas
that are adjacent to and overlap with rhetoric like technical communication; indeed, many
scholars see themselves as working simultaneously within and on the fringes of each of these
often interdisciplinary fields. Instructors teaching first-year-composition (FYC), upper- and
intermediate-level writing courses, digital rhetorics courses, and technical communication, as
well as those teaching in the computer sciences, are primed to introduce DRP and to interrogate
ethical issues concening digital privacy and surveillance. 114 Importantly, introducing these topics
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works towards a socially-just, antri-racist approach to the teaching of writing by challenging
teachers and students to contend with the impact of race and racism on society. But, how do
instructors move from teaching about digital privacy and talking about oppression in the
classroom to actually replacing oppressive, white-supremacist systems and technologies? As
explained in Chapter 5, I posit developing assignments like public-facing arguments so that the
work students performs could115 maintain a trajectory beyond the classroom. Doing so cultivates
a coalition of students, many (if not all) of whom are users who maintain some sort of digital
presence whether it is on social media platforms like Instagram or Tik Tok or in workflow spaces
like Slack for their job or the Learning Management System (LMS) for their university.
The main goal of this project is to reveal how repurposing DTC-genetics for police
surveillance is an unethical invasion of privacy. When websites and services like Ancestry are
purchased by conglomerates like The Blackstone Group and 23andMe partners with a multinational pharmaceutical company like Almirall, users must be proactive in their pursuits to end
injustice because the values of these entities are rooted in financial growth, not equity.
Furthermore, the division between law enforcement (and those who assume law enforcement
will support them) and BIPOC citizens, and Americans generally, expands with each racist
epithet, erroneous traffic stop, and murderous chokehold performed by a police officer. My
proximity to power as someone who practices allyship, someone whose praxis continues to

White Institution (PWI) contributes to oppression. Consider Nicole Hannah-Jones’s decision (noted in Chapter 1) to
reject her oppressors at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill and join Howard University, an HBCU,
counteracts white supremacy.
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expand and evolve, and my positionality as a graduate student completing a terminal degree
stations me to enter responsibly into these conversations with the goal of revealing the unethical
use of DTC-genetics for law enforcement surveillance and working to build a coalition of
scholars and users who reject inequitable practices.
To me, one aspect of recognizing, rejecting, revealing, and replacing (Walton, Moore, &
Jones, 2019) inequity and injustice through coalitional work means incorporating a call-to-action
upon which others can actively reject the injustice. Thus, I mean for this project to serve as a
call-to-action to make change together by boycotting the DTC-genetics companies who work
with law enforcement agencies. Based on my proximity to power and privilege, I consider it my
responsibility as a both a citizen and a scholar dedicated to an equitable future to reveal that the
DTC-genetics industry contributes to the matrix of domination (Collins, 2002) constantly
crafting American society. Other rhetoric, composition, and technical communication scholars
must follow suit because the DTC-genetics industry abets police violence in America, which
Americans already know disproportionately impacts multiply-marginalized and BIPOC bodies
and communities. Yet, this dissertation is not enough—especially as the DTC-genetics industry
is set to expand over the next decade.
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APPENDIX A: PRIVACY POLICY REMEDIATION ASSIGNMENT

Privacy Policy Remediation Assignment
Course Name and Number • Semester and Year

Due Date
State the dude date for the first privacy policy genre remediation here. Instructors should list
other important dates here, specifically dates for any workshops or peer review.

Submission Guidelines
Please submit your Privacy Policy Remediation Assignment as an attachment via our university
LMS by the due date.

Purpose
The purpose of this assignment is to develop a sense of how privacy policies function as a genre
and to explore their rhetorical implications on your own lived experience, particularly your
experiences with digital privacy.

Deliverable
Remediated Privacy Policy: each student will remediate the privacy policy for a DTC-genetics
website like Ancestry, 23andMe, or Helix. If you are unsure if the privacy policy is appropriate,
you can check with me or you can use one from the pre-approved list of privacy policies
available on our university LMS. The length of the remediation is to be determined by the
student. Consider all potential audiences for your remediated privacy policy for this assignment.

Instructions
To complete this Privacy Policy Remediation Assignment, review the privacy policy for a DTCgenetics company (a pre-approved list can be found under the Resources tab on our LMS). Then,
remediate the privacy policy (or specific sections of the privacy policy) based on classroom
discussions and course readings to amplify content related to temporality, transparency, and
language. The goal is highlight things we have talked about in class in the document by rewriting
it to include language which promotes digital privacy and restricts unethical surveillance.
Ultimately, your remediated privacy policy should be more accessible, usable, and clear for a
variety of audiences. This assignment is not an essay. You are working in a completely different
genre: the privacy policy. Feel free to be creative, but make sure you can defend each of your
rhetorical decisions. If you have questions concerning this assignment or choosing a privacy
policy, please reach out.

Assessment
Assessment for the Privacy Policy Remediation Assignment includes proof that you thought
about the privacy policy being remediated; the successful genre remediation of the privacy
policy to highlight issues of temporality, transparency, and language; proof that you thought
about the impact of digital privacy on different cultures; knowledge of genre conventions of a
privacy policy.
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Citation Guidelines
If you cite anything in your remediated privacy policy, do so using the guidelines you will work
with in your future careers (MLA, APA, etc.).
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APPENDIX B: SECOND PRIVACY POLICY REMEDIATION

Second Privacy Policy Remediation
Course Name and Number • Semester and Year

Due Date
State the dude date for the second privacy policy genre remediation here. Instructors should list
other important dates here, specifically dates for any workshops or peer review.

Submission Guidelines
Please submit your Second Privacy Policy Remediation as an attachment via our university LMS
by the due date.

Purpose
The purpose of this assignment is to develop a sense of how privacy policies prescribe power
online and to explore their rhetorical implications on your own lived experience with digital
privacy as well as the experiences of others.

Deliverable
Second Remediated Privacy Policy: each student will remediate the privacy policy for a DTCgenetics website like Ancestry, 23andMe, or Heli. You can continue to work with the same
privacy policy used for the first genre remediation, or you can use one from the pre-approved list
of privacy policies available on our university LMS. The length of the remediation is to be
determined by the student. Consider all potential audiences for your remediated privacy policy
for this assignment.

Instructions
To complete this Privacy Policy Remediation Assignment, review the privacy policy for a DTCgenetics company (a pre-approved list can be found under the Resources tab on our LMS). Then,
build upon your previous remediation as well as classroom discussions and course readings to
amplify content in the privacy policy related digital surveillance, data usage, and meaningful
access. The goal is highlight things we have talked about in class in the document by rewriting it
to include language which promotes digital privacy and restricts unethical surveillance.
Ultimately, your remediated privacy policy should be more accessible, usable, and clear for a
variety of audiences. This assignment is not an essay. You are working in a completely different
genre: the privacy policy. Feel free to be creative, but make sure you can defend each of your
rhetorical decisions. If you have questions concerning this assignment or choosing a privacy
policy, please reach out.

Assessment
Assessment for the Privacy Policy Remediation Assignment includes proof that you thought
about the privacy policy being remediated; the successful genre remediation of the privacy
policy to highlight issues of digital surveillance, data usage, and meaningful access; proof that
you thought about the impact of digital privacy on different cultures; knowledge of genre
conventions of a privacy policy.
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Citation Guidelines
If you cite anything in your remediated privacy policy, do so using the guidelines you will work
with in your future careers (MLA, APA, etc.).
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